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This dissertation examines the impact of emerging transnational institutions on 
contentious politics in an authoritarian context. Many theorists have noted that the 
emerging governing architecture at the supranational level weakens the authority of 
nation states and opens up political participation to a wider range of non-state actors in 
areas such as health, environment, labor, and corporate behavior. However, why, how, 
and with what consequences such changes at the transnational level affect domestic 
politics remains poorly understood. This dissertation proposes a new conceptualization 
of the mechanisms that transmit global precepts to domestic politics. It argues that, 
beyond supplying opportunities and resources to activist actors and punishing coercive 
states, transnational institutions shape the cultural rules and organizational models that 
dictate the forms of local mobilization and state repression in domestic institutions.  
This dissertation demonstrates this conflict-centered institutional framework 
through an investigation of the consequences of the growth of transnational AIDS 
institutions for the AIDS movement in China. Drawing on a combination of institutional 
ethnography and archival and interview data, this study analyzes the historical trajectory 
of AIDS activism in China—from the failed early initiatives around male 
homosexuality of the 1990s, to its dramatic rise surrounding contaminated blood issues 
in rural areas from 1999–2003, to its expansion from 2004–2007 and finally, to its shift 
towards a sexual-identity-based activism and decline from 2008–2012. Far from arising 
	   xvi	  
independently, Chinese AIDS activism received substantial support from transnational 
AIDS institutions against ever tightening state control. Transnational engagement has 
generated an unprecedented rise of Chinese grassroots community organizations in 
public health. Rather than simply helping to move this domestic movement forward 
along its own trajectory, I argue that transnational AIDS institutions transformed the 
very configuration of AIDS activist actors on the one hand, and the operation of 
authoritarian state repression on the other hand. This dissertation examines how these 
two mechanisms: (1) alternately mobilized and demobilized various constituencies of 
the local AIDS movement along lines of class, gender, and sexuality; and (2) 
strengthened the political apparatus of authoritarian state power. The shape of those 
























Introduction: The Paradox of AIDS Activism in China 
 
 
In May 2001, the New York Times declared Dr. Gao Yaojie, a 74-year-old physician and 
activist, an “AIDS Crusader” and described her work: 
[She] help[ed] poor farmers in Henan Province who became infected with HIV 
in the 1990s through selling their blood at collection stations whose unsanitary 
practices fostered the spread of disease. The HIV infections are a highly 
sensitive topic, because health officials in Henan often ran the collection stations 
and profited from them. For the most part, local officials have sought to quash 
discussion, prohibiting local journalists from covering it and warning Dr. Gao 
not to speak out. But the HIV-infected farmers have themselves become more 
vocal. This week, a group of seven patients, including three children, traveled 
from Wenlou Village to Beijing, hoping for treatment and publicity about their 
plight.1 
Around the early 2000s, China’s blood contamination scandal became widely 
publicized by international media and human rights groups who criticized the Chinese 
state’s indifference towards HIV/AIDS, its attempts to conceal the scale of the 
epidemic, violation of the rights of people living with HIV/AIDS, and repression of 
their grassroots action. The Chinese government came under further unusually harsh 
critique by the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (hereafter, UNAIDS), 
which publicly warned that China’s existing AIDS policy had such as “infinitesimally 
small impact” that the country was “on the verge of a catastrophe that could result in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 “AIDS Crusader’s International Award Wins Scowls in China,” New York Times, May 31, 
2001. 
	   2	  
unimaginable suffering, economic loss and social devastation,” and called on 
government officials to loosen restrictions on bottom-up action.2 Many senior political 
leaders, like George W. Bush, United Nations Secretary Kofi Annan, and World Bank 
President Sir James Wolfensohn, expressed similar concerns through direct 
communications with China’s President Jiang Zeming at the time. 
This was just the first of an unprecedented series of external interventions. 
Major transnational AIDS institutions—from intergovernmental organizations, 
international financial entities, foreign governments, international nongovernmental 
organizations, human rights groups, private companies, to private philanthropists3 —
brought an explosion in material resources, technical support and activist guidance for 
Chinese AIDS activism. Foreign donors invested at least 28 million USD in Chinese 
civil society groups working in the HIV/AIDS area between 2005 and 2009.4  
The remarkable domestic impact of transnational AIDS institutions presents the 
most significant case of external intervention in China. With support from abroad, the 
number of grassroots AIDS nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) reached 413 in 
2009 from 54 in 2004 (see Figure 1.1). The AIDS movement thus became one of a few 
national-level social movements in post-socialist China against a backdrop of ever 
tightening state control especially since the early 2000s.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 United Nations Theme Group on HIV/AIDS in China, HIV/AIDS: China's Titanic Peril, 
UNAIDS, 2001. 
3 Working internationally on AIDS control, these entities are bound together by sets of formal 
and informal norms, rules, and decision-making procedures. 
4 This is my estimate based on different NGOs’ annual reports as well as official documents of 
foreign donors.  
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Figure 1.1 The Growth of Grassroots AIDS NGOs in China, 1993–2009 
 
 
However, the rise of AIDS activism is only half of the story. When the number 
of grassroots AIDS NGOs reached its peak in 2009, this was also the year when the 
whole movement started to decline. If we take a closer look at the configuration of the 
AIDS movement, among grassroots AIDS NGOs in 2009, close to half were gay male 
organizations, while only about four and six percent, respectively, worked with 
commercial sex workers and injection drug users. Yet, among people who were HIV 
positive in China in 2009, only 3.8 percent were infected through homosexual 
transmission, while 40 percent were infected through heterosexual transmission, and 
20.3 percent through injection drug use. NGOs mainly focusing on contaminated blood 
issues were marginalized, even though 34.3 percent of HIV positive cases were infected 
via blood.  
Also in 2009, Dr. Gao was the first leading activist who was forced to flee the 
country. She explained in her personal statement, “I realized that I could not continue 
my anti-AIDS work in China any more. . . I left not to save my life, but my work. 
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Chinese people’s experience acquired at the cost of blood and life cannot go wasted. I 
want to finish my books and leave them for later generations with truth about the AIDS 
epidemic in China.”5 The remaining organizations and activists became either 
depoliticized by adopting more service-oriented goals to collaborate with the 
government, or radicalized after becoming marginalized within transnational AIDS 
advocacy networks. 
This dissertation examines the surge and fall of the AIDS movement in China 
between 1989 and 2012. The story is not a smooth narrative of global civil society 
development and authoritarian state retreat. My goal was to discover the factors that 
explain the historical trajectory of China’s AIDS activism and, in doing so, identify the 
general dynamics between transnational institutions, strong authoritarian states, and 
social movements. I address questions such as: Why do some transnational institutions 
matter in an authoritarian context, while others do not? When transnational institutions 
do matter, what determines their impact on domestic conflicts? What changes and what 
remains constant? Ultimately, the goal of this dissertation was to answer to what extent, 
in what ways, and with what consequences transnational institutions affect domestic 
contentious politics in authoritarian contexts. 
The AIDS movement in China is an ideal case through which to examine 
dynamics between transnational institutions and authoritarian contentious politics. It is 
rare for any transnational institution to have a significant influence in any of China’s 
policy domains, especially concerning political conflict. International relations theorists 
have noted that the emergence of transnational institutions shook the dominance of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Yaojie Gao, “My time back in China,” Personal statement (Chinese), January 22, 2009. 
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sovereign states (Keohane and Nye 2001). Many transnational institutions have been 
involved in a variety of areas in China such as environment, gender, law, labor, poverty 
relief, and human rights. However, China, like Russia and India, is not susceptible to 
external impacts due to its size, economies, and military forces (Keck and Sikkink 
1998; Levitsky and Way 2005). So, the influence of external interventions has largely 
been limited to specific campaigns, organizations, or individual activists. It is puzzling, 
then, why transnational AIDS institutions had such unprecedented impact, especially 
when global norms in public health—traditionally perceived as “soft/low politics”6—do 
not even have any jurisdictional power in international society. 
Furthermore, the paradoxical changes that came from the interventions of 
transnational AIDS institutions were unexpected. To appreciate how remarkable the 
impact of transnational AIDS institutions was, one must understand that AIDS activism 
broke sharply from traditional approaches to mobilizing not only in China, but also in 
“high-capacity authoritarian states” (Johnston 2012) in general. Similar to its 
counterparts in Iran and Russia, high-risk resistance in China usually takes episodic, 
localized, and informal forms because state repression is far more intense vis-à-vis 
formally organized and/or cross-regional activism (Cai 2002, 2005, 2010; Gallagher 
2006; Lee and Seldan 2007; Michelson 2007; O’Brien and Li 2006; Perry 2001). 
Nonetheless, in the past decade, the AIDS movement is the only social movement that 
has not only adopted a western advocacy NGO model, but also developed formal 
networks and alliances across national and local levels covering 22 of 23 provinces, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Usually international relations scholars group environmental, human rights, labor, and gender 
issues as part of the low politics domain. It is important to notice that such categorization 
changes across time and space. High politics usually pertain to economy and military issues.  
	   6	  
autonomous regions, and municipalities in China. Given China’s unprecedented state 
capacities and political control, such sweeping changes are nothing less than 
extraordinary. 
But if transnational AIDS institutions account for the rise of the AIDS 
movement in the early 2000s, why did the AIDS movement suddenly decline in 2009, 
despite the continuous rise in support from abroad? Broadly speaking, scholars typically 
emphasize either mechanisms of supply or punishment in explaining the domestic 
impact of transnational institutions: (1) how transnational institutions facilitate domestic 
activism by supplying political opportunities, material resources, or cognitive frames to 
local activists; and (2) how transnational institutions constrain national governments by 
punishing their coercive behavior.  
Applying these approaches, one would expect to find that transnational AIDS 
institutions not only expanded Chinese activists’ access to political, economic and 
symbolic power and resources to an unprecedented extent, but also attenuated the 
Chinese state’s repression of the AIDS movement. Starting in 2003, the Chinese state 
did drastically decrease its show and/or use of physical sanctions such as intimidation, 
interrogation, detention, and arrest against AIDS activists and their organizations. 
Current theories have predominantly focused on how transnational institutions empower 
previously disadvantaged communities into political action; thus, there is scant basis 
upon which to explain anything but successful cases of external interventions. This 
makes the fall of the AIDS movement a valuable case for close examination, since it 
provides a rare window into the nonlinear and contested processes and unintended 
outcomes of transnational engagement.   
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I. Overview of the Argument 
 
These exceptional aspects of the AIDS movement reflect the current literature’s 
deficiencies in conceptualizing the nature and operation of domination and resistance in 
transnational contentious politics. Too often, this literature overemphasizes the 
structural conditions under which high-risk activism originates and then focuses only on 
the quantity of such activism that survives. I argue that, beyond supplying opportunities 
and resources to activist actors and punishing coercive states, transnational AIDS 
institutions shape the cultural rules that dictate the specific forms of local mobilization 
and state repression. In other words, the impact of transnational AIDS institutions is 
reflected not so much in the amount of activism enabled, but the kind and quality. 
Transnational AIDS institutions’ interventions accounted for both the rise and decline 
of the AIDS movement in China by changing the cultural scripts and organizational 
principles of domestic AIDS institutions, deliminating the range of legitimate or 
admissible actors and behavior. Those changes served as an engine that drove two 
processes: the formation and transformation of AIDS activist actors, on the one hand, 
and the reconstitution and reconfiguration of state repression on the other hand. It was 
the interplay between these two processes that determined the trajectory of the AIDS 
movement in China.  
This argument is based on three major claims, which I briefly outline here and 
then elaborate in sections to follow. First, my approach defines institutions as sets of 
rules and models that do not just influence, but actually constitute local actors. 
Transnational AIDS institutions can be conceptualized as a partially integrated set of 
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organizational and discursive structures, resources, and practices regarding HIV/AIDS 
interventions. They are institutions that, in a sense, determine the cultural rules in 
specific issue areas. Here, culture refers to institutional arrangements and organizational 
models. Traditionally, it is authoritarian states that establish rules that govern other 
institutions of society. Such rules regulate how power is maintained, operated, or lost in 
a particular issue arena and constitute a focal point of both domination and resistance. 
The intervention of transnational institutions provides a different set of rules that 
challenge the monopoly of the state in this arena and put in motion the recombination of 
institutional logics as repertoires that domestic activists—including the government and 
challengers—can draw on and utilize.  
Second, transnational AIDS institutions have shaped Chinese AIDS activism 
indirectly by shifting state repressive behavior. In most scholarly models, external 
intervention only mediates the level of a given type of repression. My approach, 
however, suggests that external intervention does not simply thwart state repression. 
Rather, the cultural frameworks of transnational institutions—as a set of practices, 
organizational forms, and repertoires of action—are constitutive of the technologies and 
political models that fashion state repressive practice. The characteristics of repression 
of AIDS activism have transitioned from direct and overt hard repression related to 
physical force to covert and indirect soft repression, as the state now develops new 
semi-state organizations that act in concert with traditional security/police agents within 
and even outside its territorial jurisdiction.  
Third, transnational AIDS institutions have shaped AIDS activism directly by 
shaping the constitution and transformation of goals, issue-framing, organizing forms 
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and, indeed, the very constitution of AIDS activist actorhood. By actorhood, I refer to 
AIDS activist actors and their agency as their motives for conflict in the first place and 
their choices of methods and resources for engaging in conflict. AIDS activist actors 
were not rational and unitary adaptive vehicles who made use of resources and chose 
organizing forms to pursue fixed interests and preferences. Rather, the actorhood of 
activists—including their goals and the most appropriate means to pursue these goals—
was constructed and authorized through institutional rules. This authorization process, 
in turn, promoted specific organizational forms and marginalized others for local 
activism.  
These two mechanisms—which shaped the configuration of state repression and 
activist actorhood at different historical moments—determined the trajectory of China’s 
AIDS movement from the failed early initiatives of the 1990s, to its drastic rise from 
1999–2003, and to its expansion and decline from 2004–2012. Initiated by heterosexual 
men in urban areas, early AIDS activism focused on homosexual men in urban areas 
and remained in its infancy at best throughout the 1990s. It was not until the 
intervention of transnational AIDS institutions between 1999 and 2003 that peasants 
who were infected through selling blood/plasma were able to take action and a 
movement as such began to coalesce. Instead of simply helping to move this domestic 
movement forward along its own trajectory, transnational engagement transformed 
AIDS activist actorhood. Between 2004 and 2012, the framing of the issue shifted from 
one of blood contamination to an increasingly sexual identity-based focus; the 
leadership of the movement shifted from rural peasants to the gay male community in 
urban areas; and NGO building became the dominant organizing form. Along the way, 
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other incipient groups within the movement—such as those working with female sex 
workers—were displaced, while the organizing impetus of infected peasants declined. 
The purpose of this dissertation is to examine how and why this happened.   
This research applies a conflict-centered institutional perspective to examine the 
impact of transnational institutions on domestic contentious politics in an authoritarian 
context. To contextualize the significance of this approach, it is necessary to identify 
major theoretical issues and sketch the primary modes of explanation offered by 
currently prevalent theories. This is not intended to be a comprehensive review; instead, 
I focus on summarizing the important characteristics of various approaches embodied in 
a small number of representative works. 
 
II. A Conflict-Centered Institutional Approach to Transnational Contentious 
Politics 
 
The account I advance in this dissertation differs from conventional perspectives 
on social movements, authoritarian states, and transnational institutions, though it is 
indebted to the many insights these perspectives have generated. The difference stems 
in part from the dissertation’s main focus on cultural rules in specific institutional areas  
as a set of institutional arrangements and organizational models, rather than power, 
resources, or culture in the traditional sense as a set of substantive values. Mainstream 
approaches to transnational conflict and authoritarian regimes draw from two 
paradigms: One is the supplying model from sociology with a focus on mobilization; 
the other is the punitive model from political science with a focus on repression. 
Despite their many overlapping themes and concerns, these two bodies of scholarship 
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are largely separate and barely acknowledge one another. I argue that by shifting 
attention to actorhood as “a scripted form more than a hard-wired reality” (Meyer 2010, 
14), we could bridge the gap between these two literatures and recognize transnational 
contentious politics as involving both repression and mobilization.  
In the following sections, I outline two major perspectives in the sociological 
“supplying” model: the bottom-up perspective of the contentious politics approach in 
social movement literature, and the top-down perspective of the institutional approach 
in world society literature. Then, I outline the punitive model in state theory and 
international relations studies. I conclude the section by demonstrating how a conflict-
centered institutional approach enables a more effective examination of the AIDS 
movement in China.  
 
i. Contentious Politics Approaches to Social Movements 
 
An increasing number of scholars have examined the impact of transnational 
institutions on domestic social movements in non-democratic contexts (Bob 2005; 
Hemment 2007; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Loveman 1998). Authoritarian countries are 
characterized by large investments in, and consequently strong capacities for repression 
and social control in general (Earl 2011). Scholars thus attend more closely to the 
conditions under which high-risk activism originates and survives than to why specific 
forms of resistance are chosen and others are not. 
The contentious politics approach explains the impact of transnational 
institutions in terms of how they expand domestic actors’ access to political, social, or 
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symbolic sources of power. In this line of research, motives for conflict are typically 
derived from constellations of actors with given, mutually incompatible preferences and 
differential access to economic, social, or symbolic power. Likewise, methods of 
conflict resolution are typically related to actors’ preferences that guide their cost-
benefit calculus. Existing accounts working from this view conceptualize transnational 
institutions as supranational polities promoted by global integration that generate 
transnational political opportunities for national social movements to occur, sustain, and 
succeed that otherwise could not have developed. Scholars thus concentrate on whether 
and to what extent transnational institutions may supply movements with structural 
leverage over opponents (Keck and Sikkink 1998), new material resources (Barr et al. 
2005; Henderson 2002;Wapner 1996 ), or cognitive frames (Longhofer and Schofer 
2010; Tsutsui 2008). In this vein, activists’ decisions are based on either instrumental 
adaptation to structural and resource conditions or ideological commitment (see Figure 
1.2).  
The first line of research argues that it is the reconfiguration of political 
authorities that reduces the structural power discrepancy between domestic dissidents 
and political elites so as to shape domestic forms of action (Bob 2002; Risse, Ropp, and 
Sikkink 1999). It theorizes transnational institutions as a new set of supranational 
political bodies promoted by global integration that place social movement actors in a 
triangular structure (Rucht 1999; Smith 2004; Tarrow 2001, 2005). Scholars recognize 
that the emergence of transnational institutions shook the dominance of sovereign states 
by establishing “regular interactions across national boundaries when at least one actor 
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is a nonstate agent” (Keohane and Nye 1971, xii-xvi), thereby offering new venues and 
resources for domestic contestation.  
 




The second argument focuses instead on the cultural content of transnational 
institutions. From this perspective, new organizing forms are explained not only by the 
existence of sufficient resources, but also by the existence of actors with sufficient 
resources who recognize those forms as “an opportunity to realize interests that they 
value highly” (Rao 1998, 913-14). Much work traces mechanisms that shift activists’ 
ideological commitment. One strand follows a top-down perspective that highlights the 
principled nature of actions in an emerging transnational civil society, “one that could 
embody a democratic and redistributive justice for the world-system as a whole” 
(Bandy 2004b, 425). This line of research concentrates on mechanisms as forming 
common identities (Bandy 2004a; Brysk 2000; Snow and McAdam 2000) and diffusing 
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global norms and rules (Bandy and Smith 2005; Benford and Snow 2000; Brysk 1994). 
The other strand uses a bottom-up approach to argue that social movement groups 
strategically transform themselves to match agendas, missions, and organizational needs 
of transnational actors in order to enhance their appeals and gain external assistance 
(Bob 2005; Hertel 2007). 
Both accounts take seriously the idea that transnational institutions matter in 
shaping local actors and conceiving of new forms of activism as a direct response to the 
emergence of power and resources made available by transnational institutions. While 
these accounts are useful for answering certain questions about particular topics, 
however, they have explanatory limitations. As highly suggestive as they are for 
demonstrating the empowering and positive effects of transnational institutions, existing 
accounts are poorly equipped to predict other consequences. Much of this research is 
characterized by an upbeat tone “as a general rule” (Hafner-Burton and Ron 2008, 9). 
Empirical studies have challenged this expectation by showing rather ambiguous effects 
of transnational models such as impermanence, fragmentation, internal cooptation, and 
external control (Brandy 2004a; Edelman 1999; Henderson 2003; Hrycak 2007, 2010; 
Mendelson and Glenn 2002; Widener 2007). Existing accounts offer little space within 
their conceptualization of transnational institutions and their impact for an analysis of 
the complicated and unexpected effects of transnational intervention.  
On the one hand, much of this research privileges macro-political structural 
shifts as the ultimate determining factor for patterns of mobilization, which is too easily 
coupled with an overly optimistic and generalized reading of the structural transforming 
potential of transnational institutions (Imig and Tarrow 2001; Khagram, Riker, and 
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Sikkink 2002; Kriesi 1995; Tarrow 2001). The primary research question of much work 
could be framed as: To what extent are a new set of formal supranational political 
bodies promoted by global integration granted the type of institutionalized power 
formerly leveraged through and embodied by states? The underlying purpose of many 
studies has, thus, been to challenge the state-centered conception of transnational 
politics in political science and of contentious politics in sociology. In contrast, Tarrow 
(2004) first warned of the danger of ignoring the importance of states, especially strong 
authoritarian states, in transnational contentious politics. While a changing structural 
configuration of politics proved to be an effective explanatory factor in Latin America 
and East Europe, transnational institutions do not have such influence in Africa, Asia 
and countries in the Middle East (Hafner-Burton and Ron 2008).  
On the other hand, because they conceptualize activism as being formed in 
straightforward strategic terms, both accounts neglect to ask why external opportunities 
and resources constitute a viable option in authoritarian contexts in the first place. As 
such, much of the literature ignores an issue critical to understanding the relationship 
between international support and high-risk social movements—what makes external 
opportunities and resources a viable repertoire from which domestic activists can draw 
organizational forms. The literature tends to perceive local activists as “strategic choice 
makers” (Polletta 2005, 274) and explains the effects of transnational institutions as 
functionally necessitated by the internal needs of national social movements. Most 
scholars either assume activists may endorse international agendas and resources as 
long as they need leverage against repressive states (see Liu 2006), or take for granted 
the ideological consistency or effectiveness of international frameworks (Hafner-Burton 
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2008; McAdam et al. 2001). One can discern an underlying assumption that presumes a 
positive resonance between transnational institutions and national social movements.  
In contrast, recent empirical evidence suggests that it is a mistake to presume 
collaborative relations between international and local actors, especially in authoritarian 
contexts under conditions of high risk (Bandy 2004b). As Liu demonstrates, we need to 
“stop assuming that transnational agendas are pre-given systems” and “start theorizing 
that national movement responses to transnational agendas are context-dependent” 
(2006, 922). For example, the presence of hard repression makes informal and small 
groups a prevalent organizing basis of mobilization in authoritarian contexts (Johnston 
2006, 2012; O’Brien and Li 2006; Opp and Gern 1993; Perry 2001). Domestic activists 
might or might not engage with western organizational forms, especially when there is 
little predictable payoff (Hemment 2004; Wood 2005). This problem begs for a careful 
analysis of how subnational contexts facilitate or hinder the transmission of global 
precepts to local actors. 
As it currently stands, the contentious politics approach does not provide 
sufficient analytical traction to explain anything other than the strengthening and 
amplifying impact of transnational engagement. This largely structural perspective 
starts with assumptions about domestic actors’ predetermined preferences and relies on 
their varying access to power to explain the interactions between the state and social 
movements. As the following section will show, literature from an institutional 
perspective presents a different causal account to explain the impact of transnational 
institutions on domestic actors. Scholars in this tradition highlight the significance of 
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actorhood and conceive of institutions in a fundamentally different way, which can help 
to illuminate old theoretical dilemmas and open up new avenues for empirical research.  
 
ii. Institutional Approaches to Social Movement Organizations 
 
The world society literature adopts an institutional perspective rooted in 
organizational studies. Instead of understanding international institutions as indicative 
of emerging global politics that circumvent the authority and power of national 
governments, institutional perspectives direct our attention to the logics of international 
institutions that are available to social movements as local actors to internalize and 
elaborate. By institutional logics, they refer to cultural scripts and organizational 
principles as background rules that dictate and justify certain organizational 
arrangements (Friedland and Alford 1991). Organizational forms, in this sense, translate 
institutional logics into action and carry them across borders. Accordingly, activist 
actors are not pre-given rational and unitary adaptive vehicles who make use of 
resources and choose organizing forms to pursue fixed interests and preferences (Scott 
1987). Rather, the actorhood of activists, including their goals and the most appropriate 
means to pursue these goals, are authorized through the logics of different institutions 
(Meyer and Jepperson 2000). 
Institutional approaches draw distinctiveness and power largely from their 
explicit rejection of a view presuming the existence, autonomy, and rationality of social 
movement organizations (Meyer and Jepperson 2000). This approach allows us to 
depart from a series of assumptions, rooted in American organizational society, about 
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what social movements should look like, what the carriers of social movements are, and 
how social movements relate to other actors. Instead of taking social movement 
organizations as a starting point, it questions why and how activists construct 
organizations rather than other social forms (see Figure 1.3).  
 




Social movement studies utilizing the institutional approach often focus on the 
question of activist actorhood change, and grant explanatory primacy to the cultural 
substance of institutional logics that are embedded in institutional locations and fields 
composed of networks of social relations and power (Armstrong 2002b; Clemens 1997; 
Rao, Morrill, and Zald 2000). Organizational forms of social movements are shaped by 
institutional logics that govern the legitimate means and ends organizations employ. 
Therefore, scholars examine logics of various institutions and trace their changes, both 
in the configuration of their structure and content and in the way that politics evolves to 
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include ever-shifting actors, values, and processes, in order to understand organizational 
transformation (Amenta 2006; Armstrong 2002a; Fligstein and McAdam 2012; Rao 
1998; Schurman 2004; Walker, Martin, and McCarthy 2008).   
The world society literature was the first to map this line of thinking onto the 
supranational level. Scholars argue that it is the distinctive culture of the world polity 
enacted through and embodied in international institutions that constitutes local actors, 
leading to isomorphic outcomes (Frank et al. 1999; Meyer et al. 1997; Schofer and 
Longhofer 2011). Such culture is a set of generally universalistic principles of 
rationality and progress, as well as actorhood and empowerment (Meyer 2010). This 
approach recognizes the global proliferation of formal organizations in advocacy 
activism and argues that the world polity facilitates collective action in ways that 
significantly diffuse NGOs as an organization (Watkins, Swidler, and Hannan 2012). 
Empirical studies have supported this argument by showing how the formation and 
expansion of international institutions has promoted formal nongovernmental 
organizations across disparate nations in activism areas such as the environment (Frank, 
Hironake, and Schofer 2000; Hironaka 2002; Longhofer and Schofer 2010), gender 
(Barrett and Kurzman 2004; Boyle 2002), ethnicity (Olzak 2006; Tsutsui 2004), and 
human rights (Koenig 2008).  
Less positively, the world society model is often criticized for its overemphasis 
on structural isomorphism and lack of attention to the actual mechanisms through which 
transnational institutions reach local actors (Koenig and Dierkes 2011; Tsutsui 
unpublished). This perspective is most effective in outlining overall global processes. 
Its proponents largely share the upbeat tone of most human rights studies, as they are 
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much more interested in providing strong evidence of the positive and empowering 
effects of international institutions resulting in a high degree of institutional 
isomorphism across countries. However, international institutions are formulated in 
broad, universal, abstract, and sometimes contradictory terms. Recently, anthropologists 
and Political Scientists especially those in gender and ethnic studies argue that those 
universal norms’ translation and even transformation in domestic contexts should be 
seen as more problematic than most studies imply, especially in authoritarian contexts 
(Brysk 2013; Merry 2006; Yashar 2005). As Best (2001) suggests, differences in 
domestic institutional structures may hinder the diffusion of international models and 
norms. Statistical scholars have found negative effects of authoritarianism or state 
repression on the diffusion of international organizational models in cross-national 
analyses (Schofer and Longhofer 2011). I argue that the cost and barriers involved in 
transmitting global intercepts to local actors are simply too prohibitive to ignore their 
mechanisms and consequences. It is necessary to bring authoritarian states into the 
analytical focus to “develop a dynamic conceptualization of national contexts to 
facilitate inquiry into processes” (Liu 2006, 922).  
However, in opposition to the contentious politics approach, institutional 
approaches remain largely silent on high-risk activism in authoritarian countries. This is 
partly due to the fact that scholars first employed institutional approaches to examine 
social movements that work outside the state. Those studies developed in response to 
the overly narrow conception of politics as defined by the political process model in 
contentious politics literature. For example, Armstrong and Bernstein (2008) offer the 
multi-institutional politics model specifically for social movements that do not involve 
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the state, as a critique of the Marxist state-centered model that has dominated social 
movement scholarship since the early 1980s.  
But I argue that recent studies of high-risk activism in authoritarian states have 
developed in ways compatible with an institutional approach. Many scholars have 
illustrated a strong critique of rational choice assumptions and started to take a cultural 
turn in examining social movements in authoritarian contexts (O’Hearn 2009). Extant 
studies highlight the significance of preexisting local communities as the basis of 
solidarity culture and movement mobilization (Goldstone and Useem 1999; Loveman 
1998; Maher 2010). By culture, they refer to moral, emotional, and cognitive substances 
and values, instead of a strategic organizational tool for consensus formation and action 
mobilization on the basis of a cost-benefit calculus.7 Although this body of research 
largely concentrates on micro-level analysis, it is in line with institutional approaches 
that evolve around the reinterpretation of social movements from a constructivist view 
of culture (Armstrong 2002b). The explanatory strength of the cultural approach is that 
it proposes a more sophisticated conceptualization of the relations between contentious 
practices and their macro-historical context. This makes it possible to view the content 
and analytical status of concepts like the political, culture, structure, and agency as 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 See Sewell 1999 for more on the difference regarding the definition and operationalization of 
the term “culture.”  
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iii. Globalization Approaches to Authoritarian Regimes 
 
Examining the impact of external forces on authoritarian states is hardly new, 
but it is also more theoretically challenging now that authoritarianism has become more 
sustainable (Magaloni and Kricheli 2010). Since the “third wave of democratization” 
(Huntington 1991), the survival of one-party authoritarian regimes8 primarily rests on 
how governing institutions handle two principal sources of danger: one from dissidents 
within the society, and one from outsiders abroad (Tullock 2005). In the post-Cold War 
era, external pressure on authoritarian regimes increased as the influence of democratic 
countries grew (Strange 2012), the ties of authoritarian countries to world political 
economic systems has also intensified (Levitsky and Way 2005), and the strength of 
transnational institutions has enhanced (Franklin 2008). However, as human rights 
scholars point out, state repression against social movements has not yet decreased 
amidst the “turbulence” of world politics (Rosenau 1990).  
Studies of globalization and authoritarian regimes emerged out of the 
intersection of two analytical shifts: first, the frustration of democratization scholars 
with dominant regime theories, namely those focusing on domestic polity in order to 
explain the transition of post-communist countries following the end of the Cold War 
(Way 2005); and second, a growing interest in constructivist approaches at the global 
level (Checkel 1998; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998) that contend that normative 
institutions like global human rights have the potential to alleviate political repression 
and promote democratic institutions (Risse and Ropp 1999; Simmons 2009).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Here, I am mainly using research on single-party and dominant-party regimes that are both 
treated as one-party regimes in literature (Magaloni and Kricheli 2010). 	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This body of scholarship finds that states, especially strong states, have 
continued to be active participants in transnational politics, and concentrates on one 
specific form of state behavior—repression. While numerous studies confirm that the 
growth of transnational institutions matters vis-à-vis state behaviors, most studies adopt 
what I call a punitive model to explain how and with what consequences it matters (see 
Figure 1.4). The punitive model has concentrated on how transnational institutions—
embodied by actors ranging from states, to international organizations, to transnational 
advocacy networks—pressure recalcitrant governments to reduce their level of 
repression (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005; Risse et al. 1999; Thomas 2001) through 
bilateral aid withdrawal (Neumayer 2003), multilateral and/or unilateral political and 
economic sanctions (Wood 2008), or “naming and shaming” (Krain 2012). While these 
means are interrelated,9  they constitute the empirical foci of two distinct camps: statist 
versus constructivist scholars.  
Statist and constructivist approaches diverge regarding the driving forces and 
mechanisms of top-down effects on state repression. Statist researchers are mainly 
concerned with sanctions as material means of enforcement (Allen 2008; Kaempher et 
al. 2004) in a hegemonic world system (Wallerstein 2000). Most statist studies take as 
their starting assumptions: (1) that the force of transnational institutions depends on the 
endorsement of strong western states; and (2) that states are unitary actors with stable 
interests and motives that are sensitive to the distribution of power in world politics. So, 
repressive behaviors are explained by changing constraints (Lektzian and Souva 2007), 
while authoritarian states are assumed to have a pathological preference for political 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 For example, some empirical studies show that the effect of naming and shaming is 
conditioned by the allocation of economic aid. 	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repression (Davenport 1995). Sanctions are used to augment targeted authoritarian 
states’ repressive resources and destabilize their governing elite coalitions.  
 
Figure 1.4 Globalization Approaches to Authoritarian Regimes 
 
 
Current literature suggests two major factors in determining the success of 
sanctions. One is the position occupied by human rights on the agenda of international 
donor communities (Nielsen 2012). For example, the degree of sanctions varies across 
issue areas. The other is the leverage of sanctions relative to the targeted state’s power 
(Escriba-Folch and Wright 2008; Kaempfer et al. 2004).  China, Russia, and India are 
not susceptible to sanctions due to their respective sizes, economies, and military forces. 
The empirical results with regard to the application of material punishments has been 
mixed. Only some empirical studies find evidence to support the theoretical argument, 
while others have found that sanctions actually lead to a deterioration of human rights 
conditions in authoritarian contexts (Wood 2008). Under what conditions does money 
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work? This question challenges a narrow interest-based explanation referring to a 
traditional international world centering on nation states.  
Constructivist scholars concentrate on the transnational advocacy campaigns 
that publicize rights violations and pressure governments to change their behavior, 
known as naming and shaming, respectively (Keck and Sikkink 1998). Risse et al. 
(1999) posited a spiral model to trace the influence of global norms and rules on 
domestic repression. This model led to a boom in empirical studies preoccupied by 
three assumptions: first, that transnational institutions have been ceded legitimate 
authority (Simons and Martin 2003); second, that non-state actors including 
transnational social movements started to emerge in certain issue-specific arenas as 
competing locations of authority (Tarrow 2002); and third, that states are no longer the 
only actors with independent symbolic power or final legitimate authority (Keohane and 
Nye 1989). These studies locate naming and shaming as part of a larger project of 
normative socialization that either alters the authoritarian state’s repressive preferences 
or increases the cost of repression. Many theorists ascribe the effectiveness of such 
measures to the variation in the strength of norms (Schmitz and Sikkink 2003), while 
some studies show naming and shaming along with economic sanctions achieves 
greater success (Murdie and Davis 2011; Zartner and Ramos 2011). However, empirical 
data has generated conflicting findings in regard to the effectiveness of naming and 
shaming on political repression (Franklin 2008; Young 2009). Constructivists are 
presented with a similar challenge as that faced by realists: transnational interventions 
do not lead to a broad improvement in human rights when states decrease the use of 
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targeted coercive tactics, but rather, increase other covert and indirect forms of 
repression with less cost (Conrad and DeMeritt 2011). 
Both statist and constructivist approaches point out that the behaviors of 
authoritarian states cannot be understood in isolation. This is a healthy corrective to 
contentious politics studies’ fixation on the domestic sources of state’s preferences and 
policy choices. But both statist and constructivist approaches also adopt a similar 
structural perspective and tend to perceive the state as a coherent unity. More recently, 
authoritarianism theorists in political science suggest that authoritarian states’ reactions 
to external pressure cannot be reduced to a simple dichotomy of compliance and 
rejection. Authoritarian governments often actively engage with international 
frameworks in response to external pressure so as to gain access to foreign aid and 
international legitimacy, and to shield themselves from more pressure for further 
substantial policy change (Bates 2001). These studies are turning to a more 
institutionalist definition of the state as a complex organization, which is helpful in 
highlighting dynamics between transnational institutions and the state.  
 
iv. Towards a Conflict-Centered Institutional Approach 
 
I develop a conflict-centered institutional approach by integrating existing 
efforts to bring power and conflict into institutional theory. Even though such efforts are 
mainly concentrated in economic and organizational studies, they offers a vantage point 
from which to understand how varying modes of activist actorhood may arise through 
the multiple and complex dynamics between transnational institutional forces and 
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domestic actors. Research in this vein is critical of existing transnational institutional 
research that usually stops once transnational institutions enter into domestic contexts 
and pays little attention to their actual operation. Scholars further suggest that the 
formation and expansion of transnational institutions and their domestic implementation 
are driven more by conflict than consensus (Bartley 2005a, 2007; Drori, Meyer, and 
Hwang 2006; Weber, Davis, and Lounsbury 2009). As Zelner, Henisz, and Holburn 
have argued (2009, 380), local implementation of transnational institutions is “an 
ongoing sociopolitical process, in which the domestic proponents and opponents of a 
globally diffusing policy continue to struggle against each other.” This line of research 
follows institutional theory in arguing that institutions constitute actors. But as scholars 
highlight the presence of multiple transnational and domestic institutions, they explain 
actors and their action as a result of contradiction and competition between various 
institutional logics. While this perspective has gained traction in research on global 
business regulation (Vogel 2008), I extend it to studying the impact of transnational 
AIDS institutions on the activist actorhood of high-risk activism.  
The conflict-centered institutional approach, as summarized in Figure 1.5, 
conceptualizes the impact of transnational institutions as a context-based process in 
which no global precept is a pre-given object to be taken hold of and utilized by 
domestic activists in a vacuum. Instead, the impact of transnational institutions is 
processual in the sense that it involves evolving and interactive dynamics between 
transnational institutions, the state, and social movement actors. These dynamics are 
ignited by political contentions over the local interpretation and modification of global 
precepts, as transnational institutions penetrate domestic contexts and affect the 
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organizing forms of domestic social movements. Accordingly, changes in activist 
actorhood do not take place in direct response to the availability of transnational 
resources or internal development needs. Rather, they are shaped by specific 
transnational institutional conditions that impact the cultural rules of conflict, including 
domestic actors’ motives for conflict and their choice of methods and resources for 
engaging in conflict.  
 
Figure 1.5 The Conflict-Centered Institutional Approach 
 
 
Transnational institutions are institutions that, in a sense, set the cultural rules 
that delimit “the range of legitimate or admissible behavior” (Rittbertger 1993, xii) in 
specific issue areas (Arrow I). Culture refers to organizational forms and practice. 
Specifically, transnational institutions can be defined as “sets of implicit or explicit 
principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors’ 
expectations converge in a given area of international relations” (Krasner 1983, 21). 
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The underlying purpose of much literature on transnational institutions is to challenge 
the state-centric and domestically-contained conception of politics. Many scholars thus 
define transnational institutions as constituting a polity at the supranational level that 
reveals the extent to which emerging global politics  circumvent the authority and 
power of national governments. My study moves away from this structural perspective 
and directs our attention to the specific substance of institutional arrangements and 
organizational models that guide the construction and practice of various domestic 
actors, and dictate the relationships among those actors including social movements and 
the state.  
Specifically, this conflict-centered institutional approach examines two 
intertwined mechanisms that account for the divergent and especially unintended impact 
of transnational institutions. Arrow II (see Figure 1.5) shows that transnational 
institutions directly shape and reshape goals, issue-framing, mobilization forms, and, 
indeed, the very constitution of activist actorhood in local contexts. This impact can be 
further divided into three levels: (1) culturally, transnational institutions define the 
nature of the policy issue at stake and authorizes a set of norms and manners in 
governing the issue effectively; (2) structurally, transnational institutions translate those 
rules into a structure of legitimate organizations and their roles, positions, and relations 
with a problem-solving focus; and (3) technically, transnational institutions construe 
those norms in a series of agendas, standards, and models, as well as proper and 
effective techniques and strategies to govern the issue. In the process, transnational 
institutions promote specific organizational forms and marginalize others.   
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Arrow III (see Figure 1.5) illustrates the indirect impact of transnational 
institutions on domestic activism through shifting state repressive behavior. My 
approach perceives the state not as a political apparatus that passively accepts or 
opposes global norms, but as a dynamic actor participating directly in transnational 
contention. I argue that three organizational principles of state repression are subject to 
the impact of transnational institutions and their construction of activist actorhood. 
First, transnational institutions shape the state’s definition and perception of the threat 
posed by domestic social movements. The motives for and options of repression cannot 
be derived only from the power of the state given structurally given preferences, as the 
current literature would suggest. Rather, it is important to look at the distinctive 
meanings of the activism upon which the state acts. Examining the threat perception of 
activism bears on how the state’s diagnoses and explains specific activism and, in turn, 
selects a particular set of repressive agents and actions.  
Second, transnational institutions give rise to new repressive agents and interests 
with variable connections with the central state authorities. Authoritarian states play an 
active role in transnational contentions given regimes’ increasing interest in engaging in 
transnational institutions and adopting external institutional models and organizational 
practices since the end of the Cold War (Gleditsch and Ward 2006; Levitsky and Way 
2012). Not only do authoritarian governments continue to restrain transnational ties 
(Wiest 2007), they also strive to play transnational interests to their advantage and 
mobilize transnational material and symbolic resources to sustain one-party regimes 
(Magaloni and Kricheli 2010). This process promotes the formation of new repressive 
actors. Third, transnational institutions open up new battlegrounds of conflict beyond 
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the state’s jurisdictional territory, which shapes what action should and can be taken in 
which domain.  
The configurations of these two mechanisms (Arrows II and III) at different 
historical moments determine the creation and/or reproduction of particular forms of 
collective actorhood at the local level.  
 
III. Research Design 
 
This study employs a research design attentive to both shifts over time and to 
actors and processes connecting various political levels. My empirical analysis 
compares three activist sub-groups in one country across the time period of 1989–2012: 
female sex workers, gays, and peasants infected via blood. For each group, I seek to 
identify relationships between transnational institutions, the state, and local groups that 
explain the rise of the AIDS movement in China in general, the success of gay groups 
within that movement, and the decline of other groups such as female sex workers and 
peasants infected via blood.  
In particular, I adopt the incorporated comparison method developed by 
McMichael, which “analyzes a cumulative process through time- and space-
differentiated instances of a historically singular process” (1990, 392). Incorporated 
comparison views social changes as outcomes of historical processes unfolding across 
local, national, and global levels. This method was proposed to address the 
shortcomings of conventional research design in historical comparative studies that 
discounts the significance of changes at the supranational level. It calls for the in-depth 
	   32	  
study of a strategically selected case, situated in historical and comparative perspectives. 
China presents a unique case through which to examine globalization theories that deal 
with transnational institutions and the state. China’s strong state presence could act as a 
potential barrier to external influences. In contrast, public health is a weak regime 
without jurisdictional power. There exists only quasi-legislation or soft laws concerning 
AIDS governance, and a global AIDS treaty has yet to be brokered. I chose this pairing 
of context and issue in order to explain the strong impact of transnational institutions 
and to trace “within-case” changes across three time periods (Mahoney 2004).  
China also provides an ideal case in which both successful and failed sub-group 
activism exists, which allows me to overcome the difficulties inherent in social 
movement studies that are typically built only on successful cases. All three sub-groups 
of activists were formed when China entered into the era of transnational AIDS 
governance. By studying the variation in AIDS activist actorhood across time periods, I 
am able to hold constant the national political and cultural contexts that have served as 
the major analytical foci of previous literature. 
I consider various stages of AIDS activist actorhood transformation as outcomes 
or moments of the evolving institutionalization process of transnational AIDS 
institutions across time, and utilize a multi-sited research design, attentive both to shifts 
over time and to actors and processes connecting various political levels. I define the 
cases under study as four instances of activist actorhood evolution. I draw on a 
combination of historical and institutional ethnography fieldwork at three different sites 
in order to examine three clusters of actors: transnational institutions, the state, and 
grassroots organizations.  
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My analysis focuses on four historical periods between 1989–1998, 1999–2003, 
2004–2007, and 2008–2012. These divisions are based on an analysis of the evolution 
of the impact of transnational AIDS institutions in China, referred to as the 
“effectiveness” of transnational institutions in international relations literature (Keohane 
et al. 1993). The more effective the implementation, the more influential transnational 
AIDS institutions are in China, and the more changes they solicit in activist actorhood. 
The effectiveness of transnational institutions evolves along two dimensions (Levy 
1995): one is the formality of rules, and the other is the shared normative expectation of 
acceptable behavior in AIDS governance. Extensive archival research was conducted 
between 2009 and 2010 to establish a historical document dataset that traces the 
evolution of the principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures of the 
institutions. I also use secondary sources to describe this historical process. This is 
followed by an analysis of the specific implementation of transnational AIDS regimes 
in China. The next chapter goes into the details of this process. 
My analysis relies on archival research combined with ethnographic work 
conducted at the Chinese Secretariat for the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, 
and Malaria (hereafter, Global Fund) in Beijing in 2009. The Global Fund is the most 
influential transnational AIDS institutional entity, providing 25 percent of all 
international funding for AIDS intervention. Supplementary interviews were conducted 
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Table 1.1 Multi-Level/Sited Data Collection Summary 
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After this analysis to establish the historical instances as four cases, I turn to the 
comparison of AIDS activist actorhood across these cases by combining comparative 
historical and institutional ethnography (see Table 1.1 for a summary of research 
methods). To study the behavior of the Chinese state, I conducted interviews with 
government and semi-government agents involved in regulating AIDS and repressing 
AIDS activism. First, in-depth interviews were conducted in 2009 and 2013 with 42 
officials in charge of regulating and policing NGO activities at 24 government and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 These four provinces were chosen because they enjoy high statues among all the local states. 
As my research subjects requested, no specific information is released here to protect their 
identity information.  
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Communist Party (hereafter, simply Party) organizations, including the Ministry of 
Health, Bureau of Civil Affairs, Foreign Affairs Office, Police Department, and the 
Homeland Security Department at the central government and provincial levels in four 
provinces. Additionally, officials in two major government-organized social 
organizations were interviewed. Most interviews were recorded and transcribed in 
Chinese.  
To study domestic activist groups, I use data collected via archival and 
ethnographic research focusing on peasants infected via contaminated blood, gay males, 
and female sex workers based on a total of two years of fieldwork conducted at the 
transnational, national, and local levels. I observed and participated in the campaigns 
and daily activities of three grassroots organizations, and interviewed 94 grassroots 
organizational leaders, members, people living with HIV/AIDS and independent 
activists with no organizational affiliation in 19 cities and villages in China as well as 
the United States between 2007 and 2013.  
 
IV. Overview of the Dissertation 
 
This chapter establishes the conceptual foundations for the whole dissertation, 
while Chapter 2 provides an introduction to the broader historical context of both 
transnational AIDS institutions and the Chinese state. It first delineates how AIDS 
became a political problem via a historical process of institutionalization at the 
transnational level. It was through this process that a new set of institutional logics were 
established and introduced into China. The rest of the dissertation demonstrates the 
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outcome of this process as the mobilization and repression of AIDS activism in China 
has shifted. Chapter 2 also considers two potential domestic explanations of the 
evolution of AIDS activist actorhood. The first explanation focuses on changes to the 
AIDS epidemic itself, while the second hinges on shifts in the political opportunity 
structure of the Chinese state. This chapter pushes the historical explanation of my 
conflict-centered institutional approach a step further, beyond standard structuralist 
modes of analysis, by specifying the historical processes by which conditions of 
domestic health institutions were transformed. 
The following chapters delve into the empirical body of this dissertation. 
Chapter 3 examines the failed advocacy initiatives in China before transnational AIDS 
institutions were established. This chapter orients the reader to the obstacles to 
mobilization around AIDS, specifically the socialist disease control model of AIDS as 
an immoral western disease. Although China’s two major AIDS outbreaks occurred 
during this time period, the examination illustrates that without external intervention, 
not only did the AIDS movement fail to emerge in a bottom-up way, it was also 
impossible for local communities to recognize transnational resources and opportunities 
as viable options in a highly repressive environment.  
Chapters 4, 5, and 6 explain the historical emergence, transformation, and 
decline of the AIDS movement in China, respectively, before Chapter 7 summarizes the 
practical and theoretical contributions of the dissertation. In Chapter 7, I will also 

















Examining activism in a strong authoritarian country requires attention to the 
larger historical context in which the AIDS movement is situated. This chapter 
considers two potential explanations of the rise, transformation, and decline of China’s 
AIDS movement. The first explanation focuses on changes to the AIDS epidemic itself, 
while the second hinges on shifts in the political opportunity structure of the Chinese 
state. While these two approaches help explain mobilization around AIDS, they are only 
effective in recognizing and explaining features of specific contentious episodes. To 
understand the overall trajectory of the AIDS movement, it is necessary to shift 
attention from domestic factors to transnational structures and processes.  
This chapter argues that neither the epidemiology nor political structure of AIDS 
alone accounts for the patterns of mobilization and repression around AIDS in China 
because they both fail to answer a basic question: what political interests were at stake? 
Conventional social movement studies, especially those examining authoritarian 
contexts, usually study activism taking place in domestic domains where states have 
already established administrative and political control. The existence of actors with 
conflicting interests is assumed as a given starting point of those studies. However, 
AIDS is not a political issue because of something inherent in the nature of the disease 
	   38	  
itself. It did not become a political issue in China until the early 2000s, when the 
Chinese state finally started to build an administrative apparatus around the epidemic 
after simply attempting to ignore or deny it for more than a decade. Applying the 
institutional approach developed in Chapter 1, this chapter examines how AIDS became 
a site of political struggle among actors with an interest in AIDS intervention. I use the 
term “political” here in a narrow sense to refer to activity related to “formal governance 
by nation-states” (Armstrong and Bernstein 2008, 77). This chapter thus demonstrates 
the political content of the AIDS movement and its links to transnational AIDS 
institutional changes, as well as to larger political institutions in China. 
The first section evaluates the adequacy of existing theories for explaining the 
evolution of the AIDS movement in China. The second section sketches the 
institutionalization of transnational AIDS regimes between the late 1980s and 2012, 
showing how this process placed AIDS on the global political agenda, generated a civil 
society institutional model, and undermined the authority of nation states in AIDS 
governance. The third section then turns to a more detailed historical illustration of how 
these institutional changes at the supranational level, combined with domestic factors, 
impacted the shape of domestic AIDS institutions in China. This process transformed 
the nature and operation of power and domination around AIDS, which served as an 
engine driving the dynamics of mobilization and repression as examined in the 
following empirical chapters.  
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I. Domestic Factors: Disease and Authoritarian Power 
 
i. AIDS Epidemics 
 
The evolution of AIDS epidemics contributes to, but cannot fully account for the 
trajectory of AIDS activism. China’s first AIDS case was identified in 1985 in a tourist. 
After the first indigenous AIDS case was identified in 1989, two major AIDS outbreaks 
occurred in China in the late 1980s and the mid-1990s. The first AIDS outbreak 
featured an infection pattern via injecting drug use in the southwest border areas of the 
country. The second major outbreak of AIDS occurred among commercial plasma 
donors in rural areas in east-central provinces between the early and mid-1990s. The 
number of annual reported HIV infections in China increased steadily every year 
between 1995 and 2000, at an average rate of 30% (Cui et al. 2009). The state, however, 
denied the existence of an AIDS epidemic and did not release any epidemic 
information. This caused yet another epidemic among people who were using blood and 
plasma products. The conservative estimate shows that blood contamination caused 
around 300,000 cases of HIV infection (Ministry of Health 2010). By 1998, HIV 
infection had been documented in every region of China (Wu et al. 2007) and was in a 
phase of exponential growth. 
The year 2004 marked a watershed in AIDS governance. It was in this year that 
the central government first publicly acknowledged the existence of a severe AIDS 
epidemic caused by blood contamination. This opened the door for other HIV/AIDS 
cases, especially those infected via contaminated blood, to be reported, and led to a 
spike in the number of annual reported cases (See Figure 2.1). Chapter 4 discusses this 
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scandal in greater detail. The magnitude of HIV/AIDS epidemics in China has not 
dramatically changed since then. According to the joint reports by the State Council 
AIDS Working Committee Office and the UN Theme Group on AIDS, China’s 
HIV/AIDS epidemic has remained one of low prevalence with clusters of high infection 
in certain areas and specific sub-populations. Currently, the HIV infection rate among 
China’s population is 0.05% (range: 0.04-0.07%), while the new infection rate has been 
decreasing even as the epidemic continues to expand. At the end of 2011, the estimated 
number of people living with HIV/AIDS in China was 780,000, of whom 154,000 were 
living with AIDS. Women accounted for 28.6% of those cases. The six provinces with 
the highest cumulative number of reported HIV/AIDS cases are Yunnan, Guangxi, 
Henan, Sichuan, Xinjiang, and Guangdong. They represent 75.8% of the national total.  
Overall, the rate of increase in the growth of the AIDS epidemic has slowed and 
new HIV infections have been contained at a low level. Among newly reported cases, 
sexual transmission has slowly increased since 2004, replacing injecting drug use and 
blood contamination to become the primary mode of transmission of new infection in 
2009. Among Chinese people living with HIV/AIDS in 2011, 46.5% were infected 
through heterosexual contact, 28.4% through injecting drug use, 17.4% through 
homosexual contact, and 6.6% through contaminated blood.11 Of those infected through 
heterosexual transmission, around one third were infected through spousal transmission, 
and two thirds through non-spousal transmission.12 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 People's Republic of China Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS World Health 
Organization, “2011 Estimates for the HIV/AIDS Epidemic in China,” Ministry of Health, 
November 2011. 
12 Ministry of Health, “China 2010 UNGASS Country Progress Report (2008-2009),” April 2, 
2010. 
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However, there has been an upward trend in the number of AIDS patients, both 
among newly reported AIDS cases and in HIV-infected persons who progressed to 
AIDS. There were 154,000 AIDS cases in 2011, compared to 75,000 in 2005. Among 
154,000 Chinese people living with AIDS in 2011, 46.8% contracted HIV through 
heterosexual contact, 26.6% through contaminated blood, 18.8% through injecting drug 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Ministry of Health, Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS, World Health 
Organization, 2011. 
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Figure 2.2 The Distribution of Reported AIDS Cases in China, 2002-200914 
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Figure 2.2 shows the geographic distribution of AIDS patients who received 
treatment between 2002 and 2009, with each county/district stratified by predominant 
modes of HIV transmission. At the same time, the mean annual mortality rate increased 
by 44% between 1999 and 2008, when the mortality rates of most other communicable 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Taken from Zhihui Dou, Ray Chen, Jiahong Xu, et al., “Changing Baseline Characteristics 
among Patients in the China National Free Antiretroviral Treatment Program, 2002–09,” 
International Journal of Epidemiology 2010 (39): 56–64. 
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diseases actually decreased in China (Zhang and Wilson 2012). Between 2002 and 
2008, treatment failed for 25% of patients, with the cumulative treatment failure rate 
increasing to 50% at 5 years (Zhang et al. 2009). Currently, the most concerning 
emerging challenge is increased future transmission of drug-resistant strains of HIV, 
which have caused a continuous increase in AIDS-related mortality. AIDS-related 
deaths were estimated at 25,000 in 2005, 20,000 in 2007, 26,000 in 2009, and 28,000 in 
2011.15  
HIV/AIDS is only one of the many challenges faced by China’s health system. 
80% of deaths in China are caused by non-communicable diseases such as heart disease, 
strokes, diabetes, and chronic lung disease (WHO 2012). Even among communicable 
diseases, both viral hepatitis and bacterial infections such as tuberculosis have much 
higher prevalence rates than HIV.16   
In summary, the evolution of HIV/AIDS epidemics does not explain the 
trajectory of the AIDS movement in China. The mobilization of infected peasants was 
almost ten years later than the AIDS outbreak caused by blood contamination, and 
injecting drug users and female sex workers have not developed substantial activism. In 
contrast, gay male communities in urban areas took action one decade before the 
epidemic actually took place among gay men.  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Ministry of Health, Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS, World Health 
Organization, 2011. 
16 UN Health Partners Group in China, A Health Situation Assessment of the People’s Republic 
of China, 2005; WHO, Country Cooperation Strategy: WHO China Strategic Priorities for 
2009-2003, 2009. 
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ii. Political Opportunity Structure 
 
The trajectory of AIDS activism has not been not characteristic of the Chinese 
political regime. Existing studies note that the Chinese state apparatus has been 
becoming more stable and increasingly repressive against dissidents in general after 
1989, especially between 2004 and 2012 (Ching and Zhang 2013)—making the rise and 
development of AIDS activism, in particular, all the more puzzling.  
The current literature on high-risk activism in authoritarian regimes usually 
starts by examining the polity’s relative accessibility. Such literature is mainly 
influenced by the political process model that focuses on political opportunity 
structures17 to explain when and how protests arise and succeed at certain times and 
places, as well as their development over time, their forms of action, and their outcomes 
(Kurzman 1996; McAdam 1999; McAdam et al. 2001; Tarrow 1994). Political 
opportunity structures can be broadly defined as “consistent but not necessarily formal, 
permanent, or national signals to social or political actors which either encourage or 
discourage them to use their internal resources to form social movements” (Tarrow 
1994, 54). More specifically, the concept refers primarily to the degree of 
democratization and state oppression capacity (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001).18 
This form of conceptualization makes the state a powerful factor in explaining cross-
national differences in mobilization over a long period of time. As political opportunity 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 For a critical review of the concept of political opportunity structures along with its 
application, see McAdam (1996).  
18 The most identifiable dimensions of the political opportunity structure at the national level 
can be listed as follows: the relative openness or closure of the political system, the stability or 
instability of the set of elite political alignments, the presence or absence of elite allies, and the 
state’s capacity and propensity for repression (McAdam 1996; Tarrow 1994). 
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expands, it reduces the power discrepancy between dissidents and political elites, and 
hence improves the prospects for the movement’s emergence and success (McAdam 
1986). In the context of authoritarian states, the power of political elites manifests itself 
in terms of infrastructural power, the capacity of the state “to penetrate civil society and 
to implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm” (Mann 1986, 113). 
When we look at China’s political structure and its changes over the past two 
decades, we find that China has been a continuously high capacity authoritarian state, 
well-equipped to established a monopoly of violence, regulate institutions, and extract 
resources. As many scholars agree, China has become one of the most enduring 
dictatorships since “it has remained remarkably stable in the face of mounting domestic 
social unrest for more than a decade” (Ching 2013, 1476). The year 1989 brought the 
now infamous crackdown on the Tiananmen Democracy Movement that stands as the 
watershed in China’s political history since market economic reform first started in the 
late 1970s. Whereas the pre-Tiananmen period featured a shift from China’s planned 
economy and radical socialist ideology, the Tiananmen turmoil generated the problem 
of ensuring political stability and set a conservative tone for the political atmosphere in 
general. 
The current political apparatus to maintain social stability was founded in the 
early 1990s in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union. The major goal was to 
perpetuate the Party’s monopoly of power by enhancing its capacity to rule. After two 
years of planning, the Party officially placed maintaining social stability at the center of 
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its agenda in 199119 and wrote it into the General Program of the CCP Constitution in 
1992 as follows: 
The Party will strengthen comprehensive measures to maintain law and order, 
and resolutely combat criminal activities that endanger national security and 
interests, social stability and economic development and bring criminals to 
justice in accordance with the law, so as to maintain lasting social stability.20  
 “Comprehensive measures of public security” (SheHui ZhiAn ZongHe ZhiLi) thus 
replaced the “people’s dictatorship”21 (RenMin ZhuanZheng) to become the political 
apparatus to institute surveillance and repression of social unrest. Developed in the Mao 
era, the principle of people’s dictatorship provided the legitimacy for the state to use 
coercive violence to repress dissidents in order to defend the Party’s power. This 
system, primarily based on socialist ideology, mainly relied on mass campaigns 
combined with the army, police, and courts. The founding of the Central Committee for 
Comprehensive Management of Public Security in 1991 marked a transition to a 
coercive institution constituted primarily by the police and courts. This Committee 
serves as the national leading body of the Party to direct various levels of government to 
manage forms of social instability.22 Since the Party issued the regulation “On 
Enhancing Comprehensive Measures of Public Security,” this newly strengthened 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 CPC Central Committee and the State Council, Decision on Intensifying the Improvement of 
Public Security by Taking Comprehensive Measures (Chinese), February 19, 1991. This was 
erected into law as the Decision of the People’s Congress on Intensifying the Improvement of 
Public Security by Taking Comprehensive Measures. 
20 “General Program,” Constitution of the Communist Party of China, amended and adopted at 
the Fourteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China (Chinese), March 1991.   
21 Mao Tse-Tung, “On the People’s Democratic Dictatorship,” June 30, 1949. 
22 “The Central Committee for Comprehensive Management of Public Security Established,” 
Xinhua News Agency, March 22, 1991; “The First Meeting of the Central Committee for 
Comprehensive Management of Public Security was Held in Beijing,” Xinhua News Agency,  
March, 22, 1991. 
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apparatus has been adopting an increasingly hardline polices towards dissidents (See 
Figure 2.2).  
 
Figure 2.2 Number of Political Crimes-related Arrests (unit: individual) and 




One of the factors that helped to consolidate Hu Jintao’s Leninist governance 
line25 was the Orange Revolution in the Ukraine. Top Chinese leaders were convinced 
by the explanation that the Orange Revolution resulted from the collaboration of 
western agencies and aspiring domestic NGOs in east European countries. A central 
coordinating institution was thus established to strengthen the political apparatus in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 According to China’s new criminal code (1997), political crimes were redefined as 
endangering state security, replacing the previous offense of contra-revolution (1979). It 
includes charges against subversion, inciting subversion, secession, and leaking of state secrets. 
24 China Statistical Yearbook, 1999-2010. 
25 Internal Party struggle and debate have never stopped. Neither the Central Committee nor the 
central government has achieved unity in terms of general principles and policies. Officials 
from police and security departments complained about the inconsistency and weakness of 
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targeting transnational activism after Hu came back from his visit to east European 
countries in 2004.26 Tasked with “anti-penetration” and “risk prevention,”27 this 
institution was created as a joint committee of the Ministry of Civil Affairs, Foreign 
Affairs, State Security, and Public Security. This committee attempts to extend the 
scope of regime capacity by intensifying scrutiny of Chinese society and Sino-western 
transnational networks. The joint committee meets every month and invites specific 
functional departments to attend meetings regarding their specific issue areas. With 
State Security and Public Security playing leading roles, the committee focuses on 
coercive strategies.  
In 2006, the Chinese Central Military Commission issued a directive that 
allowed the mobilization of the military in support of local governments when incidents 
are deemed to threaten local social or political stability. Moreover, the easy escalation 
of collective petitions into more disruptive modes of action has also led the central and 
local governments to re-emphasize the five-person limit in collective petitions since 
2005, when a new directive on petitions took effect. 
Despite the relative decentralization that accompanied market reforms, the 
Party-State has retained, although not always enforced, much of the coercive capacity 
built up during the Maoist totalitarian period.  The public security expense of the central 
government increased from RMB 61,340,000 in 2005 to RMB 875,770,000 in 2008, 
and to RMB 1,475,420,000 in 2010.28  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Interview 3144 (Government), June 16, 2009. 
27 Interview 31122 (Government), July 29, 2009. “Anti-penetration” means preventing the 
penetration of western forces into the socialist regime. 
28 The listed numbers are only a small part of the national government’s expenditure on public 
security. The Fourth Session of the Tenth National People’s Congress, Annual Report on the 
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Had AIDS activism been determined by the political opportunity structure, we 
would not have expected the rise of the AIDS movement around the early 2000s, let 
alone its expansion to the national level after 2004. To produce a completely systematic 
evaluation of the Chinese state’s capacity would require a more extensive analysis than 
can be presented here. Nevertheless, the discussion is intended primarily to orient the 
reader to the domestic mobilization challenges faced by Chinese activists.  
 
II. Challenging Dictators: The Institutionalization of  
Transnational AIDS Regimes 
 
i. Transnational AIDS Institutions: Civil Society as an Organizational Model 
 
Transnational AIDS institutions see AIDS as much more than a health problem, 
and as such, they advocate a comprehensive and coordinated set of measures involving 
all sectors of society—government, civil society, business, and communities (see Table 
2.1). They are characterized by non-state actors’ direct involvement in and contribution 
to not only policymaking and implementation, but also the provision of public goods. 
At the center of transnational AIDS institutions’ normative framework is that national 
health ministries do not have central authority over AIDS governance. Rather, AIDS 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Budgetary Performance of the Central and Local Governments in 2005 and the Draft 
Expenditure Budget in 2006 (Chinese), March 6, 2006; The Second Session of the Eleventh 
National People’s Congress, Excerpts from the Annual Report on the Budgetary Performance of 
the Central and Local Governments in 2008 and the Draft Expenditure Budget in 2009 
(Chinese), March 15, 2009; The Fourth Session of the Eleventh National People’s Congress, 
Annual Report on the Budgetary Performance of the Central and Local Governments in 2010 
and the Draft Expenditure Budget in 2011 (Chinese), March 17, 2011.  
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programs must include civil society actors, especially people living with HIV/AIDS, as 
equal partners with governments (Buse and Walt 2000; Dodgson et al. 2002). 
 
Table 2.1 Comparison of International and Transnational AIDS Institutions 
 International AIDS Institutions Transnational AIDS Institutions 
Funding Year 1985 1996 
Framing of AIDS A domestic health matter A global political concern 
Key Actors National health ministries 
WHO 
National health ministries 
International governmental   








State leadership Local community strengthening 
Norm(s) of Rule Sovereignty Deterritorialization  
Human rights 
Multisectoralism  




Transnational AIDS institutions represent a significant shift from traditional 
international health institutions, which were first and foremost state-centric. This 
previous system considered AIDS as a domestic health issue of certain countries. In 
fact, international health, by definition, referred to “health issues of countries other than 
one’s own, especially those of low-income and middle-income” (Koplan et al. 2009, 
1993). International health institutions only recognized national health ministries, the 
World Health Organization (hereafter WHO), and a relatively small group of national 
medical research agencies as major actors. Following a traditional approach to 
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communicable disease control, international institutions defined AIDS in terms of 
individual risk behaviors and designated intervention programs focused around 
information, education, and clinic services.29 Within the international health system, 
every matter related to AIDS had to be handled with or through national health 
ministries. This approach was represented by the Global Program of AIDS (GPA) of the 
World Health Organization. GPA focused on the ramifications of infectious diseases for 
the health service delivery of national governments.  It identified “national governments 
[as] central to the response”30 and stated that the success of the fight against AIDS relied 
on the performance of national health ministries. Accordingly, the GPA not only 
confined its goal to providing technical assistance to national governments, but also 
limited its partners to national ministries. Within this institutional arrangement, local 
NGOs did not occupy autonomous subjectivities or have sufficient  political power to 
effect social change. In a more extreme statement, local NGOs—especially those in 
developing countries—were only considered to be playing “the receptor-site role” 
through “receiving and transmitting signals from world society to state authorities and 
thus catalyzing policy adoption” (Frank 2007, 289).  
In contrast, transnational AIDS institutions largely rest upon three principal 
norms: (1) a deterritorialization that locates the AIDS epidemic in a global context, 
thereby legitimating global policy intervention (Dodgson et al. 2002); (2) a human 
rights framing of AIDS-specific concerns as related to broader social justice issues 
(Gruskin et al. 2007); and (3) a form of multisectoralism that emphasizes the inclusive 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 World Health Organization, “The Global AIDS Strategy,” WHO AIDS Series (Series 11), 
1992.  
30 Jonathan M. Mann, Daniel J. M. Tarantola, and Thomas W. Netter, eds., AIDS in the World. 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), 365. 
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participation of non-state actors as a way to bolster the effectiveness of intervention 
(Buse and Walt 2000).  
These three norms constitute the pillars for a particular organizational model of 
civil society participation. While many other issue-oriented transnational institutions—
such as those concerned with human rights and the environment, for example—
recognize the significance of civil society engagement, transnational AIDS institutions 
are the only ones to build the financial infrastructure to channel substantial resources 
directly to civil society organizations at the local level. This financial infrastructure is 
composed of three transnational health initiatives—the World Bank's Multi-country 
HIV/AIDS Programme (MAP), the Global Fund, and the President's Emergency Plan 
For AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). These initiatives provide “a blueprint for financing, 
resourcing, coordinating and/or implementing disease control across at least several 
countries in more than one region of the world” (Brugha 2008, 72), and they contribute 
more than two thirds of all direct external funding for AIDS. Not only do they 
circumvent national health ministries and deliver resources directly to civil society 
organizations, these initiatives also play a significant role in promoting civil society 
engagement at the national level.  
It is important to note that civil society refers to “a recognized area of 
institutional life” (DiMaggio and Powell 1991, 65) as an essential constituent part of the 
organizational model promoted by transnational AIDS institutions. This definition is 
related to, but not the same as the view of civil society commonly held in political 
sociology literature. Usually civil society is treated as an autonomous sphere of social 
power independent of the state. Scholars and policy makers are particularly enthusiastic 
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about associational life in authoritarian contexts because civil society presumably 
generates autonomy from traditional politics, whereby “citizens can pressure 
authoritarians for change, protect themselves from tyranny, and democratize from 
below” (Foley and Edwards 1996, 46). This conception of civil society does not 
designate who can be included as a civil society actor or what form that actorhood must 
take; nor  does it require civil society to fulfill certain functions.  
In contrast, in transnational AIDS governance, civil society is a distinctive 
institutional model and organizational form based on policy effectiveness. Civil society 
is defined as a collective of community organizations    
who act at the community level to deliver community-based services and 
activities, and to promote improved practice and policies. This includes many 
civil society organizations, groups and individuals that work with communities, 
particularly community-based organizations, nongovernmental organizations 
and faith-based organizations (FBOs), and networks or associations of people 
affected by particular challenges such as HIV.31 
This model of civil society integrates a wide range of non-state actors, especially people 
living with HIV/AIDS. It operates according to the premise that the old approach 
relying on a centralized national government does not work. The locus of AIDS policies 
and decision-making shall be decentralized to affected communities through the 
representation of NGOs. AIDS is not just a disease, but a crisis associated with citizens’ 
rights and access to decision-making. Any effective response to AIDS must expand 
beyond the traditional confines of the health sector and employ a combination of health- 
and non-health-based interventions. 
This institutional model of civil society has two important consequences. First, it 
defines the legitimate characters and scripts of local organizational actors, and outlines 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Global Fund, “Community Systems Strengthening Framework,” August 2011.  
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how local groups can transform to resemble the general and abstract concept of NGOs. 
This model recognizes that the spread and impact of AIDS is shaped by various 
asymmetrical social relations and forms of inequality. It thus emphasizes that AIDS-
related issues must be resolved in the local political contexts in which the disease grows 
and spreads. On the other hand, this model focuses on promoting certain organizational 
arrangements and behaviors linking inputs provided by transnational AIDS institutions 
to performance as improved health outcomes. NGOs are designated to perform specific 
functions in a country’s health system, from delivering services and monitoring 
government behavior to advocating on behalf of particular communities. NGO 
organizational capacity is understood in terms of leadership, networking, accountability, 
and possession of management skills, information, and resources, all of which can be 
clearly defined, operationalized, and measured by numbers. For example, the Global 
Fund has compiled a detailed list of indicators of NGO working process and output 
indicators, one of which is organization training, measured as:  
[The numerator] as total number of targeted community-based organizations that 
have at least one staff member or volunteer who received training or retraining 
according to nationally recommended guidelines (where such guidelines exist) 
in management, leadership or accountability during the last 12 months and who 
is still working for the community-based organization at the time of reporting” 
and “[denominator] as total number of community-based organizations in a 
targeted area.32 
Second, this model circumscribes the ways in which transnational AIDS 
institutions, states, and local NGOs shall interact with each other as “equal” partners. 
This is represented by the Global Fund, which was created as a new transnational 
institution to embrace multisectoral partnership between government, civil society, 
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private sector, and affected communities. The Global Fund’s international constituency 
board is comprised of representatives of donor and recipient governments, NGOs, the 
private sector, and affected communities. Among board members, there are 9 regional 
seats, 6 donor countries, 2 NGOs, 1 private foundation, 1 private company, 1 
representative of someone living with the disease, and 4 non-voting advisory seats 
representing the WHO, UNAIDS, the World Bank and a Swiss member, respectively. 
At the national level, the Global Fund has a country coordinating mechanism (CCM) to 
administer its operation within the country, composed of representatives from 
governmental, civil society, and private sector groups. The country coordinating 
mechanism is meant to be the governing body by which local stakeholders deliberate 
and collectively design grant proposals, design new health programs in line with current 
infrastructure, and tailor program implementation strategies in order to specifically 
allow “national ownership and [to] respect country-led formulation and implementation 
processes.”33 
Such a model of civil society is political by nature because it delineates the roles 
and boundaries of responsibility held respectively by international organizations, states 
and non-state actors, as well as the relationships between them “for the conditions that 
constrain or enable health and for delivery of health and related services” (Hein et al. 
2007, 132). At the same time, it strives to address AIDS-related vulnerability and 
powerlessness from a more technical perspective and within a framework that 
designates the role of NGOs in operational terms. The next section sketches the rise and 
expansion of this model, before turning to how this process has impacted China. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Global Fund, Global Fund Framework Document, 2.  
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ii. Institutionalization of Transnational AIDS Regimes 
 
Transnational AIDS institutions have evolved through institutionalizing the 
participation of non-governmental organizations and people living with HIV/AIDS. By 
institutionalization, I refer to the process by which the norms of deterritorialization, 
human rights, and multisectoralism are translated into organizational structures and 
decision-making procedures.34 Using terms from international relations studies, we can 
describe this as a process to turn norms as “standards of behavior defined in terms of 
right and obligations” (Keohane 1984, 4) into rules to “forbid, require, or permit 
particular kinds of actions” (Simmons and Martin 2002, 194). These rules provide 
specific prescriptions and proscriptions for organizations with an AIDS-intervention 
focus, including both national governments and NGOs, and expectations regarding their 
roles, positions, and inter-relations.  
The emergence (late 1980s–early 1990s), formation (1995–2002), and 
consolidation (2003–2012) of transnational AIDS institutions was driven by three 
underlying processes: the establishment of norms, the development of organizational 
structures, and the development of effective techniques and strategies in treatment and 
prevention (See Figure 2.3). While the norms of deterritorialization and human rights 
were created in the mid-1980 and mid-1990s, respectively, the formal institutional 
structures were not put in place at the same time. For a long period, then, transnational 
AIDS institutions remained largely declaratory and promotional, without binding 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Given limited space, this section can only highlight certain aspects of this process. It is 
important to note that the development of transnational AIDS institutions did not follow a linear 
path, but was filled with conflicts and contradictions. Transnational AIDS institutions are not a 
unitary and cohesive entity with a single dominant culture.  	  
	   57	  
structures or implementation procedures that provided more specific injunctions for 
appropriate state action (Donnelly 1986).  Figure 2.4 displays the evolution of 
transnational AIDS institutions and highlights major events in this process.  
 
Figure 2.3 A Schematic Model of Transnational AIDS Institutions 
 
 
This situation started to change in the mid-1990s with the emergence of 
multisectoralism, which officially placed civil society in AIDS governance structures 
and created formal links to channel the influence of transnational regimes into domestic 
policy domains. Multisectoralism refers to “public-private partnership between 
governments, civil society, the private sector and affected communities” to “attract, 
manage and disburse resources.”35 Two groups of actors played major roles in this 
process: activists, primarily those in the global North working from the bottom-up, and 
the United Nations working from the top-down. Because of the early perception of 
AIDS as a “western gay disease” (Adam et al. 1999; Epstein 1994; Norman 1985), 
African governments denied the existence of AIDS and blamed the western media for 
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  Global Fund, Global Fund Framework Document, Section 3. 
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inventing AIDS-related issues in the 1980s.36 western industrial countries were on the 
front lines of the early fight against AIDS, and the United States played a vanguard role 
in the emergence and mobilization of AIDS movements (Adam et al. 1999; Altman 
1994, 1999). American activists were also among the first to become aware of the 
unprecedented expansion of AIDS in the South (Merson et al. 2008).  
These activists succeeded in turning AIDS into an important issue in the 
American political landscape and established a political advocacy model of NGOs with 
three important characteristics. First, this model featured community-based 
organizations and American volunteerism associated with doubt about state control 
(Altman 1986; Epstein 1998). Second, preexisting gay and lesbian movements served as 
a foundation and stimulus to this new form of organizing. For example, most 
organizations were concentrated in the same large coastal cities where such movements 
were concentrated. Thirdly, organizations were mainly led by white, middle-class, and 
educated gay men (Kayal 1993; Wilton 1994), who were already equipped with an 
advanced awareness of politics, along with other forms of cultural capital, which they 
used to challenge the medical profession. Overall, the development of AIDS NGOs was 
closely related to gays as a particular social category and was defined by gay 
communities’ experiences and struggles in relation to the particular forms of 
domination in the U.S. This civil society participation model thus developed around 
identity building and AIDS politicization (Adam et al.1999), which put the engine of 
worldwide AIDS movements into motion.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 John Grauerholz, “From Alma Ata to AIDS: the Russian’s WHO Operation to Destroy 
Africa,” Executive Intelligence Review 12, no. 49 (December 13, 1985): 13–14.	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Marking the formation of transnational AIDS institutions, UNAIDS was 
launched as an innovative “joint and co-sponsored” institution in 1996. Its creation was 
largely driven by frustration with the old state-centric system represented by the WHO. 
While other UN programmes37 mainly concentrated on the coordination of national 
governments, UNAIDS was the first UN agency to include NGOs on its executive 
governing board,38 thus granting them a status that far exceeded the formal or informal 
consultative status endowed by other UN bodies. UNAIDS also became one of the main 
advocates for constructing a multisectoral framework as the guiding model for building 
national AIDS governance architectures. The objective of a multisectoral response to 
AIDS was first suggested by UNAIDS.39 Its major goal was to achieve and promote 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Those programmes included the environment, education, poverty eradication, and food 
security, among others. 
38 UNAIDS operates under the authority of an executive board called the Programme 
Coordinating Board (PCB), which brings together 22 member states, the ten co-sponsoring 
organizations, and five representatives of NGOs. It means NGOs are granted formal 
participation as well as decision and voting rights. 	  
39 UNAIDS/PCB (2), July 1995.  
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Figure 2.4 Transnational AIDS Institutions Timeline 
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Transnational AIDS institutions were further advanced around 2000, when the 
significance of AIDS was finally established on the global political landscape.40 Not 
only was AIDS the major disease included in the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs),41 the term “multisectoral governance” was also put forth as the primary 
legitimate model for combating AIDS in the Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS 
at the 2001 UN General Assembly Special Session.42 More than a rhetorical statement, 
the Declaration explicitly granted legitimacy to NGOs to participate in policy-making, 
program implementation, and reviewing processes at both of the UN and country 
levels.43 It also specified their roles and positions relative to states: 
A strong civil society flourishes in an environment in which the state allows for 
such nongovernmental organization participation. In an activist mode, civil 
society organizations must be empowered by law and daily practice to organize, 
publish and collect information, which having legal resources to the courts and, 
if necessary the option to demonstrate. As active participants in policy and 
programming design and implementation, they must be at the table, right from 
the beginning.44 
A new transnational entity, the Global Fund, was introduced at the meeting to 
establish an institutional infrastructure that would build and diffuse multisectoral 
governance at the country level, designating the institutional blueprint for multisectoral 
architectures and activities. Along with the World Bank's Multi-country HIV/AIDS 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 UN Security Council, “UN Security Council Holds Debate on Impact of AIDS on Peace and 
Security in Africa,” SC/6781, January 8, 2000; UN General Assembly, “Review of the Problem 
of Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome in All Its Aspects,” 
A/RES/54/283, 2000. 	  
41 It is noted that the health sector as a whole was largely marginalized within the UN during 
that period of time (Hulme 2009).	  
42 A/RES/S-26/2, 2001. 	  
43 UN Non-Governmental Liaison Service, “Voice from Africa 10: NGO Responses to 
HIV/AIDS,” 2001. 
44 UNAIDS, “Report on the Global HIV/AIDS Epidemic,” 2002, 179. 
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Programme (MAP) and the President's Emergency Plan For AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), 
the Global Fund marked the consolidation of transnational AIDS institutions and jump 
started resources available for AIDS programs at the supranational level. Together, 
these three programs contributed more than two-thirds of all external funding to AIDS 
programs in resource-poor countries (see Figure 2.5). All of them emphasized 
delivering resources directly to local NGOs in order to substantiate civil society 
participation. 




All three multisectoral initiatives have enabled local NGOs to gain direct access 
to financial resources, and boosted the diversification of non-state actors in AIDS 
governance. The Global Fund has the tightest conditions, stimulating that all the country 
coordinating mechanisms must include NGOs in preparing proposals and applying for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 UNAIDS, “Using Strategic Information to Optimize Outcomes and Resources,” A 
Presentation at the 1st International and 5th National HIV Congress, October 24, 2012; UNAIDS, 
“2008 Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic,” 2008. 
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funding. For example, the Global Fund’s China program started in 2003. Since then, it 
has approved over 800 million dollars to AIDS intervention in China, 30% of which 
was meant to be allocated to NGOs.  
 
III. Challenging Authoritarian Rule:  
AIDS Governance, the Chinese State, and Transnational Institutions 
 
How did the institutionalization of transnational AIDS regimes impact China 
when the authoritarian state was striving to strengthen its rule? It was not until AIDS 
was placed on the international political agenda that AIDS governance began to emerge 
as an independent policy domain in China, almost ten years after the first major 
epidemic outbreak. Transnational AIDS institutions put the issue of AIDS squarely on 
the government’s agenda, despite the state’s efforts since the early 2000s to simply 
avoid the issue. Importantly, the particular governance model promoted by transnational 
AIDS institutions decenters the role of states in public health and grants legitimacy to 
grassroots self-organizing. The fact that AIDS politics described by transnational 
institutions are no longer confined to state regimes, but are characterized by increasing 
inclusion of non-state actors fundamentally challenge the primary principle of 
authoritarian rule—that the Party is the sole actor with legitimate final authority in 
every domain of social life.  
Generally speaking, as the institutionalization of transnational AIDS regimes has 
increased, so too has the impact of these regimes on China. As discussed in Chapter 1, 
the various impacts of transnational AIDS regimes can be understood as their collective 
“effectiveness” in China. The more effective the implementation, the more influential 
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transnational AIDS institutions are in China, and the more changes they solicit in 
domestic AIDS politics manifested in state and activist action.46 The effectiveness of 
transnational institutions evolves along two dimensions (Levy 1995): one is the shared 
normative expectation of acceptable behavior in AIDS governance, while the other is 
the formalization of rules (see Figure 2.6). Effectiveness relies on the degree of a 
transnational regime’s institutionalization.  
 
Figure 2.6 The Effectiveness of Transnational AIDS Institutions in China 
 
Initially, between 1989 and 1998, transnational AIDS institutions had barely any 
impact on domestic politics in China, as the institutions remained at an embryonic 
stage. AIDS as a policy issue domain simply did not exist at the national level when the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 As debatable as it is in current literature, effectiveness and compliance are two different 
concepts. Only compliance constitutes a necessary condition of a transnational regime’s 
significance to a state, while effectiveness indicates changes in state behavior no matter whether 
they are rule consistent or not. In other words, as long as transnational AIDS institutions 
provoke reactions from the Chinese state, they are effective even when the state reacts by 
breaking the rule. 
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central government was convinced that AIDS as a western disease would not threaten 
China. When AIDS cases were first diagnosed, the central government took an attitude 
of avoidance. Throughout the 1990s, the Chinese state was not interested in building its 
institutional capacity to exercise control and develop policy choices in AIDS 
governance. For example, a monitoring and surveillance system did not exist in Beijing 
throughout the 1990s, and the Center for Disease Control and Prevention lacked a 
specialized unit to administer AIDS. Indeed, two officers in the gonorrhea unit under 
the sexually transmitted disease office were responsible for handling matters related to 
AIDS.47 This lack of interest was compounded by the fact that public health as a whole 
had been politically marginalized since the late 1980s (Cook 2007; Wang 2008). 
Following the marketization of health services following the 1994 tax reform and 1995 
healthcare reform, public health systems suffered from a lack of political commitment 
and financial investment. The major theme of those reforms was to commercialize 
medical services and transfer responsibility for health financing to local, especially 
county and township, governments. Disease control and prevention were hurt most 
when public funds from local fiscal avenues could barely cover administrative 
expenditure since local governments had little incentive to invest in long-term health 
development.  
In the second stage, 1999–2003, transnational AIDS institutions took notice of 
the AIDS epidemics in China and this led to attention from foreign media, international 
organizations, international NGOs, and western governments. The formalization of 
multisectoral frameworks drew international attention to the AIDS epidemic in China, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Interview 335 (Government), July 15, 2013. 
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as it was primarily bilateral and multilateral funding that supported China’s AIDS 
programs (Sun et al. 2010; Wu et al. 2007). The sudden surge of attention was first 
triggered by the blood selling and contamination scandal and then intensified by the 
state’s repression of AIDS activists. A variety of entities publicly condemned the 
Chinese government’s inaction surrounding blood contamination, and stated that 
China’s AIDS-related strategies were not up to international standards. The emergence 
of AIDS as an international political issue captured the Chinese state’s attention, but 
still not enough for the state to agree to put an AIDS governance infrastructure in place 
with formal organizations and procedures. The Chinese state could not entirely dismiss 
the new transnational norms surrounding AIDS governance, but neither could it accept 
them. Instead, the state continued to insist on a monopoly over disease control, deny the 
severity of the epidemic, and ignore the demands for an independent AIDS governance 
domain.  
The third stage, 2004–2007, can be described as a period of “tactical 
concession” (Risse and Sikkink 1999), during which the central government made 
concessions in the face of a spike in international pressure, especially after the SARS 
crisis in 2003.48 This moment constituted a “tipping point,” when the three major norms 
of transnational AIDS institutions were recognized and embraced by a critical mass of 
states (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). The Chinese state was forced to make its first 
display of political commitment to fighting AIDS,49 by launching a process of domestic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 “China Shows It Is Responsible,” China Daily (Chinese), June 30, 2003.	  
49 Political commitment refers to the extent to which top-level government leaders acknowledge 
the HIV/AIDS crisis and support AIDS as a priority on the national agenda. While it is 
considered one of the most crucial elements in the AIDS Program Effort Index (API), political 
commitment is commonly indicated by whether the head of the state and/or other senior 
officials publicly mention AIDS issues (USAID, UNAIDS, WHO and the Policy Project 2003)	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AIDS governance-building. This process had several facets: accepting the framing of 
AIDS as a political issue, starting to develop a domestic AIDS issue domain by setting 
up agendas; establishing governing organizations; and formulating policies and 
procedures. Transnational AIDS institutions displaced the authority of nation-states and 
the Chinese state now faced the challenge of how to control this new space created by 
transnational regimes. From the state’s perspective, establishing an AIDS policy area 
was simultaneously about building organizational structures and practices that could 
increase the authoritarian regime’s ability to withstand external pressure. Far more than 
in any other areas, transnational AIDS institutions had already obtained a high degree of 
autonomy, robustness, and legitimacy by 2003. The central government had no choice 
but to start to working with various transnational entities. This stage was characterized 
by strategic bargaining and instrumental adaptation on the government side, and 
normative and persuasion via economic and normative means on the transnational side.  
The year 2004 was also when the process of bureaucratic administration started 
to develop and expand in AIDS control. The Beijing Center for Disease Control and 
Prevention set up a dedicated department with nearly thirty officers to conduct AIDS 
monitoring and intervention work. As one government officer described, “all of sudden 
money was dropping from the sky. Projects related to AIDS sprang up all over the place 
in the past 10 years.”50 Figure 2.7 shows the national AIDS program budget from the 
central government, which takes up almost half of all the funding in public health from 
the central finance between 2003 and 2008 (Cheng 2008). This shift of attention, as 
another government officer explained, was “due to political reasons. It hardly had much 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Interview 335 (Government), July 15, 2013.  
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to do with AIDS epidemics. We have many other important public health issues but 
only AIDS became a political hot button at the time.”51  





The fourth stage, 2008–2010, was not marked by norm socialization of the 
Chinese state, as human rights scholars had hoped (Risse and Sikkink 1998), but neither 
did the Chinese state simply go back to public non-compliance. This period was 
characterized instead by “decoupling” (Meyer and Rowan 1977) as the state sought to 
balance the approval of transnational AIDS institutions with its actual (un)willingness 
to implement transnational norms. The impact of transnational AIDS institutions was 
further scaled up to the national level when a variety of actors—including multisectoral 
initiatives, international organizations, western countries, and private foundations—
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Interview 44 (Government), July 17, 2013. 
52 Yan Cui, Adrian Liau, and Zunyou Wu, “An Overview of the History of Epidemic of and 
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invested heavily in building a multisectoral governance structure in China. They did this 
by attempting to cover nearly every aspect of AIDS-related activities: planning and 
budgeting, HIV/AIDS surveillance, primary prevention, testing and counseling, 
antiretroviral therapy treatment, case management, monitoring and evaluation, 
administrative capacity building, and promotion of grassroots NGO involvement. Not 
only did these projects contribute to one-third of the resources provided for the AIDS 
response (Sun et al. 2010), they also extended over two-thirds of Chinese territory. In 
particular, around 13 million USD was invested to increase civil society participation in 
AIDS governance between 2005 and 2009.53 These projects promoted activities among 
new subpopulations in China, such as homosexuals,54 and penetrated into new areas of 
social life beyond state-delineated space. Such projects were, thus, seen as representing 
a disruptive new potential to the authoritarian order. Yet, at the same time, the 
intervention of external actors inadvertently turned AIDS into an important target for 




This chapter describes the shifting character of AIDS politics both in China and 
in the transnational realm, and tracing their interaction in a broader historical context. It 
examines a basic question: Why does AIDS matter? This analysis is a response to recent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 International Cooperation Programs (China), 2010. International Co-operation Programme 
Management Office of the National Center for AIDS/STD Control and Prevention  (China), 
2005, 2009. Global Fund Annual Reports, 2006-2010. 	  
54 I don't mean “new” in the sense that homosexuals were a new phenomenon in China, but 
rather, they were a subpopulation that became newly active and recognized as an object for 
governance during this period. 
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appeals for returning to an earlier tradition in political sociology and understanding why 
social movements assume various political contents (Fligstein and McAdam 2010; 
McAdam and Boudet 2012; Oliver 2012). Some scholars have raised concerns that 
current studies often reduce the actual substance of social movements to a historical 
background “that was implicitly set aside as a separate matter—preconditions that 
provided the raw material for mobilization, but were outside the scope of the theoretical 
problem” (Walder 2009, 398). As Walder further points out, social movement studies 
have become so narrowly preoccupied by the question of participation and mobilization 
that “we have ended up with a subfield that aims to explain the conditions under which 
a movement—of any type—can grow and succeed, but we no longer have explanations 
to offer about variation in the substantive content of a movement—the type of politics 
that it represents” (2009, 398). It was AIDS politics, rather than the disease of AIDS or 
domestic political opportunities, that generated a movement.  
While the rest of this dissertation explores the evolution of AIDS activist 
actorhood, this chapter has sought to explain the clash of interests that has driven AIDS-
related political contention in China. AIDS politics in China have emerged in a context 
within which multiple overlapping but conflicting processes of institutional building 
processes coexist and interact with one another. While the Chinese state did not initially 
consider AIDS to be an area important to its political power, the increasing impact of 
transnational AIDS institutions turned this formerly unnoticed domain into something 
that directly challenged the authoritarian regime, and then, ironically, into an arena in 
which the regime could attempt to expand its control. AIDS governance has become a 
battleground on which the Chinese state now competes with transnational institutions 
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and domestic activists for authority. Without the intervention of transnational AIDS 
institutions, neither the trajectory of the AIDS epidemic itself nor the political 
opportunity structure alone would have led to AIDS activism developing as it did in 
China. 
This chapter also shows how the civil society model, rooted in the global North, 
was imported from the top-down throughout transnational institutional channels in the 
global programming against HIV/AIDS. NGOs’ organizational and political intentions, 
behaviors, and actions are constructed and maintained by the multisectoral norms of 
transnational AIDS institutions, and play an important role in the monitoring and 
advocacy of global health policy at the country level. Therefore, NGOs are capable of 
producing social change as a result of the growing impact of transnational AIDS 
institutions. However, as the politicization of AIDS took place outside the local context 
within which the epidemic and its related problems were produced, local communities 
were subsumed into the role of forming NGOs in order to fulfill the role of representing 
civil society in opposition to both the state and the market. The following chapters 
examine how the changing influence of transnational AIDS institutions has further 
shaped mobilization and repression.   














Between 1986 and 1999, there were major outbreaks of HIV/AIDS in China 
among injecting drug users in borderland regions and among commercial plasma donors 
in rural areas. Yet, these outbreaks were largely met with silence and indifference on the 
part of both the Chinese government and society. It is not unusual for government 
reactions to lag behind the spread of HIV/AIDS (Padamsee 2007), but such delays in 
other countries have served to mobilize the affected communities therein (Epstein 1998; 
Gruskin 2007; Richardson and Seidman 2002). In China, by contrast, early AIDS 
activism in the 1990s was not among the most affected populations; rather, early 
activism focused on homosexual men and was initiated by heterosexual men in urban 
areas. What is more puzzling is that, despite a relatively relaxed political environment, 
advocacy initiatives remained in their infancy during the 1990s and did not constitute a 
“movement.” This chapter examines this early phrase of AIDS organizing prior to 1999, 
and explores what shaped its trajectory and hindered its development.  
The focus here is on AIDS activist actorhood in China between 1989 and 1999, 
before transnational AIDS institutions intervened. The predecessors of later key 
advocacy organizations and activists appeared during this period. They pioneered a 
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repertoire of goals, tactics, and actions that had a far-reaching impact on later 
mobilization. However, they were not able to transform their individual efforts into a 
broader form of mobilization, especially as activists disagreed about the validity of an 
international sexual-identity-based AIDS movement model. An analysis of this time 
period is critical because it illuminates, by contrast, the dramatic nature of the rise of the 
Chinese AIDS movement that was to embrace transnational resources and norms in the 
subsequent period. 
This chapter focuses on four empirical questions: Why did early AIDS 
initiatives only emerge around homosexual men, a population that was relatively 
unaffected by AIDS at the time? Why did these initiatives take on a domestic, 
fragmented, and non-confrontational form that focused on homosexuality or sexuality in 
general? Why did such sexuality-focused activities choose to reject the international 
agendas of identity politics? And why did the state respond to such nonthreatening 
activism with coercion?  
China’s AIDS activism in the 1990s appears exceptional because existing 
literature tends to assume that domestic actors always endorse international resources 
(Liu 2006). The purpose of this chapter is, thus, to highlight the problem with such an 
assumption, and to examine the particularity of domestic AIDS governance that 
circumvented the formation of AIDS politics in China in the 1990s. The chapter also 
describes the domestic institutional context in which transnational AIDS institutions 
would, indeed, have a significant impact—but not until later than existing theories 
would have predicted.  
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This focus on the particularity of domestic factors in China cannot be separated 
from an understanding of how they related to transnational actors and actions. Empirical 
studies in this area often start with preexisting local actors and focus on how they 
respond to international and domestic structural shifts (Shin and Tsutsui 2007). Instead, 
I focus on the ways in which power and domination were organized in public health and 
how this shaped the construction of AIDS activist actorhood, including its 
constituencies of heterosexual institutional elites, its goal of de-pathologizing 
homosexuality, its decision to conduct nonpolitical and non-confrontational action, and 
its preference against drawing on international resources and norms.  
Between 1989 and 1999, China’s domestic AIDS institutions defined AIDS as a 
nonpolitical, immoral, western issue associated with promiscuous sex, and adopted 
what I call  the “socialist contagious disease model.” Ironically, it was precisely because 
transnational AIDS institutions were relatively weak at this time that the Chinese state 
was willing to develop and maintain ties to the world health system, and it was these 
ties that provided the institutional conditions for the diffusion of transnational agendas 
among professionals within public health institutions.55 This, in turn, put into motion 
the formation of institutional activist actorhood. However, transnational norms only 
became relevant because of existing domestic AIDS institutional antecedents. 
Therefore, it was AIDS activists’ interaction with the Chinese state that determined 
their choice to reject transnational norms, which were considered not viable at the time.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 As world society scholars have noted, two factors circumscribe the impact of global models. 
First, the impact of global models is stronger for countries that are more tightly linked to 
international society. Second, global models with stronger legitimacy at the international level 
are more likely to have domestic impact.  
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This chapter is structured as follows. First, I present a narrative of the 
emergence of early AIDS activist actorhood in the 1990s. Second, I analyze the model 
of AIDS governance in China in the 1990s and its links to emerging transnational AIDS 
institutions. This is followed by an analysis of how this particular model shaped the 
form of early AIDS activist actorhood and the response it received from the state, both 
of which led to an unsuccessful quest for broader mobilization. 
 
I. The Emergence of AIDS Advocacy Initiatives 
 
i. Early Institutional AIDS Activism, 1989–1993 
 
Despite the fact that the sexual transmission rate was very low at the time,56 
initial AIDS-related grassroots organizing in the early 1990s focused on male sexuality 
in urban areas.57 AIDS prompted action first, not among affected communities, but 
among public health officials and academics. These were insiders or “institutional 
activists” whom social movement literature identifies as “[occupying] formal statuses 
within the government and who pursue movement goals through conventional 
bureaucratic channels… in that they have routine, low-cost access to decision-makers” 
(Santoro and McGuire 1997, 504). Institutional activists rely primarily on non-
confrontational contained/conventional strategies. McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2001) 
define differences between what they call “transgressive” and “contained” contention 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 It should be noted, however, that the national sentinel surveillance system did not collect data 
on the prevalence of HIV among gays or men who have sex with men until 2002. 
57 It should be noted that homosexuality or same-sex love was often used to refer to gay men in 
China at that time, as gay identity as such had not yet developed.  
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based on whether all parties to the conflict are established political actors and whether 
innovative means of collective action are employed. Institutional activists depended on 
institutional channels and utilized strategies that were already accepted by the 
government without incurring extra cost and higher risks. With the goal of 
“[convincing] the government of the need to tackle the gay issue in order to deal with 
urgent practical matters like AIDS,”58 they mainly targeted the Ministry of Health and 
adopted strategies affirming the gay community, de-pathologizing homosexuality, 
opposing discrimination, raising consciousness, and lobbying for a better public health 
response. 
The first institutional AIDS activist was the director of the National Health 
Education Institute,59 Chen Bingzhong, who also served as the vice president of the 
Chinese Association of Health Education and an adjunct professor at Beijing Medical 
University. In 1990, Chen launched the first STD/AIDS education program in Beijing 
amidst widespread disagreement among Chinese medical specialists. This education 
program allowed one of Chen’s assistants, Wan Yanhai, to establish the project, 
“Investigation into the Knowledge, Beliefs, Attitudes and Behavior of Gay Men and 
AIDS Education Research” in 1991. The goal of the project was to study homosexual 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Tiffany Bown, “Hostile Society Keeps China’s Gay Community Cowed,” Chinese Cultural 
Studies: Homosexuals in Modern China – Recent Press Report, December 13, 1994. Available 
at: http://academic.brooklyn.cuny.edu/core9/phalsall/texts/c-gays.html (accessed February 11, 
2012).  
59 The National Health Education Institute is a unit directly under the National Patriotic Health 
Campaign Committee, one of six authorities at the ministry level in public health. At the same 
time, the institute also received instructions from the Ministry of Health. Compared to many 
other institutions like education, the public health system within China features a lack of 
effective central control and coordination, arising from the fragmentation of responsibilities and 
authorities among different agencies within central government, and between the central and 
provisional municipal councils. It was renamed the Chinese Center of Health 
Education/Communication Center of the Ministry of Health in 2008. 
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men’s social behaviors in relation to HIV/AIDS.60 Wan focused on the “underground” 
parks, public restrooms, and bathrooms where homosexual men would meet and have 
sex. He later became one of the most famous leading AIDS activists, but he emphasizes 
how he started his advocacy career by accident and describes his original intentions as 
purely academic:  
I was only doing a research project [since AIDS was not studied in China]. All I 
wanted was to publish several good articles and then go abroad pursuing my 
doctoral degree in the U.S. just like most of my classmates. …I was a researcher 
who followed his professionalism.61  
 
Chen and Wan launched the first AIDS Helpline on April 7th, 1992 and began to build 
an advocacy network,62 marking the beginning of AIDS activism in China. Wan 
recruited and trained forty to fifty young volunteers to carry out public health 
campaigns, provide phone support and consultation for those infected, and disseminate 
information related to AIDS prevention.63 Most volunteers were college students in 
education, law, public health, sociology, and psychology, many of whom participated 
with enthusiasm to “fix homosexual men’s problems.” Homosexual men were actually 
only a portion of the various marginal and underground groups that Chen and Wan 
originally planned to target. Nonetheless, the campaigns mainly focused on homosexual 
men in Beijing and the helpline became “the only open official source for [homosexual 
men] to get any sort of consultation.”64 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Yanhai Wan, “A Petition Letter to the Ministry of Health,” Personal Statement (Chinese), 
February 20, 1999. 
61 Interview 342 (Activist), July 1, 2007. 
62 “Beijing Opens AIDS Hot-line,” Xinhua News Agency, April 9, 1992. 
63 Bingzhong Chen, “A Resignation Letter to the Minister Chen Mingzhang and Ministry Party 
Committee” (Chinese), May 18, 1993. 
64 Interview 342 (Activist), July 1, 2007. 
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The AIDS Helpline received extensive attention and praise from the propaganda 
system, which quickly excited great interest among homosexual men. Many official 
press agencies, such as People’s Daily, China Youth Daily, China Radio International, 
and People’s Public Security Newspaper, reported the opening of the AIDS Helpline 
and applauded its work. As the head of the state’s news service Xinhua News Agency 
stated, the helpline was a part of efforts “helping young souls in a changing world,”65 
with AIDS understood as something that was caused by extra-marital sex and 
homosexuality, both of “which are illegal and contrary to Chinese morality.”66 
Ironically, the AIDS Helpline helped the terms “homosexuals” and “sex” to enter public 
and media discourse. As Wan explained in one interview:  
The more media coverage we got, the more phone calls we received from 
homosexuals. …They (homosexuals) had no way of dealing with any of their 
problems. We were the only public hotline available for them. Once media 
reports approved our legitimacy, homosexuals welcomed us with joy.67 
 
The helpline received 1126 phone calls in the first eight months, over 75% of which 
came from homosexual men.68  The high number of calls was remarkable, given the 
limited access most Chinese people had to telephones during this time period. Of these 
calls, 75.59 percent were from homosexual men, 20 percent were from heterosexual 
men, and only 2.39 and 1.82 percent pertained to prostitution and injected drug use, 
respectively, the other transmission routes emphasized in the media. Positive responses 
from homosexual groups further encouraged Wan and his volunteers’ outreach activities 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 “Helping Young Souls in a Changing World,” Xinhua News Agency, May 25, 1992.  
66 “AIDS Unlikely to Spread in China,” Beijing Review (Chinese), August 8, 1987. 
67 Interview 342 (Activist), July 19, 2007. 
68 Bingzhong Chen, Yanhai Wan, Bocheng Zheng, and Qun Wang, “AIDS Helplines in 
Development,” Health Education on Tuberculosis (Chinese), 1 (1994): 27–29; “Opens Hotline 
for AIDS and Venereal Disease Victims,” Xinhua News Agency (Chinese), March 9, 1993. 
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and kept those activities focused on locations where homosexual men were 
concentrated.  
Inspired by the success of the helpline, Chen completed a landmark article on 
World AIDS Day in 1992, entitled, “Homosexuality, AIDS, and Health Education,”69 
describing how AIDS intervention should be combined with advocacy activities. For the 
first time in China, Chen explicitly proposed and discussed the concept of human rights 
and asserted that “homosexuals’ personal dignity and rights must be respected.” He 
even stated:  
Homosexual culture… is the foundation for the whole harmonious society. We 
call on our society to take a more open and helpful attitude towards individuals 
who are morally and legally disadvantaged in order to prevent AIDS and reduce 
its harmful impact. 
 
The very concept of human rights was foreign and far-fetched to most Chinese people. 
This article, along with Wan’s article, “Nongovernmental Organizations Shall be of 
Great Use for AIDS Control,”70 broke risky new ground by publicly advocating for the 
rights of people living with HIV/AIDS and marginal groups such as homosexuals, sex 
workers, and injecting drug users to organize and participate in AIDS intervention. 
Even sixteen years later, a major AIDS activist Zhang Beichuan described Chen’s work 
as “so ahead of his time and even our time” that it continued to provide guidance for 
AIDS activism in 2008.71   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 All copies of the August issue of the Chinese Journal of Health Education that included this 
article were recalled by the Ministry of Health. The editorial office later published a new 
August and September combined issue without the article.  
70 Published in the same recalled Chinese Journal of Health Education in 1992. 
71 Beichuan Zhang, “Professor Chen Bingzhong,” Personal memorandum (Chinese), 2008.  
	   80	  
Activists such as Chen and Wan largely relied on institutional tactics; when not 
focused on interacting with the general public, their activities catered exclusively to 
institutional elites and intellectuals. The outreach activities of the AIDS Helpline were 
mainly conducted in Dongdan Park, a known gathering place of homosexual men, and  
eventually led to China’s first gay men’s club in November of 1992, Men’s World, 
which hosted monthly gatherings for homosexual men to engage in free discussion in 
Beijing. Although the goal was to educate Beijing’s general homosexual population 
about HIV/AIDS, the salon turned into a cultural event for scholars, writers, 
government officials, and reporters. Bioethicist Qiu Renzong gave a speech at the first 
meeting that subtly appealed to those with a more international perspective:   
A lot of problems were created by the repression of the majority against 
minority such as the problems of women and black people. So is the problem of 
homosexuality. There is no ground for regarding homosexuality as a morbid 
psychology, crime or immorality. …Sex is for pleasure, not for reproduction. 
Even one child policy promotes birth control. …The government should not 
intervene since homosexuality is a private manner. In fact, government 
regulations may force citizens to go underground, which creates social 
problems. We have to promote a more tolerant attitude towards and more 
assistance to those who are in a morally and legally unfavorable position in 
order to protect the health of the public.72  
 
Men’s World achieved great success among educated professionals and captured 
significant attention from national and international media.73 Domestic mainstream 
media described this salon as “an earthshaking event.”74 Helplines and discussion 
groups were rapidly extended to big cities such as Shanghai, Shenyang, Shijiazhuang, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 Yanhai Wan, “Sow Seeds on Fertile Land – for the Seventh Anniversary of the Men’s 
World,” Personal memorandum (Chinese), 2000. 
73 Reports appeared in the People’s Daily (Renmin Ribao), in New World (Xin Shijie) magazine 
(1993, 2), and on the BBC, Radio Australia, and Radio China. 
74 Zien Cui, “The History of Tongzhi, 1981–2000,” An Unpublished Talk at the 1st Chinese 
Homosexual Cultural Festival (Chinese), 2001. 
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and Kunming, which together comprised the first national network of voluntary 
counseling and services for infected persons. Shenyang and Shanghai later became two 
of the most important bases in the AIDS movement in the 2000s. By 1993, AIDS 
activism had evolved into advocacy initiatives predominantly focusing on homosexual 
men in urban areas.  
 
ii. “Homosexualizing” AIDS Activism, 1994-1999 
 
Between 1994 and 1999, institutional activists continued to play a leading role 
in AIDS activism and decided to focus all of their efforts on homosexuals. In 1994, Qiu 
Renzong convinced the Chinese Society for Dialectics of Nature/Philosophy of Nature, 
Science and Technology75 to convene a national symposium on homosexuality and 
AIDS education, called Special Issues and AIDS Education. Qiu invited forty scholars 
and government officials to attend the conference and introduced them to five 
homosexual men and women. For some officials, it was their first time meeting 
homosexual people. While this was the first open official discussion about 
homosexuality at the national level, some participants were strongly opposed to AIDS 
intervention strategies such as condom promotion, insisting that homosexuality should 
be punished in order to prevent AIDS and safeguard socialist morals.76 The symposium 
eventually reached a consensus and submitted a proposal to the Ministry of Health. The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 The Chinese Society for Dialectics of Nature/Philosophy of Nature, Science and Technology 
was funded by the central government in 1978. It is affiliated with the China Association for 
Science and Technology as a constituent member of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative 
Conference, where it participates in policy-making and consultation.  
76 Ge Tong, “The Past History and Present Situation of Chinese Homosexual Activities” 
(Beijing Gender Health Education Institute, 2007). 
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proposal captures the priorities of AIDS activism in the 1990s: (1) The state shall 
recognize the presence of homosexuality in China since ancient times; (2) homosexual 
desires are not immoral, deviant or abnormal; (3) legal and medical prosecution of 
homosexuality must stop as discrimination causes harm to social order.77  
During this period, a unprecedented number of books on homosexual men were 
published in China: Their World  (1992) by Li Yinhe and Wang Xiaobo,78 Homosexual 
Love (1994) by Zhang Beichuan,79 and Homosexuality in China (1995) by Fang Gang.80 
Li Yinhe, Wang Xiaobo, and Fang Gang were important members of the Men’s World 
club. All three were heterosexuals with prestigious institutional affiliations. Thus, they 
focused mainly on demonstrating that homosexual conduct was not an illness or 
immoral, and they stopped short of supporting the concept of “claiming homosexuals’ 
rights.”81 Zhang, for example, explicitly stated in his book that “I do not approve of 
homosexual sex” (1994, 4).  
As limited and problematic as this approach was, these early forms of AIDS 
activism were a huge improvement on the existing relationship of non-recognition 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Chinese Society for the Study of Sexual Minorities, “Special Issues and AIDS Education 
Symposium,” Tao Hong Man Tian Xia (Chinese), 1997. 
78 Yinhe Li and Wang Xiaobo, Their World (Taiyuan: Shanxi People’s Press, 1992). Li and 
Wang respectively received doctoral and master degrees in Sociology and East Asian Studies at 
the University of Pittsburg. Li was an assistant professor at Beijing University and Wang was a 
lecturer at Renmin University while they were working on the book. Wang later became one of 
the most important writers in China.  
79 Beichuan Zhang, Homosexual Love (Shandong Technology Press, 1994). Zhang Beichuan 
was a dermatologist working at the Center for Sexual Health of Qingdao Medical University 
Hospital.  
80 Gang Fang, Homosexuality in China (Changchun: Jilin People’s Press, 1995). Fang Gang was 
a reporter of the Tianjin Worker Newspaper at the time. He was forced to resign after the book 
was published. 
81 Field notes, July 11, 2007  
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between homosexual populations and official health institutions. Institutional activists 
opened up a channel through which homosexual men were allowed to interact with 
public health officials and take part in official policy programs and open dialogues in 
medical and health fields—a key advance not achieved in political and legal 
institutions, where homosexuality remained invisible. Institutional activists strove to 
provoke discussion around homosexuality among public health professionals and 
promote conversations between public health institutions and homosexual men through 
the latter’s involvement in various research projects and conferences. For example, 
between 1997 and 1998, Zhang Beichuan and his colleagues researched high-risk 
behaviors of homosexual men in 31 provinces. Their research results were compiled in 
the collection, “Strategies to Combat HIV/AIDS in China”82 and presented at the 131th 
Xiangshan-Science Conference in 1999.83 Zhang and several homosexual men gave a 
talk at the conference and submitted a petition letter to the Minister of Health, in which 
they appealed to the central government to acknowledge the significance of involving 
homosexual men in AIDS intervention.  
Although early AIDS activism mainly utilized contained strategies, it started to 
mutate into transgressive action when previously unrecognized actors emerged. Those 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 Other articles published later include:  Beichuan Zhang, Hu Tiezhong, Li Xiufang, Liu 
Dianchang, and Cao Ningxiao, “The Relationship between AIDS High Risk Behaviors and 
Childhood Status, Attitude/Perception to Gender/Sex Orientation and Rare 
Experiences/Psychology among Homosexuals in China,” Chinese Journal of STD and AIDS 
Prevention and Control (Chinese), 8, no. 2 (2002): 148–50; Beichuan Zhang, Liu Dianchang, 
Liu Xiufang, and Hu Tiezhong, “Study on HIV/AIDS High Risk Behavior and Its Factors 
among Men Who Have Sex with Men,” Chinese Journal of STD and AIDS Prevention and 
Control (Chinese) 7, no. 1 (2001): 7–16; Beichuan Zhang, Liu Dianchang, Liu Xiufang, and Hu 
Tiezhong, “Study on HIV/AIDS High Risk Behaviors among Men Who Have Sex with Men in 
Mainland China,” Chinese Journal of Epidemiology 22, no. 5 (2001): 7–10.  
83 The Xiangshan Science Conferences was initiated by the State Science and Technology 
Commission (now the Ministry of Science and Technology) in 1992. It is one of the highest 
level academic workshop series with the objective of providing consultations to top leaders.   
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actors fell into two categories. One was exiled former institutional activists. Wan 
Yanhai was such an example. After being fired for taking part in AIDS activism, Wan 
formed the AIZHI Action Project in 1994, which has since become a pillar of the AIDS 
movement. The project was the predecessor of the Aizhixing84 Institute of Health 
Education that later became the largest advocacy organization in the 2000s. AIZHI, 
meaning love and knowledge in Chinese, was used by many activists in East Asia to 
name AIDS. As Wan described it, the AIZHI Action Project was the result of his efforts 
to “explore approaches outside the institutional structure.”85  
New activist subjects in homosexual communities emerged as a second category 
of actors. Even though early AIDS activism afforded new roles for homosexual men 
who had previously been excluded from the polity, those roles remained secondary or 
subordinate, with the men serving as either research objects or assistants for 
institutional activists. Nonetheless, by advocating for the rights of gay people before a 
category even existed acknowledging such persons, early activism not only mobilized 
preexisting actors to take action, but also contributed to the process of gay identity 
formation. In March 1997, a diverse group of Chinese and western gays, both men and 
women, contributed funds to buy a pager and opened a gay hotline to provide 
counseling and disseminate AIDS-related knowledge. They named the hotline “Beijing 
Tongzhi Hotline.” The term was adopted by activists in Hong Kong as a reference to 
homosexuals and same-sex desire in the early 1990s.86 Tongzhi became increasingly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 Xing means action in Chinese.  
85 Interview 342 (Activist), July 19, 2007. 
86 Originally used in Chinese communist discourse, Tongzhi, or comrade in English, was a 
general term to address the masses with similar communist ideas that fell into disfavor after the 
1980s given its revolutionary connotation in China. As Chou Wah-Shan (2000) demonstrates, 
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popular and widespread as an identity concept as this hotline rapidly formed a national 
network that “enabled conversations across China and the world” (Rofel 2007, 87). As 
the first hotline initiated, funded, and operated by homosexual individuals, it received 
tens of thousands of phone calls from every Chinese province except Tibet.87 The 
hotline also hosted discussion groups that generated a core group of activist leaders, 
especially women.88  It was transformed into the Beijing Gender Health Education 
Institute, a major NGO conducting AIDS advocacy in 2002. In 1998, the Beijing 
Tongzhi Hotline hosted a secret underground meeting for Chinese gay activists from all 
over the country and abroad to meet in Beijing and discuss how to mobilize the Tongzhi 
Hotline to combat AIDS and how to build tongzhi communities and culture. This first 
national meeting of homosexuals was initiated by Zhou Huashan and Lu Jianxiong, two 
activists from Hong Kong. Preparing for this meeting in a manner that would avoid 
attracting police attention took a whole year.89 The conference reiterated the theme of 
apolitical and non-confrontational strategies in developing tongzhi communities. Unlike 
institutional activists, this new group highlighted both homosexual men and women, 
with women tongzhi equally involved in AIDS activism. He Xiaopei and Shi Tou, two 
female gay activists, played important roles in developing the Beijing Tongzhi Hotline 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the term tongzhi was reappropriated for its “positive cultural references, gender neutrality, 
desexualization of the stigma of homosexuality, [and] politics beyond the homo-hetero duality” 
(2). By using tongzhi instead of queer, gays were able to “expresses both the sexual identity of 
difference and a political identity of sameness” (Wah-Shah 2000, 2).  
87 “A Brief Introduction of Beijing Tongzhi Hotline,” (Chinese), 1999.  
88 He, Xiaopei, “Chinese Queer (Tongzhi) Women Organizing in the 1990s,” in Ping-Chun 
Hsiung, Maria Jaschok, Cecillia Milwert, eds., Chinese Women Organizing: Cadres, Feminists, 
Muslims, Queers (Berg, 2001), 41-60.  
89 Ge Tong, “Some Memorable Pieces about the Gathering at the Temple Dajue in 1998,” A 
Personal Memoir (Chinese). Available at: http://tongge2005.blog.sohu.com/157915897.html 
(accessed June 28, 2012) 
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and the national meeting. They then joined eight other women tongzhi in organizing the 
first mainland Chinese Convention of women tongzhi and starting a women’s tongzhi 
Group in 1998.  
Nonetheless, towards the end of the 1990s, AIDS still remained confined to a 
loose collection of groups and events that did not yet constitute a major force for policy 
change in China. The significance of AIDS as an important issue was not established 
within tongzhi communities. Although AIDS activism played a crucial role in 
stimulating tongzhi communities and activities, most AIDS advocacy initiatives were 
still met with little response among homosexual men outside the middle dclass and 
failed to provoke any full-scale mobilization across the country. Indeed, the AIDS 
activism of this period was generally fragmentary, informal, and non-confrontational, as 
activists were still engaging in self-censorship. Wan confessed in an interview that he 
believed that an AIDS movement driven by tongzhi and organized around sexuality 
issues was so unlikely to happen that he was planning to give up.90 The rest of this 
chapter examines what generated and shaped these early initiatives and why they did 
not successfully evolve into a movement.  
 
II. AIDS as a Foreign Sexual Disease: State-Centrist AIDS Governance in China 
 
Between 1989 and 1999, the Chinese state had exclusive political authority over 
AIDS governance. Domestic public health institutions restricted the impact of external 
forces on the nature and characteristics of AIDS activism, as transnational AIDS 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 Field notes, July 15, 2007. 
	   87	  
institutions remained at an embryonic stage. Here, I delineate the state-centrist model of 
domestic AIDS governance in China and its interactions with transnational AIDS 
institutions during this time period. Examining AIDS governance reveals that power 
and domination was exercised less through direct force or oppression and more through 
the state’s denial and inaction around AIDS, which was justified by the link between 
AIDS and western sexual immorality. Indeed, it was this silence surrounding AIDS and 
its total absence from mainstream political agendas that was the biggest hurdle AIDS 
activists would need to overcome (Gamson 1989).  
 
i. Socialist Contagious Disease Control 
 
As long as the Chinese central government enjoyed a monopoly over public 
health, it applied a preexisting socialist contagious disease control model that simply 
added AIDS to the list of notifiable infectious diseases regulated by the 1989 Infectious 
Disease Prevention and Control Law.91 In opposition to the governance model of 
transnational AIDS institutions discussed in Chapter 2, this socialist contagious disease 
control model defined and stigmatized AIDS as a foreign disease, ascribed the problem 
to infected people’s individual conduct motivated by poverty or immorality, refused to 
develop a national response to the epidemic, and assigned local governments 
responsibility for AIDS control.  
The socialist contagious disease control model was centered on the state’s 
refusal to admit the existence and prevalence of the AIDS epidemic in China. This 
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model employed a tropical approach to treat AIDS as a relatively minor, specifically 
spatialized disease confined to foreigners and minority borderlands and, consequently, 
focused on simply preventing AIDS from “getting into” the country. The first known 
AIDS-related death took place in China in 1985. Two months later, the Ministry of 
Health announced that China had banned all blood products from abroad in order to 
prevent AIDS from entering China.92 HIV/AIDS epidemic reports were categorized as 
foreign news in the state propaganda system throughout the 1990s.  
Two types of discourse concerning AIDS have tended to prevail internationally 
over the years: epidemiological thinking and tropical thinking (Patton 2002). 
Epidemiological thinking frames AIDS as restricted to particular bodies with specific 
behaviors. Influenced by the United States, most countries in the 1980s and early 1990s 
applied the epidemiological model and defined the boundaries of AIDS by identifying 
certain categories of people, such as gays or sex workers, as risk groups (Patton 2002). 
In contrast, tropical thinking confines AIDS not to particular groups, but to well-
delineated geographic spaces. This was the discourse that the Chinese government 
adopted first. For example, the Ministry of Health required that all foreigners planning 
to live in China be tested for AIDS and forbade sexual contact with foreigners.93 It was 
further stated in the Regulations Concerning the Monitoring and Control of AIDS 
issued in 1988 that people infected with HIV/AIDS would be denied entry into China. 
Meanwhile, the frontier province of Yunnan was the only area that received central 
financial support to combat AIDS (Hyde 2006). Although HIV/AIDS had reached all of 
China’s provinces by 1998 (Wu et al. 2007) and was in a phase of exponential growth, 
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the national government continued to deny its existence and many local officials 
referred to AIDS as an “unknown fever” as local outbreaks took place (Li 2012). Local 
health departments would send migrants back to their home provinces of residence after 
they were found to be HIV positive. As a result, the Chinese state was ten years behind 
many other countries in responding to the AIDS epidemic (Huang 2005). 
Accordingly, AIDS as a policy issue domain did not exist at the national level 
since AIDS was perceived as “the bitter fruit of a decadent society… in a grotesque and 
gaudy society like the West’s, lots of people have become dispirited and addicted to 
drugs…. Now in addition there has been a booming current of homosexuality.”94 The 
central government was not interested in HIV/AIDS epidemics. There were no 
nationwide comprehensive efforts at constructing a reliable estimate of HIV/AIDS cases 
in the 1990s. China’s Ministry of Health has admitted that little was known about the 
epidemic before 2003.95 Traditional quarantine was viewed as the solution to the 
problem (Settle 2003). According to the law, names and address of all individuals with 
HIV/AIDS had to be reported to the local health authority within 6 hours in cities and 
12 hours in the countryside96 and AIDS patients were quarantined.97 Existing policies 
granted local authorities the power to test any Chinese citizen for AIDS.98 Measures 
aimed at prohibiting the involvement of people with HIV/AIDS from various social 
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arenas. HIV/AIDS patients were denied rights to marriage and parenthood,99 schooling, 
health-care service, and equal employment opportunities, especially in governments, 
education, and service sectors.100  
The socialist contagious disease control model was a reactive emergency 
system. It did not develop a national regulatory response involving any measures or 
infrastructure for prevention or even surveillance.  There were only 42 HIV sentinel 
surveillance sites in 23 provinces for monitoring HIV infection (Su et al. 2007), with no 
voluntary counseling and testing (VCT) available. Local governments were largely left 
to their own devices to tackle AIDS. This state (non)response coincided with a drastic 
downturn in China’s health performance101 as the government focused almost 
exclusively on economic growth in the 1990s. There was little fiscal support from the 
central government for AIDS intervention. The Chinese state believed that AIDS would 
not become a public health problem in China; as the Minister of Health explained, 
“homosexuality and promiscuity…which is how AIDS spreads are limited in China 
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ii. Impact of Emerging Transnational AIDS Institutions 
 
The socialist contagious disease control model was not implemented in 
isolation.  It took place at a moment in time when the concepts of global disease, global 
politics, and global solutions were beginning to develop. Transnational AIDS 
institutions first took form in 1987 when the Global Programme on AIDS (GPA) was 
created to oversee the joint efforts of United Nations agencies to defeat AIDS. After the 
first AIDS cases were found, most national governments initially responded to the 
epidemic with avoidance or denial (Adam et al. 1999; Norman 1985). The early 
perception of AIDS as a “western gay disease” obstructed the construction of the 
“globality” of the epidemic around the mid-1980s. For example, African governments 
denied the existence of AIDS and blamed the western media for inventing it.103 As 
discussed in Chapter 2, the founding of the GPA established two of the major 
frameworks of transnational AIDS institutions: deterritorialization and human rights, 
both which contributed to the process of turning AIDS into a new issue domain.  
The Chinese government was not completely inactive or absent from these 
developments. As discussed in Chapter 2, AIDS, or even public health in general, 
belonged in “low politics” pertaining to economic and social issues versus “high 
politics” pertaining to political and national integrity and security during the 1990s. As 
low politics were considered less threatening to state sovereignty, the Chinese state was 
willing to display formal and symbolic ratification of transnational AIDS rules at the 
international level as a way to facilitate and encourage foreign ties and obtain external 
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legitimacy. Since health was considered apolitical, public health institutions in China 
remained in contact with international organizations. 
 Shortly after indigenous AIDS cases were identified, the Ministry of Health set 
up a professional team to follow the development of AIDS in the world.104 The 38th 
plenary meeting of the United Nations General Assembly in 1987 called on member 
states to establish national AIDS programs in line with the global strategy for the 
prevention and control of AIDS by the WHO.105 As part of the effort to implement this 
solution, Dr. Jonathan Mann, the director of the Global Program of AIDS (hereafter, 
GPA), visited China in 1988.106 The central government showed interest in accepting 
the WHO’s technical and financial assistance and collaborating with foreign experts on 
HIV/AIDS control.107 This tie was maintained even when the Chinese government’s ties 
with the outside world soured in other areas after the Tiananmen event in 1989. In the 
same year, four days after the May Fourth Demonstration, Chen Minzhang, the Minister 
of Health, delivered the opening speech as the President of the 42nd World Health 
Assembly in Geneva. In his speech, the Minister demonstrated how the national, 
regional, and globally-tiered structure was intensified through WHO collaboration with 
individual countries. Chen indicated that the Chinese state acknowledged the early 
response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic represented by GPA. The next year China 
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delivered its promise to Dr. Mann, drafted its first National Plan to Prevent and Control 
AIDS, and set up the National AIDS Committee with the assistance of the WHO. China 
had also hosted a number of international seminars and conferences on AIDS since 
1990. Starting in 1992, the state sent delegates to the International AIDS Conference 
every year. In an effort to repair its relationship with the West, China was one of only 
42 countries to attend the World AIDS Summit and to sign the Paris AIDS Declaration 
in 1994.108 The central government even pledged funds for the founding of the Joint 
United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) in 1996.109 
Staged for the international audience, such compliance did not have direct 
effects on domestic practices as transnational AIDS institutions did not have the 
capacity to proscribe, prohibit, or forbid various actions (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 
2005). China’s socialist contagious disease control came to external actors’ attention as 
early as the late 1980s. Right after its founding, the GPA publicly criticized the Chinese 
government’s measures to screen foreigners for AIDS as “useless” and pointed out that 
“there are no geographic ‘safe zones’.”110 In 1988 China’s mandatory testing was 
criticized repeatedly at major international forums such as the first World Summit of 
Ministers of Health on Prorgrammes for AIDS Prevention in London and the 5th 
International Conference on AIDS.111 But nothing changed. 
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Transnational AIDS institutions lacked the capacity to target China, let alone 
exert pressure, as transnational norms were still not widely embraced. Russia even 
defended China’s attempt to resist a western disease. The WHO was the only external 
actor that noticed the ongoing AIDS epidemic in China and urged the central 
government to take action. In the early 1990s, the WHO was concerned about the 
epidemic’s development in China when researchers were convinced that Asia might 
confront the next wave of AIDS outbreaks after Africa.112 But as Arthur Holcombe, 
Beijing representative of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) said, 
“there is little chance that the present Chinese system will stop criminalizing 
homosexuals, prostitutes, and drug users”113 because “homosexuality and casual sex are 
illegal and contrary to Chinese morality.”114 Even as China was signing the Paris AIDS 
Declaration in 1994, its delegate claimed that AIDS would only threaten western 
countries since there were no homosexuals, drug users, or prostitutes in China (Garrett 
1994). Therefore, the Chinese state had no intention of enacting the transparency or 
accountability required by transnational rules. Nor did it implement those rules at the 
domestic level, especially once the WHO shifted its attention away from China after the 
mid-1990s.  
All this was further compounded by the Communist Party’s traditional hostility 
to multilateralism. The socialist contagious disease control model was based on the 
principle that the Party’s absolute control would not be compromised under any 
circumstance. China’s AIDS policies were largely opaque, and epidemiological 
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information was withheld from intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). For example, 
the Ministry of Health refused to collaborate with the WHO to survey and estimate the 
scale of the AIDS epidemics.115 Moreover, the central state limited the presence of 
international actors, including intergovernmental organizations and international 
nongovernmental organizations, to borderland areas, particularly the Yunnan province. 
Although the Chinese state was not vulnerable to external pressure in the public 
health domain in the 1990s, its ties with the external world would have unexpected 
effects on the development of AIDS activism in China.   
 
III. Politics of Inclusion and Visibility 
 
Current social movement studies usually focus not on grievances per se, but the 
mediating mechanisms leading grievance to action. Scholars tend to assume that 
grievances are in constant supply and, thus, are not sufficient for mobilization. Chinese 
AIDS activism in the 1990s was an extreme case. Injected drug users and peasants who 
were selling blood were the infected groups on the top of the “suffering list” (Feldman 
and Crowley 1997) of those harmed by the denial and inaction of the Chinese state. But 
as the first section of this chapter discussed, early AIDS activism did not originate from 
the bottom-up in response to the grievances of these groups; neither did they originate 
from any preexisting entity reacting to political or social changes. Instead, grievances 
were defined and, in a sense, constituted in the process of AIDS advocacy initiatives 
constructing AIDS activist actorhood itself. The question is thus: If those initiatives 
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were not the expression of already defined groups and grievances, how did they 
originate? And why did they take on a fragmented and non-confrontational form that 
focused on homosexuality or sexuality in general?  
In this section, I analyze how state-centric AIDS governance gave rise to early 
AIDS activism. With transnational AIDS institutions still weak, AIDS contention in 
China was largely organized by and around the Chinese state as the single source of 
power and domination. This state-centric governance model was characterized by the 
denial and inaction of the state, which positioned itself as the ultimate and only 
authority for regulating AIDS without complying with transnational norms.  
While the state perceived and framed AIDS as an immoral western disease with 
“homosexuality, drug addiction and pre-marital sex as the root,”116 its policies 
dismissed the relevance of AIDS to China. Accordingly, the institutional silence around 
AIDS became the primary “enemy” and target of AIDS activism. How to bring AIDS 
into mainstream policy discussion and engage meaningfully with institutional decision-
making was the driving logic underlying the first failed attempts at grassroots 
organizing. 
 
i. Becoming AIDS Activists 
 
Although the 1990s was a crucial period for the spread of HIV in China, 
HIV/AIDS was not a salient social issue that received any attention during this time. 
National case studies share a common premise that the epidemic involved a variety of 
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marginalized social groups as it continued to shift and concentrate in different 
vulnerable subpopulations, all of whom could make claims on the state. Meanwhile, 
scholars observe how AIDS as a disease of the disadvantaged made it too difficult for 
high risk social groups to mobilize and advocate around this disease (Cohen 1999; Fee 
and Fox 1992; Johnson 2005). As such, the absence of mobilization among affected 
Chinese communities is not surprising, but the question remains: why did institutional 
activists emerge from unaffected communities?  
The institutional activists who mobilized around AIDS in China did not match 
the traditional assumption that social movement actors “who are economically and 
politically disadvantaged in relationship to the state are expected to participate in 
movements” (Armstrong and Bernstein 2008, 77). Wan Yanhai was a typical example. 
As a heterosexual man whose parents are both Communist Party members, Wan 
graduated from the School of Public Health at Shanghai Medical University in 1987 and 
had no intention becoming an AIDS activist. 
Q: How did you start to work in this (AIDS) area?                                                 
A: You see, AIDS was discovered in 1983 and later reported in western 
newspapers as a global problem. I was in college at that time. I read all kinds of 
materials published by [the] WHO because my major was health education. ...It 
was in the late 1980s when the Ministry of Health asked me to translate a book, 
Health Education Planning and Evaluation, for a national workshop. I also 
helped them translate a pamphlet about psychological issues related to AIDS as 
well as some research reports about how to conduct AIDS monitoring and 
consultation. Those documents were only for internal use. …AIDS was a 
foreign word to most Chinese. But because I was a professional, I sensed that it 
would be an important issue.117    
 
When Wan joined the National Health Education Institute in 1988, he planned to take 
on the challenge of studying AIDS to become a successful researcher working for the 
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central government. Through his research, Wan met female sex workers and 
homosexual men with whom he came to empathize, and who eventually influenced the 
kind of activities he decided to pursue. Yet, it is clear that Wan’s social position did not 
translate directly into his political behavior.  
Institutional activists’ activities did not take place in a vacuum. In the late 
1980s, the state’s concern was to defend China from the invasion of AIDS from the 
West, provoking public health officials to invest in building a domestic policy domain 
around the disease. Interest grew in strengthening popular moral and sex education for 
young people. While it only lasted for a short time, such impetus provided the 
institutional conditions for the diffusion of transnational norms into domestic public 
health institutions.  
In 1989, the first Beijing citizen was diagnosed as AIDS positive as a result of 
engaging in homosexual conduct, triggering concern among some public health 
officials. Although it was the only indigenous case of infection via sex, the People’s 
Daily, the organ of the Central Committee of the Party, published the news.118  The 
AIDS victim was detained for committing homosexual acts and the health and public 
security bureaus intensified their monitoring of “sex criminals.”119 This was the same 
year that the first AIDS outbreak occurred among injection-drug users in the rural areas 
of Yunnan province, which borders the drug-producing “Golden Triangle.” The 
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Ministry of Health focused on protecting large urban areas of inland China120 from 
Yunnan, historically considered a remote barbarian region of ethnic minorities.  
Over a span of three years from 1990 to 1992, the Ministry of Health indicated 
its interest in developing an AIDS governance infrastructure. The Anti-Epidemic 
Department intended to increase attention to AIDS epidemics and placed it on the 
priority list of the Ministry of Health. Its director made public comments such as 
“AIDS in China is no longer a myth. The spread of this disease is in fact very 
serious,”121 and “AIDS has become a reality in China and it may develop into a serious 
problem.”122 Such statements had some effect. The Ministry of Health was also more 
open to collaborating with international organizations and, following the WHO’s 
suggestion, the National AIDS Committee was funded.123 This committee at least 
admitted the possibility that even Chinese with no contact with foreigners might be at 
risk.124 Meanwhile, the Ministry of Health launched the process making China’s first 
national plan to prevent and control AIDS.125 In 1992, Guangming Daily, the most 
influential newspaper in the fields of science and technology, published an editorial 
entitled “Away the AIDS Phantom that has Entered China – Situation of Prevention and 
Cure of AIDS on Chinese Mainland.”126 For the first time, an article highlighted the fact 
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that most AIDS cases in China involved local residents, rather than overseas infections, 
and called for the central government to invest in AIDS control.  
This shift to reinforce the policing approach of socialist contagious disease 
control conformed to the Party’s needs to ensure political stability during the post-
Tiananmen Democracy Movement period. Public health officials’ efforts to develop a 
policy domain around AIDS concentrated in two areas: tightening control of China’s 
southern borders and eliminating “abnormal” sexual behavior in central cosmopolitan 
areas. While the former focused on venereal disease clinics and drug treatment 
programs, the latter discussed adopting behavior intervention strategies in high-risk 
subpopulations. This provided resources and opened up new space for the activities of 
institutional activists as discussed in the first part of this chapter. Between 1990 and 
1992, the Ministry of Health conducted research on the social behaviors of two 
subpopulations, female sex workers and homosexual men, in Beijing, Shanghai, and the 
coastal urban province of Guangdong. The project involved multiple research institutes 
and universities affiliated with central and local governments such as the Chinese 
Academy of Social Science, the Chinese Academy of Medical Science and Peking 
Union Medical College, and the Shanghai Health Education Institution. The allocation 
of material institutional resources not only allowed researchers with a preexisting 
interest in sexuality studies to engage with AIDS-related activities, but also drew other 
institutional members into advocacy activities. Participants in Men’s World, the first 
gay club, were able to conduct research because of funding provided by the Ministry of 
Health. For example, Pan Suiming, a sociologist whose studies of sexual behaviors had 
previously been marginalized, conducted research on female sex workers and 
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homosexual men with the support of the Ministry of Health and National AIDS 
Committee. This process generated a network of interrelated activists located across 
various institutions, channeling and sharing resources and forming the first mobilizing 
foundation for AIDS activism.  
While most institutional activists were affiliated with the central government, 
local governments also offered political resources for activists to access local 
communities. The Public Security Bureau facilitated research and outreach activities 
when the Ministry of Health emphasized the importance of coordinating with local 
public security departments to “help prevent and treat AIDS.”127 Ironically, police 
officers also played an important role, especially during the early stages, helping 
institutional activists to locate and make contact with homosexual men.128  
Meanwhile, institutionalized repertoires of action offered institutional activists 
means to engage in AIDS initiatives. These repertoires were sets of known routines and 
familiar interactions between the state and institutional activists that provided “the 
advantages of being accepted, familiar, and relatively easy to employ by claimants 
without special resources or willingness to incur costs and take great risks” (McAdam, 
Tarrow, and Tilly 2004, 41). By employing such repertoires, institutional activists were 
able to explore the fuzzy boundaries of contained and proscribed activities. The first 
outreach initiatives followed the style of mass mobilization campaigns invented by the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127 “China Curbs Sexually Transmitted Diseases,” Xinhua News Agency, September 6, 1991. 
128 Yanhai Wan, “Becoming a Gay Activist in Contemporary China,” Journal of Homosexuality  
40 (2001): 47–64. As Wan admitted, using police help to locate and recruit a population that has 
historically been coerced and oppressed by the police was deeply problematic. As discussed 
above, these institutional activists were a group of heterosexual elites who did not emerge from 
homosexual communities. As a matter of fact, this early history of AIDS activism had long-
lasting impact on the relationship between different groups inside the movement, something 
discussed further in Chapter 6.  
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Party as “an organized mobilization of collective action aimed at transforming thought 
patterns, class/power relationships and/or economic institutions and productivity” (Cell 
1977, 7). Mass mobilization campaigns, especially mass education, were employed 
widely to eradicate sexually transmitted disease in the early 1950s (Abrams 2001). 
While the state’s censorship system blocked public outreach activities, institutional 
activists imitated this form of mass education: 
We made a dash for our outreach in the park. There stood several desks in a row 
with a big banner and our education materials. Lots of people came to talk to us. 
We also sent volunteers to different places to distribute our materials. We 
looked just like people from the Communist Youth League. Nowadays it is 
impossible.[Q: How did the local government approve your applications?] We 
did not submit any application. We only told the park administration that we 
were officials from the public health department. The administration was happy 
to have people from the central government to hold public exhibitions regarding 
health.129  
 
Activists were able not only to draw on traditional socialist tactics of 
mobilization, but also to deploy, often innovatively, institutional strategies of 
propaganda. AIDS hotlines, one of the most important strategies to develop connections 
and build extended networks, acquired ascendancy among activists by the mid-2000s. 
Wan described how he started the first AIDS hotline:  
Actually I did not know much about hotlines. How did I come up with the idea? 
It was July in 1989. Several psychologists at the Health Institute invited me to 
volunteer for their consultation hotline. I said yes since there was much to do 
after the Tiananmen event. This exposed me to lots of hotlines hosted by 
different government institutions in Beijing such as the Beijing Education 
Bureau, China Women’s News, and Propaganda Department.130  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129 Interview 342 (Activist), July 19, 2007 
130 Interview 342 (Activist), July 1, 2007 
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So, this strategy could be traced back to the surge in the number of hotlines when 
various state agencies used them to offer psychological services to individuals in the 
post-Tiananmen period. Beijing alone opened up 17 hotlines.131 
However, institutional repertoires also limited institutional activists’ access to a 
specific range of strategies, as well as activists’ ability to utilize them (Polletta 2005). 
While the Ministry of Health’s attention to AIDS opened the door for AIDS activism, 
its perception of AIDS as a sexually transmitted disease in urban areas caused 
institutional activists to concentrate on sexual issues. Peasants infected via 
contaminated blood and injecting drug users remained neglected until the late 1990s and 
mid-2000s. Meanwhile, even though female sex workers became a focus of activists’ 
attention at the very beginning, the Party passed A Resolution to Strictly Prohibit 
Prostitution132 in 1991 and launched a “strike hard” crackdown on female sex workers. 
The Ministry of Health thus reaffirmed that prohibiting prostitution and annihilating 
female sex workers was the only way to conduct STD control, which cleared the ground 
for activists to conduct activities in the name of public health and eventually drove 
activists away from this group in the 1990s. Early top-down AIDS initiatives by 
heterosexual institutional activists also had long-term, lingering negative effects that 
continued to affect relationships among activists and various communities of the AIDS 
movement in the late 2000s. As Wan stated, “we referred to gays as ‘them,’ and 
assumed that they were different from ‘us,’ alienated from society. …We assumed that 
our research project was in the public interest, and that it was also conducted with good 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 “Helping Young Souls in a Changing World,” Xinhua News Agency (Chinese), May 25, 
1992.  
132 Adopted by the Standing Committee of the Seventh National People’s Congress on 
September 4, 1991.  
	   104	  
intentions towards gays and, indeed, that it had to be in their interest.”133 He also 
admitted that he and his heterosexual colleagues were so conservative in the 1990s that 
they only supported homosexual volunteers doing outreach activities in order to avoid 
conducting those activities themselves, which would have required them to visit places 
where homosexual men were hanging out.134  
The Ministry of Health’s interest in building AIDS policies came to an end in 
1992. With the WHO’s assistance, the Ministry of Health had proposed to set up a 
coordinating and decision-making organ for HIV/AIDS intervention. However, the state 
council rejected it after several meetings, mainly because the number of AIDS cases 
simply did not convince them that HIV/AIDS would threaten the general population, as 
opposed to just deviant groups under western influence.135 AIDS advocacy initiatives 
then stalled for a period. In fact, there was no broader mobilization as institutional 
strategies that were developed during the earliest days continued to shape patterns of 
action, even after the issue started to extend beyond public health institutions after 
1993.  
 
ii. Channels of Transnational Diffusion 
 
External forces became increasingly important in provoking AIDS activism. 
Chinese activists were introduced to the model of the American AIDS movement. As 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 Wan, Yanhai, “Becoming a Gay Activist in Contemporary China,” Journal of 
Homosexuality, 40 (2001): 57. 
134 Field notes, July 9, 2007. 
135 “The Transformation of HIV/AIDS Intervention Policy in China,” Xinjing Newspaper 
(Chinese), March 30, 2004.   
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demonstrated in Chapter 2, one of the driving forces of transnational AIDS institution 
building was the diffusion of this model. Transnational diffusion in social movements 
can be defined as the process by which innovations including motivation for movement 
participation, repertoires of actions, and organizational forms are spread through 
channels linking the transmitter and the adopter over time (McAdam and Rucht 1993; 
Rogers 1995). Diffusion includes three elements: innovations that are diffused, channels 
that transmit, and environmental contexts that modulate diffusion (Wejnert 2002). The 
model of the American AIDS movement developed two major strategies: identity- 
building and the politicization of AIDS. In particular, the politicization of AIDS was 
structured through a claim to equal citizen rights of gay communities (Bosie 2005). This 
model has directly exported agendas, strategies, and organizational forms both to other 
developed countries since the mid-1980s, and to developing countries since the early 
1990s (Adam et al. 1999; Altman 1994).  
The building of relational channels of communication was particularly 
significant in the 1990s (Chabot and Duyvendak 2002; Soule 2004; Tarrow 2005). This 
process generated channels on both sides of the Pacific, which formed the early 
brokerage as “the linking of two or more currently unconnected social sites by a unit 
that mediates their relations with each other and/or with yet another site” (McAdam, 
Tarrow, and Tilly 2004, 142).  
Domestic health institutions actually facilitated this process. One channel was 
opened up from the side of China by institutional activists when the AIZHI Action and 
Friends projects were founded. Both projects were made possible by a combination of 
domestic institutional and transnational resources. When Wan lost his public health 
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position, he was forced to suspend all of his activities after losing access to institutional 
resources. Zhang Xingshui, a lawyer working for the Department of Justice, convinced 
the Beijing University of Modern Administration to offer Wan a position and shelter his 
AIZHI Action Project. The Beijing University of Modern Administration was a semi-
public school run by officials136 who classified Wan’s activities as anthropology in 
order to escape the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Health. Meanwhile, Qiu Renzong 
persuaded his superiors at the Chinese Academy of Social Science to serve as the 
custodians for the AIZHI Action Project. The founding of the AIZHI Action Project 
enabled the formation of interpersonal connections between Chinese advocates and 
transnational AIDS advocacy networks. Wan and Qiu made use of their connections to 
obtain start-up funding from the Elizabeth Taylor AIDS Foundation and the Ford 
Foundation in the U.S., and from the Australian government.137  
The Friends project opened up another channel for the diffusion of transnational 
norms, resources, and strategies among Chinese activists. Its founder, Zhang Beichuan, 
received support from the Asia Pacific Council of AIDS Service Organizations138 and 
the Berry and Martin Trust (Cao 2009) after publishing his book on homosexuals in 
1994.139 In 1997, the Ford Foundation reached out to Zhang Beichuan. Along with the 
Berry and Martin Trust, it began to co-fund his Friends project, including gay hotlines 
in over 10 major cities and a newsletter entitled “Friend Exchange” (Pengyou Tongxin). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136 The school was headed by Sha Hong, the Deputy Secretary General for the Organization 
Department of the Central Communist Party Committee, and Chen Yuan, a member of the 
Standing Committee of the Beijing Communist Party Committee.  
137 Chen Bingzhong and Wan started to work with the Ford Foundation as early as 1991.  
138 This is an international network of NGOs within the Asia Pacific region.  
139 The Berry and Martin Trust is a private British charity.  
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Choosing not to use terms such as gay or homosexual, Zhang was able to utilize his title 
at the Center for Sexual Health of Qingdao Medical University Hospital, and networks 
involving Renmin University in Beijing and the Research Group for Mental Health of 
Taishan College of Medicine. Friend Exchange was the only Chinese gay publication in 
the 1990s. Focusing on “science, health, love and civility,” the newsletter not only 
provided AIDS education and other health-related information to homosexual men, but 
also published personal stories of homosexual men in China. It was circulated by 
volunteers through the mail, with each issue having a print run of thousands of copies. 
Zhang thus had regular contact with hundreds of homosexual men throughout the 
country—a network that provided fertile soil for later grassroots gay groups.  
Another channel of diffusion was launched from the U.S. In 1997, the Chinese 
Society for the Study of Sexual Minorities (hereafter, CSSSM) was founded by several 
Chinese140 researchers, students, and professionals in Los Angeles. The CSSSM shared 
much  in common with other institutional activists as it employed non-confrontational 
strategies to target the central government. The CSSSM collaborated with the Ministry 
of Health and government-sponsored public health associations to host a series of 
workshops to train gay bar owners, website masters for gay sites, and volunteers to 
introduce many intervention methods and tools to stimulate cross-regional networks and 
alliances. It was partly shaped by the context of its early formation. The first open 
discussion of the classification of sexual orientation in psychiatrists’ diagnostic manual 
took place among health professionals in 1997. This debate was triggered by the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140 All of the founders were Chinese citizens. According to my interviews, Chinese activists 
usually try to maintain their Chinese citizenship even when working or studying abroad if they 
also expect to continue to conduct activities in China (Interview 342, May 13, 2009).  
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circulation of an article, “Homosexuality as a psychiatric diagnosis unit: Its historical 
perspective,”141 at a national conference of psychiatrists. A psychiatrist strongly 
attacked this article for “promoting American gay movements,” and triggered a half-
year debate that involved 11 published articles.142 As CSSSM members participated in 
this debate, it laid the foundation for the organization’s approach of focusing on and 
attempting to influence elites. Meanwhile, CSSSM members were also exposed to how 
Japanese activists successfully compelled the American Psychological Association and 
American Psychiatric Association to urge Japan to accept the WHO’s classification and 
remove sexual orientation as a mental disorder.143 The CSSSM was thus the first group 
that appealed to American organizations in order to promote changes in China.  
At the same time, however, the CSSSM also considered it ineffective to use 
international political conventions as a way to approach Chinese governments and local 
gay communities. Therefore, they avoided contacting the American government or 
political organizations and limited themselves to cultivating relationships with 
professional associations.144 Their efforts prompted several American associations to 
pressure their counterpart in China, the Chinese Psychiatric Association, to stop 
discriminating against homosexuals in 1998. Not only did the American Counseling 
Association pass a resolution supporting the removal of homosexuality from the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141 Michael Inaba and Doug Kimmel, Archives of Psychiatric Diagnostics and Clinical 
Evaluation, 6, no. 2 (1995): 157–170. 
142 Tao Hong Man Tian Xia, 2, 1997.  
143 Scott Sleek, “Chinese Psychiatrists Debate Meaning of Sex Orientation: APA Backs Effort to 
End Discrimination against Homosexuals,” APA Monitor 29, no. 9 (1998). Available at 
http://www.qrd.org/qrd/world/asia/china/apa.monitor.article.on.medicalization.of.homosexualit
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144 Tao Hong Man Tian Xia, 2, 1997.  
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Chinese Classification of Mental Disorders, but both the American Psychological 
Association and the American Psychiatric Association also wrote letters to Beijing 
urging this action. The president of the American Psychiatric Association also 
addressed the matter while  visiting Beijing.145 All of these activities contributed to the 
depathologization of homosexuality in China in 2001.  
 
iii. Resisting Transnational Diffusion 
 
Current literature largely agrees that the use of the American model boosted the 
emergence or visibility of gay communities elsewhere in the world and granted them a 
central role in the AIDS movements of their nations. Transnational norms were crucial 
for the initiation of AIDS activism in China as the link between grievances and 
susceptibility to AIDS activism participation was not necessary or immediate in the 
1990s. However, gay groups in China clashed over whether to adopt the American 
model of AIDS activism.  
Chen and Wan were the first signifying agents (Snow and Benford 1992) to 
translate abstract rules from WHO documents into the local context, define what made 
AIDS governance in China problematic, and articulate possible solutions.146 First, they 
framed AIDS not as a disease, but as a social problem in relation to “minority rights.”147 
They publicly advocated for the “human rights and dignity” of high-risk subpopulations 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145 Jin Wu, “From ‘Long Yang’ and ‘Dui Shi’ to Tongzhi: Homosexuality in China,” Journal of 
Gay and Lesbian Psychotherapy, 7 (2003): 117–43. 
146 This part of the analysis is inspired by the framing literature in social movement studies. See 
Benford and Snow (2000) for a comprehensive review of the framing approach.  
147 Bingzhong Chen, Yanhai Wan, Bocheng Zheng, and Qun Wang, “AIDS Helplines in 
Development,” Health Education on Tuberculosis (Chinese), 1 (1994): 27–29. 
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and people living with AIDS, suggested treating “the phenomenon of homosexuality 
with the sense of ordinary people, and homosexuals and the homosexual culture with a 
sense of equality,” and appealed for developing homosexual culture.148 They argued 
that no AIDS intervention could be properly designed without respecting the rights of 
marginal groups. Ironically, Chen used the “reality” observed and recorded through the 
AIDS Helpline to justify the association between male homosexuality and AIDS when 
epidemiological data did not support such a connection.149  
Second, Chen and Wan followed the WHO guidelines and identified 
community-based self-organizing as the only valid solution to tackle social 
discrimination and raise public awareness. Even though the Party had an absolute 
monopoly over organizing, Wan publicly stated that the key to combat the spread of 
AIDS was to  
emancipate the mind, cast off the yoke, and immediately form nongovernmental 
organizations since the government has been controlling every aspect of our 
society for a long time… People with AIDS and those in high-risk groups are 
entitled to form their own organizations and participate in policy planning, 
AIDS prevention and control.150 
 
Even though high-risk groups, by definition, included drug users, Wan specified that 
they should not be included in the organizing. With the exception of this caveat, the 
statement was truly unprecedented, as Chinese people were not allowed to form their 
own organizations and were traditionally excluded from disease control governance.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
148 Bingzhong Chen and Yanhai Wan, “Let Us Sow Seeds on Fertile Land - Homosexual 
Culture and AIDS Education,” presented at a national symposium on the spread and prevention 
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149 Official statistics showed that 74 percent of HIV/AIDS infections contracted the disease 
through drug abuse and the rest through heterosexual sexual intercourse (“China has 969 
Reported Cases of AIDs Infection,” Xinhua News Agency, December 1, 1992).  
150 Yanhai Wan, “Promoting Nongovernmental Organizations’ Roles in AIDS Control,” Chinese 
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Chen and Wan’s propositions were to materialize in the development of the 
AIDS movement after 2003. But they received limited support in the 1990s, primarily 
through the CSSSM, which was interested not only in gay rights, but also in other 
political issues such as the freedom of association and assembly. Heavily influenced by 
American AIDS and gay movements, this group viewed the persecution against gays in 
China as an instance of a general problem. The CSSSM was highly critical of the value 
placed on marriage and procreation in dominant culture, and emphasized that following 
the American model of building community-based groups was crucial for the success of 
AIDS activism in China. Meanwhile, the CSSSM derived its primary tactics from 
institutional activists and decided that the American model of a gay rights movement 
could not be simply imposed on gay communities in China without adapting to the 
particular local political and social environment. 
The CSSSM mainly targeted public health institutions in China and its primary 
mission was to depathologize homosexuality.151 As Lin Eryan and Youyun, two of the 
organization’s major founders, stated at its founding meeting, the CSSSM was to focus 
on science rather than politics.152 These founders deliberately chose to use the issue of 
HIV/AIDS and/or sexually transmitted diseases as a vehicle to establish a relationship 
between Chinese health departments and academia via professional channels, thereby 
promoting political changes in a (at least seemingly) depoliticized way. They insisted 
that the dissemination of affirmative gay culture and knowledge from the U.S. was 
necessary to equip homosexual communities in China with information to reduce 
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prejudice against sexual minorities. Group members took advantage of their location in 
the U.S. to publish a biweekly electronic journal in Chinese and break through the 
Chinese government’s blocking of the flow of information, disseminating positive 
information about gays, and introducing the gay rights movements throughout the world 
to a Chinese audience.  
The opposing school of thought regarding AIDS activism emerged directly from 
homosexual communities in China. This school was influenced by gay movements in 
Taiwan and Hong Kong that advocated the mainstreaming of homosexuality. As Chou 
Wah-shan, one of the most important leaders, argued, sexuality was not the site of the 
greatest oppression; instead, the major problem facing Chinese gays was, in fact, 
traditional family responsibility, rather than state repression or social discrimination.153 
This school of thought strongly criticized the contentious strategies and individual-level 
focus of rights-based gay movements in the West. Instead, it promoted a harmonizing 
approach that would reconcile conflicts across different identities and relationships 
through mainstream heterosexual society’s “tolerance” of same-sex behaviors and gay 
men’s own invisibility and quiescence. As Liu and Ding (2005) have summarized, this 
approach relied on a form of so-called “coming-out” defined as “non-conflictual 
harmonious relationships, non-declarative practical everyday acts, and a healthy 
personality that is not centered on sex(uality)” (15), as opposed to the process of 
coming-out that developed in western contexts. This was fully demonstrated in the 
Manifesto of the Tongzhi Conference released in 1996154: 
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154 This conference was organized by activists in Hong Kong. In this dissertation, China refers 
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The les-bi-gay movement in many western societies is largely built upon the 
notion of individualism, confrontational politics, and the discourse of individual 
rights.  Certain characteristics of confrontational politics, such as through 
coming out and mass protests and parades may not be the best way of achieving 
tongzhi liberation in the family-centered, community-oriented Chinese societies 
which stresses the importance of social harmony. In formulating the tongzhi 
movement strategy, we should take the specific socio-economic and cultural 
environment of each society into consideration.155 
 
This harmonious position particularly emphasized how to make gradual change through 
improving public opinion. It not only rejected identity politics, it shied away from  
building or really promoting identity at all. Advocates of this approach were more eager 
to distance themselves from AIDS as a western disease than to follow their 
counterparts’ example in the U.S. to link AIDS to the struggle for political and civil 
rights.  
This approach resonated with those local homosexual men who already 
disagreed with institutional activists’ urge to bring gay issues into the open. Small 
communities of homosexual people only started to appear when densely concentrated 
homosexual meeting sites came into being in many large and medium cities in the 
1980s. One activist complained that AIDS outreach activities should be limited to 
working inside homosexual communities, as publicizing such issues only exposed 
homosexual men to presumably unfriendly heterosexual communities and government 
prosecution.156 This position formed in response to the political conditions of 
homosexual men and women in China, compounded by an ambiguous legal system and 
a cultural context that silenced homosexuality in the 1990s. After the communist 
revolution, the Party strengthened its total silence regarding homosexuality. It was not 
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until the 1970s that homosexuality (tongxinglian) first appeared in official documents as 
“the love relationship that takes place between men or between women, a form of 
psychological perversion”; homosexuality “did not resurface in the urban population 
consciousness until a multitude of publications about sex emerged in the 1980s and 
1990s, with the reintroduction of a capitalist economy and western culture” (Sang 2003, 
27). 
In other words, most Chinese did not have awareness of homosexuals as the 
state simply denied that homosexuality existed in China. For example, the Ministry of 
Health claimed that “homosexuality is very limited in China” as early as 1987.157 On 
the other hand, the refusal to name or even acknowledge homosexuality also meant that 
it was not explicitly forbidden by law. This did not result in any sort of freedom, 
however. Instead, it encouraged the imposition of arbitrary administrative penalties for 
engagement in homosexual conduct—ranging from public condemnation, Party 
sanctions, and firing, to police harassment on the grounds of hooliganism158 in the 
criminal code (Li 1998). Homosexuals could also be forced to go through electric shock 
therapy,159 since the Chinese Classification of Mental Disorders listed homosexuality as 
a form of sexual orientation disorder under the category of sexual perversion.160 
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Notwithstanding debates over whether sexuality was actually an object of the state’s 
concern in the 1990s, official discourse deemed homosexuality as gender inversion and 
psychological pathology. 
In 1998, a second conference concluded that the term “movement” should be 
replaced with “work” or “culture” in activism since “the term ‘movement’ in the last 
forty years has been derogatory and disastrous in mainland China” (Chou 2000, 139). 
Wu Jin, one of the CSSSM’s founders, articulated why she did not agree with Chou’s 
position and suggested instead selectively adopting strategies from the West: “If I look 
at what’s happening [in the les-bi-gay movement] in the Philippines, England, Holland, 
I will consider what are they like because of the historical, cultural, and social situation. 
I’ll ask a lot of questions, then I’ll think, what would it be like if we tried that in 
China?”161 Another critic was more sharply critical of the harmonious approach, 
dismissing it as “prefer[ring] that we all stay in the closet and wait for some divine edict 
from heaven to bestow equality” (Brandon 1997, 14, quoted in Chou 2000, 278).  
To summarize, the introduction of the American model of an AIDS movement 
sparked the building of ties and connections inside China and across borders in the 
1990s. This process facilitated the free and open circulation of information, and laid an 
important structural foundation for mobilizing for the first wave of the later AIDS 
movement. Nonetheless, the diffusion of transnational AIDS institutions was still far 
from successful.  
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IV. Soft Administrative Coercion 
 
Even given a relatively more relaxed political environment in the 1990s, the 
Chinese state showed little tolerance towards grassroots AIDS initiatives and imposed 
legal sanctions and administrative discipline to eliminate even social gatherings and 
cultural events that “had virtually no insurgent capacity” (Boudreau 2005, 34). State-
centered AIDS governance not only gave rise to the specific pattern of activism as 
discussed above, it shaped the form of state repression as well.  
Despite the fragility and isolation of early Chinese AIDS activism, it was met 
with a form of resolute repression in the 1990s that I call administrative coercion. 
Administrative coercion involved severe administrative sanctions combined with the 
occasional use of middle-degree, direct violence in public, conducted by local 
governments. Varying forms of administrative sanctions ranged from criticism, public 
warnings, demerit recording, deduction of wages, on-duty observation, demotion, 
transfer, suspension, expulsion from the Party, or some combination of these measures. 
This set of administrative penalties and Party disciplinary sanctions was supplemented 
by the local police, who apprehended, searched, interrogated, and detained people for 
engaging in grassroots AIDS initiatives throughout the 1990s. This centrally-directed 
and coordinated form of harsh repression stood in sharp contrast to the scattered and 
limited development of AIDS activism.  
As demonstrated previously, a policy domain organized around AIDS as a 
substantive issue did not exist in the 1990s, as the Chinese state refused to admit the 
existence and prevalence of AIDS epidemics, and public health had been politically 
marginalized since the late 1980s (Cook 2007; Wang 2008). Accordingly, AIDS 
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activism was not considered an independent political issue, but rather a form of 
immoral conduct throughout the 1990s. The threat presented by AIDS initiatives was 
perceived as one of many forms of local popular resistance provoked by market 
transformation and westernization that were crossing, blurring, and shifting social 
boundaries. Administrative sanctions were not directed against particular activists or 
their activities per se, but homosexuals and sex workers with whom AIDS was 
associated. AIDS activism was considered disruptive and harmful to the social order 
because it assisted homosexuals and sex workers who should be expunged from society. 
Repressing AIDS activism was thus intended to stop actions that might increase the 
visibility of such “unsuitable groups” and lead to “moral pollution.”  
Institutional activists’ activities were subject to accusations from the beginning, 
when many public health professional described venereal diseases and AIDS as “double 
punishment inflicted by nature on human society” and claimed that “it is impossible to 
try to control AIDS with special medicines and condoms.”162 The socialist contagious 
disease control model was further consolidated after the Party rejected the proposal to 
adopt the WHO’s suggestions and pay attention to AIDS. In 1993, Chen Bingzhong was 
forced to retire, perform self-criticism, and apologize to the central government for 
following WHO recommendations to use the term “sex workers” instead of 
“prostitutes” in his articles about AIDS education.163 His article was removed from the 
Chinese Journal of Health Education, the editorial board of which was also forced to 
perform self-criticism and apologize to the Press and Publication Administration. A 
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senior official of the Epidemic Prevention Department for the Ministry of Health 
commented on the controversy surrounding Chen’s leaving: “We have many ways to 
control the problems of prostitution and homosexuality. We can lock them all up, can't 
we? Just let the foreign human-rights groups denounce us, so long as we are preventing 
these people from further spreading this dangerous thing.”164  
The purpose of repressing AIDS activism was to defend the socialist contagious 
disease control model that held up traditional quarantine as the solution to AIDS. 
According to the law, all AIDS cases with personal information such as names and 
address had to be reported to the local health authority within 6 hours in cities and 12 
hours in the countryside165 and AIDS patients must be quarantined.166 A few existing 
policies granted local authorities the power to test any Chinese citizen for AIDS. As 
discussed above, the goal was to exclude or limit the involvement of people with 
HIV/AIDS from many aspects of society and the socialist model operated on the basis 
of depriving the rights and freedoms of certain sectors of the population.  
The Ministry of Health played a leading role in repressing AIDS activism. As 
public health professionals argued, AIDS activism promoting political or civil rights 
would contaminate the government’s efforts to curb the epidemic.167 This view insisted 
that China should focus on preventing (potential) carriers of AIDS from infecting 
society, since western AIDS control strategies were not even successful in the West. 
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Men’s World was shut down as part of this effort. Its early meetings were held inside 
the office at the National Health Education Institute. In 1993, it held a public function at 
the Sea Horse Ballroom on Valentine’s Day. As the first public gathering for 
homosexuals, this was only a dancing party. One week later, the manager of the 
Ballroom was fired and the Ministry of Health started an investigation of not only the 
National Health Education Institute, but also several top research institutes in Beijing 
such as the Chinese Academy of Social Science, the Chinese Academy of Medical 
Science and Peking Union Medical College, and Renmin University of China. Many 
institutional activists affiliated with these institutes participated in Men’s World, such as 
Yinhe Li, Wang Xiaobo, Qiu Renzong, Fang Gang and others. While the Press and 
Publication Administration, the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of 
the Party, and the Ministry of Police were involved in the investigation, the Department 
of Policies and Regulations of the Ministry of Health was the one with final authority. 
As a high-ranking official complained, “That salon [Men’s World] has been 
disseminating wrong messages, it is not opposed to, but is encouraging homosexuality, 
which is contradictory to China's aim and purpose in health education.”168 Another 
more sympathetic view among officials argued that homosexual men could have met 
and discussed AIDS issues in private without setting up a high-profile club.169 
With the state largely dominating the (re)distribution of resources and life 
chances in the 1990s (Bian and Logan 1996; Griffin and Zhao 1993; Xie and Hannum 
1996), the most effective form of administrative disciplinary penalty was the policing of 
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the activities of those who were deemed to have committed social offences or political 
errors under the auspices of the Disciplinary Rules of the Chinese Communist Party. On 
the other hand, though administrative coercion sometimes cost activists their jobs, it 
usually did not affect more than their career advancement. Most institutional activists 
received warnings or criticism from their supervisors. For example, Beichuan Zhang 
was not allowed to work in the outpatients department or to receive a bonus because of 
his work, which deprived him of any chance for promotion and award. But he was 
allowed to keep his title and salary as well as the qualification to supervise graduate 
students (Cao 2009). In the case of Wan Yanhai, the new director of the National Health 
Education Institute demanded that Wan “side with abolishing homosexuality because it 
[homosexuality] was the same thing as killing people, setting fire, or stealing.”170 Wan 
was then subject to criticism, public warning, wage deductions, and on-duty observation 
before he was forced to leave. Losing his job cost Wan his household registration, 
which, in turn, affected his ability to get married even five years later. However, Wan 
considered such treatment comparatively lenient in retrospect:  
My profile had been placed under the Ministry of Health before I was arrested in 
2003. They knew me and my business well. Yes, I lost my job in 1993 because 
of them. But looking back, we were on a sort of friendly term. You know, they 
did not think of me as a spy or reactionary. The state did not pay much attention 
to us during that time. But things were totally different in 2003. It was the 
national security department that took charge. Some officials in the health 
department and CDC actually put in good words for me. But they cannot help 
since the whole thing had become a political issue.171  
 
The other major actor in state repression was the police at local levels. At the 
heart of the socialist contagious disease control model was the central government’s 
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assumption that AIDS would not threaten the general population as long as the state 
maintained strict control of sexual minorities. This mode of thinking was compounded 
by the fact that maintaining social stability was increasingly becoming one of the major 
functions of local governments in the 1990s (Friedman 1998). AIDS activism 
constituted a threat to local officials’ ability to control the situation and enforce socialist 
public order. The police force was thus mobilized against homosexual groups, 
especially after 1993. The whole homosexual community was subject to prevalent 
police harassment in the 1990s. For example, the Beijing police were sweeping public 
places as part of a crackdown on the homosexual community between August and 
December in 1994. At least two hundred homosexual men were taken into custody, 
beaten, and given punishments from fines to detention.172 The terror of direct police 
intervention pervaded local communities as the police constantly raided community 
meetings and harassed activists. The founders of the Beijing Tongzhi Hotline chose 
pagers instead of a telephone line at a fixed location so that volunteers could reply to 
calls without attracting police attention.173 Even social gatherings would attract plain-




Prior to the establishment of transnational AIDS institutions, AIDS advocacy 
initiatives originated as a form of domestic activism in response to the domination of 
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the state as the single source of power in the AIDS area in China between 1989 and 
1999. Underlying the interaction between the state and AIDS activists were three 
paradoxes: (1) early AIDS activism emerged among unaffected homosexual and 
heterosexual men, while mobilization among the affected Chinese communities of 
injection drug users and contaminated blood victims was absent; (2) local homosexual 
communities rejected external agendas even though they, in fact, benefited the 
communities; and (3) the state responded to AIDS activism with coercion regardless of 
activists’ strategy of employing only contained and non-confrontational action. This 
chapter examines how those paradoxes unfolded in a context of profound silence 
created by the Chinese state, which identified AIDS with western sexual abnormality.  
This chapter argues that we have to focus on the institutional logics of the 
socialist contagious disease control in order to understand those ironies. Simply put, the 
kinds of activists that emerged and the kind of communities that were focused on were 
determined by how the state defined the AIDS problem. The twist is that, through its 
contradictory strategy of both denying the issue altogether, but also defining it in a very 
specific and limited way, the state ended up creating channels that enabled the 
development of activist actorhood among communities it traditionally attempted to 
marginalize, and opened the way for discourses and framings of AIDS to emerge that 
challenged the stae’s own discourses and framings. All this remained fragmented in this 
period, but it laid the foundation for later developments.   
On the one hand, how AIDS and even public health as a whole was politically 
marginalized made domestic health institutions a fertile ground for the growth of 
institutional activism. However AIDS activists were quickly caught between the 
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association and disassociation of AIDS and “politics.” On the other hand, a marginal 
form of activism far away from mainstream political debate but still linked to 
immorality was an easy target for state coercion.  
Not only did the state serve as a dominant force shaping the form of AIDS 
activism, it also played an important role in defining the relationship between domestic 
activism and emerging transnational AIDS institutions. The state was engaging readily 
and seemingly openly with external actors and agendas precisely because it had no 
intention of developing any substantial AIDS policy and investing in this particular 
policy domain. As a result, even though domestic activists gained access to 
transnational norms and resources, they were all too aware of the state’s real intentions 
and, thus, understood that external agendas were not possible or even relevant in their 
domestic context at the time.  
The possibility of launching a national-level AIDS movement and becoming an 
important part of transnational advocacy networks appeared impossible in the 1990s. In 
fact, at the time it was not apparent that Chinese activists would need or be able to 
engage with external actors, resources, and agendas at all. Indeed, scholars of 
contentious studies could not have predicted the rise of the first wave of the AIDS 
movement around the early 2000s. Neither could Chinese AIDS activists have guessed 
that their focus was to shift to blood and organized confrontational politics in rural 
areas.  
This focus on the particularity of domestic factors in China, however, cannot be 
separated from an understanding of how they related to subsequent transnational actors 
and actions. As Liu (2006) shows, existing social movement scholarship on the global-
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local relationship privileges either bottom-up strategic choices of local actors or top-
down context-free channels of diffusion. Meanwhile, empirical studies in this area often 
start with existing local actors and focus on how they respond to international and 
domestic structural shifts (Shin and Tsutsui 2007). Examining the domestic factors that 
circumvented the formation of AIDS politics in China is necessary to set up the 
domestic social and institutional context in which the impact of transnational AIDS 























The first wave of the AIDS movement arrived five years after the largest 
outbreak of HIV/AIDS infections in China’s history among blood/plasma donors in 
rural areas in the early and mid-1990s. In 1999, the infections caused by blood 
contamination began to attract broad public interest outside China. Fueling international 
reactions was not only the blood scandal itself, but also the actions of Chinese citizens. 
Chinese activists’ battles contributed to exposing the state’s human rights violations and 
bringing pressure from transnational AIDS institutions to bear on the central 
government. In doing so, activists created what Keck and Sikkink (1998a) refer to as a 
“boomerang effect,” whereby international pressure eventually forced the Chinese 
central government to publicly acknowledge the magnitude of the AIDS epidemic in 
2003.  
This remarkable development appears exceptional from the perspective of 
various theories of contentious politics as well as international relations. Because the 
underlying purpose of studies of the boomerang effect has been to challenge state-
centered conceptions of politics, two types of mechanisms tend to be invoked implicitly 
or explicitly. The first, rooted in political process theory, focuses on the macro-
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structural shifts in political regimes (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999; Tarrow 2001, 
2005). This structural account identifies the major impact of transnational institutions as 
their creation of new political opportunities outside nations states that can shape 
political opportunities at the national level. In this vein, a boomerang effect is seen as 
unlikely in China, given the presumed absence of a state regime that is susceptible to 
external pressure (Keck and Sikkink 1998). In fact, newly formed transnational AIDS 
institutions at the time did not even have the adjudicating power perceived as crucial to 
generate strong reaction from domestic actors (Kay 2005). The second line of research 
takes a bottom-up approach and concentrates on how domestic activist groups enhance 
their appeals and gain external assistance by strategically utilizing the dynamics 
between transnational institutions and the state (Bob 2005; Hertel 2007). This 
perspective assumes pre-existing domestic activist actors automatically coalesce around 
transnational institutions through ongoing interaction. But, in fact, there was no 
widespread mobilization around AIDS in China at the time, other than some sporadic 
individual efforts in blood-related AIDS issue areas until transnational AIDS 
institutions began to target the country. 
This chapter examines how the intervention of transnational AIDS institutions 
enabled the AIDS movement in China to emerge between 1999 and 2003. As the 
chapter will show, the first wave of the AIDS movement in China prompts questions 
about the timing and impact of external intervention from abroad. In particular, given 
that the AIDS epidemic in China was first reported by international media in 1996, why 
did it take until 2000 for the situation to really move into the international spotlight? 
What triggered domestic interest in blood issues after inaction for such a long time? 
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How did a new form of AIDS activist actorhood come into being as a result and what 
were the defining characteristic of this actorhood? How and why did Chinese AIDS 
activists start to embrace transnational AIDS institutions just as the validity of overseas 
models was being questioned in the 1990s? And why did the Chinese state’s hard 
coercion fail to curb the AIDS movement? That transnational AIDS institutions were 
able to break the domestic silence around a blood-related AIDS outbreak in a highly 
repressive environment fits the overall contours of the transnational social movement 
argument that transnational institutions matter. However, the way that this process 
unfolded differs significantly from existing accounts.  
I argue that transnational AIDS institutions were not simply suppliers that 
provided domestic activists with structural leverage or extra resources. Rather, they put 
into motion the process of forging domestic AIDS advocacy actors by challenging the 
forms of domination through which state power is maintained—namely, the state’s 
practice of dismissing AIDS as an immoral western disease caused by individual 
misbehaviors. This understanding of the impact of transnational AIDS institutions runs 
counter to the existing structural approach that conceptualizes social movement actors 
as “groups operating rationally within international and domestic contexts of 
opportunities and constraints” (Sikkink 2005, 154). Transnational AIDS institutions 
were not a new polity at the supranational level, so they didn’t directly affect the 
political opportunity structure in China. Rather, they provided a set of new institutional 
logics that dictated a new definition of AIDS and, hence, a new vision of how it should 
be handled. The purpose of this chapter, then, is to demonstrate how transnational 
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institutional logics challenged the socialist contagious disease control model and how 
this particular process gave rise to the politics of blood.  
The analysis is divided into two parts, corresponding to the periods before and 
after the rise of transnational AIDS institutions. First, I examine the period from 1995 to 
1998 when domestic mobilization around blood infections was blocked by the socialist 
contagious disease control model, which used stigma and silence to repress grievance 
against the state. I discuss why blood contamination was concentrated among peasants 
in developing areas and spurred by the reckless expansion of the blood industry. I also 
show how domestic public health institutions’ strategies of denial and exclusion kept 
the illness and death of AIDS patients during this period from being constructed as a 
form of collective suffering.  
The second period examines how AIDS activism overcame these domestic 
difficulties and evolved into large-scale mobilization. This period, which began roughly 
in 2001, was characterized by two activating forces that drove the formation of AIDS 
activist actorhood around blood: one was the politicization of China’s AIDS situation at 
the international level, the other was the escalation of hard coercion by the Chinese 
state. These two forces propelled two major AIDS activist actors—nongovernmental 
individuals in urban areas and mutual aid groups of infected villagers—to emerge, form 
a coalition, and engage with transnational AIDS institutions. This marked the start of 
the transnationalizing of AIDS activism after domestic AIDS activists chose to avoid 
interacting with the transnational advocacy networks of foreign governments, 
international organizations, and international NGOs. In turn, AIDS activism further 
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fueled international pressure targeting the Chinese state, which created the boomerang 
effect in 2003.  
 
I. Domestic Blockages on the Road to Mobilization, 1995–1998 
 
i. The AIDS Epidemic and the State-Sponsored Blood Economy 
 
AIDS is often freighted with extraordinary symbolic power because it involves 
“social relationships in which people come into contact with others’ bodily fluids” 
(Heimer 2007, 567). While the Chinese state and activists were focusing on sexual 
contacts, the largest AIDS outbreak was linked to the transfer of another fluid—blood—
around the mid-1990s. Though the central government insisted that AIDS was an 
apolitical health matter that originated abroad, it was, ironically, the Chinese state that 
created the uniquely indigenous AIDS epidemic.  
The Chinese state set out to build a domestic blood industry in 1978, in order to 
wean the country of its dependence on imported blood products. It was a continuation 
of the state’s efforts to build its own reserves of resources for the sake of national 
security.174 The production of blood products relied on a system of biological research 
production built in the 1950s that was made up of six research institutes for biological 
products in its major administrative divisions: Beijing, Shanghai, Wuhan, Changchun, 
Lanzhou, and Chengdu. The Ministry of Health approved the proposal of the Beijing 
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Research Institute for Biological Products to introduce and promote a commercial 
plasmapheresis industry in 1978 and assigned the Tianjing Institute to put this technique 
into practice on a trial basis (Lin and Lin 2011). This plasmapheresis technique collects 
plasma after a device called a centrifuge spins the blood at high speed to fractionate the 
cells from the fluid. Because one person’s donation of blood can yield a very limited 
amount of plasma, the whole blood of many donors must be pooled before it is run 
through the centrifuge. After plasma is removed, the remaining red cells are then 
injected back into donors. Compared to whole blood donors, apheresis blood donors can 
donate every two or three weeks, instead of every twelve weeks, even when donors are 
not that healthy (Greeninga et al. 2010), with a very low chance of anemia. After 
experimentation on forty donors, the Tianjing Research Institute for Biological Product 
came to a conclusion that using plasmapheresis, “more plasma can be collected from 
each donor without affecting their health [which] is convenient for producing plasma 
protein products.”175 In short, the technique made possible the collection of large 
quantities of plasma in a short period of time, which was crucial for the fast expansion 
of the plasma industry. A number of blood collection stations were set up and 
participants in commercial blood donation totaled 80 million by 1985.176  
The blood economy took off around the mid-1980s when the Chinese state 
developed more mature plasmapheresis techniques and established its monopoly over 
blood collection. This was the same time that the plasmapheresis industry was quickly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
175 Tianjing Central Blood Collection Station, “A Plasma Pheresis Experiment Research,” 
Tianjing Medical Journal (Chinese) 4 (1981): 232.  
176 Junxiang Liu, Youchu Qi, Handbook of Plasmapheresis (People’s Medical Publishing 
House, 1987). This was a detailed guideline authorized by the Ministry of Health and released 
to governments at different levels.   
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expanding from the U.S. and Europe to central and South America, Africa, and Asia. In 
the early 1980s, imported blood products cost around 1200 million USD a year in 
China. In 1984, China’s Ministry of Health decided to restrict the importation of blood 
products to keep AIDS rooted in “homosexuality and intravenous drug use…in 
capitalist countries” outside China’s borders.177 It enhanced enforcement action against 
all blood products except for human (serum) albumin from entering into China.178 Yet, 
contaminated blood products mostly threatened developed countries (Weinberg 2002); 
in developing countries, the problem was the rapid spread of AIDS through the 
infection of paid donors in commercial plasmapheresis (Volkow 1997), but this the 
Chinese state chose to ignore. The Ministry of Health removed the major barrier to the 
state’s commercialization of blood products. In 1984, it invested heavily in the 
plasmapheresis industry to expand its production capacity by 10 times so as to fill in the 
man-made shortage of blood products on the domestic market.179  
Blood collection stations were mostly controlled by the Ministry of Health along 
with a few military hospitals180 in the 1980s. The risks associated with commercial 
plasmapheresis soon emerged. An outburst of non-A, non-B hepatitis was reported 
among plasma donors in Hebei province (Zhang et al. 1990), exposing the dangerous 
combination of high-risk procedures, recycled medical instruments, untrained staff, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
177 Ministry of Health, “Notification Regarding Limiting Blood Products Importation to Prevent 
AIDS from Coming into Our Country” (Chinese), September 17, 1984.  
178 Ministry of Health, “Notification Regarding Prohibiting the Importation of Factor VIII 
Preparations and Some Other Blood Products” (Chinese), July 26, 1985; General Customs 
Administration, “Announcement Regarding Prohibiting the Importation of Factor VIII 
Preparations and Some Other Blood Products” (Chinese), January 29, 1986.  
179 Ibid.  
180 Any agency affiliated with the military force is not subject to the jurisdiction of the Ministry 
of Health.  
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no blood testing. In Gu’an county alone, the number of commercial blood donors ran up 
to 26,000 in 1986, 31.7 percent of whom tested positive for hepatitis (Hebei Provincial 
Anti-Epidemic Station 1993). While such patterns of cross-infection served as a prelude 
for the AIDS epidemic, the Ministry of Health continued to expand blood collection 
stations. In 1993, another outbreak of malaria in the same area was reported. Several 
public health professionals set off the alarm,181 so the Ministry of Health issued a new 
standard for commercial blood collection requiring hepatitis C screening for all donors. 
Meanwhile, blood collection continued to expand. In one town alone, there were four 
blood collection stations that allowed villagers to sell blood twice a day. As one activist 
who was infected with HIV in this area stated, “Somebody I knew sold blood thirty-two 
times a month. My personal record was sixteen times a month.”182 Another activist from 
the neighboring village described how there were several stations within biking 
distance, “There was one month I did it for twelve times that I passed out. [My blood 
was so drained] that no blood would come out of pinpoint after the needle was 
withdrawn.”183 Yet, neither villagers nor activists were informed of the local outbreaks 
of infectious diseases.   
The blood and plasma production industry was thriving by the late 1980s as 
provincial and local governments at various levels were drawn to it. The industry was 
driven by the growing domestic demand for blood and blood products created by the 
liberalized pharmaceutical market. By the end of the 1980s, most countries had adopted 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
181 Suliang Chen, Zhikun Zhang, Yong Zhao, et al., “An Epidemiological Study on Malaria 
Infection in Plasmapheresis Donors,” Chinese Journal of Preventive Medicine (Chinese) 28, no. 
6 (1994): 350–52. 
182 Interview 242 (Activist), June 18, 2012. 
183 Interview 38 (Activist), May 12, 2012. 
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a heat-treatment technology to kill AIDS virus in blood stocks (Asia Catalyst 2007). But 
the Chinese blood industry concentrated instead on “volume expansion,” wherein “the 
capacity for processing large volumes of plasma and the ability to derive more 
marketable products from the same raw material are key factors for profitability,” both 
of which “[required]sufficient amounts of source plasma to keep its equipment running 
at  full capacity” (Shao 2006, 548). The profitability of blood drew governments at 
various levels—mostly in less developed central China regions—into developing 
commercial plasma collection stations in county towns and villages. These were also 
populous areas where poor peasants could be easily recruited as cheap raw materials. As 
news reports between 1991 and 1995 reveal, hospitals, health clinics, and anti-epidemic 
centers were the major operators in licensed or unlicensed blood collection,184 as 
different local governments raced to establish blood collection centers to drive local 
economic development. Health departments actively encouraged participation, 
emphasizing “how donating blood could decrease the chance of getting high blood 
pressure and high cholesterol, how the state needs your help, how you could use blood 
for free when you need it.”185 The slogans, “it is honorable to donate blood” and “it is 
the duty of every citizen to donate blood,”186 were repeatedly utilized to mobilize 
peasants to sell blood.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
184 According to state regulations, blood collection units must file an application with the state 
administrative department. However, which department in the Ministry of Health was in charge 
of granting approval and license became a battle. Later, many officials and departments outside 
public health also joined the trade.  
185 Interview 342 (Activist), June 11, 2012.  
186 China’s State Council, “The Ministry of Health’s Suggestions Concerning Strengthening 
Blood Transfusion Work with the Approval of the State Council”(Chinese), November 24, 
1978. 
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By the early 1990s, the plasma industry was spreading. Blood collection stations 
increased from 1 to 17 between 1991 and 1993 in Taicang County in Henan province 
alone.187 The blood economy received an extra boost when the Ministry of Health lifted 
the restriction on the export of blood products from 1993 to 1994, in response to the 
high demand of the global market.188 According to Shao’s estimate (2006), by 1995, 
around 1,280 tons of plasma were collected in just the province of Henan, the largest 
among 13 plasma-exporting provinces in China. In short, the blood economy flourished 
in poor and remote areas. Central areas were also considered ideal and safe locations for 
the industry because peasants did not migrate, thus presumably decreasing their chances 
to contract HIV/AIDS through contact with foreigners.  
A popular and telling chant in Henan said, “There is no way out in 1993; only 
our blood to sell for fee levies. Only a needle in my arm, a fifty-note in my palm.”189 
Peasants were paid 50 RMB (about 7 USD) for 800 cc blood.190 In the late 1980s and 
early 1990s the central government launched fiscal decentralization reform. As the 
share of the revenues accruing to the central government dropped, fiscal burdens 
including those for bureaucratic cost and public goods largely fell on local 
governments. Expenditure mandates pushed local officials to seek supplementary 
informal fiscal resources in the form of fee levies on local residents (Bernstein and Lu 
2003; Tao and Liu 2005; Unger 2002; Yep 2004). As a result, fees ate up an ever-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
187 Shuping Wang, “How I Discovered the HIV Epidemic and What Happened to Me 
Afterwards,” Seeing Red in China (Chinese), April 24, 2013. Available at: 
http://seeingredinchina.com/2012/10/08/dr-wang-shuping-how-i-discovered-the-hiv-epidemic-
and-what-happened-to-me-afterwards/ (accessed September 20, 2012) 
188 Feng Zhang, “Suppliers of Blood under Investigation,” China Daily (Chinese), July 30, 2004. 
189 Xiaoming Ai, “The Epic of Central Plains,” Documentary (Chinese), 2006.  
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increasing share of the per capita income of peasants. This was compounded by the fact 
that central Chinese areas were suffering from a slow increase in agricultural 
production.191 These factors contributed to the creation of raw materials for the blood 
industry.192 Every male activist but one infected via selling blood in my research used 
the phrase “we were poor without so much to afford soy sauce and vinegar.” Female 
activists usually sold blood to get money for emergencies such as children’s medical 
costs, infant formula, or tuition. As peasants sold blood either at hospitals or blood 
banks run by public health officials, nobody ever suspected their operations. One of the 
sentences repeated most often in my interviews was, ”How would you get sick there? 
That was a hospital, the best and biggest hospital in our county.”193 
High-risk procedures combined with recycled medical instruments, outdated 
fractionation machines,194 untrained staff, and no HIV antibody testing for donors195 
contributed to the spread of HIV/AIDS around the mid-1990s. Blood contamination 
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employed by the central government to achieve rapid industrialization. The first was price 
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peasants for their products, and raising the prices of industrial products sold to peasants in order 
to extract industrial surplus for capital accumulation. The other was an uneven regional 
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2005; Whyte 2006). 
192 See Shao (2006) for a sophisticated analysis that displays the convergence of various 
economic and cultural dynamics in this process.  
193 Interview 111(Activist), June 5, 2012.  
194 At the time, centrifuges were mostly hand operated. In 1997, the Ministry of Health began 
requiring their replacement by automatic machines.   
195 HIV screening was considered unnecessary because of its high cost and the government’s 
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existed in at least twelve provinces196 as recorded by the Ministry of Health.197 The 
average increase in reported HIV infection was around 30% annually between 1995 and 
2000 (Cui et al. 2009). The Ministry of Health was fully aware of the development of 
the epidemic. According to all the historical records that can be found, the earliest 
AIDS-related death traceable to selling blood happened in Zhumadian in 1992 (Li 
2002). The issue of blood contamination in plasmapheresis was already found in 
multiple provinces such as Hubei, Henan, Guangdong, Shandong, Jiangsu, and Shanxi 
in the early 1990s.198 In 1994, when a couple hundred blood donors across the country 
tested HIV-positive, several medical experts called for a nationwide inspection of blood 
products and a mass campaign to inform the public of the HIV problem.199 1995 saw a 
leap in the number of annually reported HIV-positives cases from 531 to 1567. The 
Ministry of Health then identified the selling of blood and plasma as the primary 
transmission mode in several less developed provinces.200 Five provincial 
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197 Minister of Health, “To Ensure the Blood Quality in Our Country,” China Health Law 
(Chinese) 5, no. 6 (1996): 4–7.  
198 Editorial, “A Study on anti-HCV Positive Cases among Blood Donators,” Chinese Journal of 
Blood Transfusion (Chinese) 6, no. 3 (1993): 160–62. 
199“To Raise Awareness of AIDS,” Xinhua News Agency (Chinese), December 1, 1994; Xiwen 
Zheng, “Curb AIDS by Drug and Blood Collection and Supply,” Chinese Journal of 
Epidemiology (Chinese) 1 (2000): 9.	  
200 Fei Gao, et al., “HIV Surveillance among Blood Donors in Heilongjiang, 1995-1996,” 
Chinese Journal of Prevention and Control of STD and AIDS (Chinese) 6 (1997): 263; Jinhua 
Jiao, “Analysis of the Situation and Countermeasures of Contagious Diseases via Blood 
Transfusions,” Chinese Journal of Public Health Management (Chinese) 6 (1999): 395–97; 
Shuzhen Liu, et al., “The Investigation of HIV Infection Among Former Blood Donors in 
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epidemiological surveys on HIV/AIDS were thus conducted between the years of 1995 
and 2001.201 Public health officials further confirmed the epidemiological scales 
between 1995 and 1998.202 According to news reports trickling in between 1994 and 
1996, the problem brought the central government’s attention to the danger in the blood 
industry. The Henan government took action to close down all the collection stations for 
rectification, and the Ministry of Health issued a new regulation for the blood supply,203 
though it insisted that this regulation aimed at controlling hepatitis issues.204  
The problem, however, was that the details of the epidemic were not released to 
the public or to affected communities. Nor was any measure taken to warn local 
villagers or ensure safety. As the proportion of deaths among people aged 20 to 49 
surged to 27.4% in 1998 (Li et al. 2010), provincial governments such as the Henan and 
Hebei governments performed mandatory HIV tests in some areas under the guise of 
implementing a general check-up. Villagers were tested for HIV without their 
knowledge and without being informed of the results or given any education or 
counseling (Li 2012). MGH, a female activist, received a box of condoms after the 
testing, but all her test reports were withheld.205 She did not know her HIV positive 
status until three years later when the extent of blood contamination was admitted by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
201 See Health Department of Henan Province, “The Report on HIV/AIDS Prevention and 
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the central state. And by then, it was too late as MGH had already transmitted the virus 
to her husband.  
As a result, the most conservative estimate suggests that HIV prevalence rates 
ranged from 9.1% to 17.0% among former plasma donors and 2.1% among their non-
donor spouses, and that the rate of intergenerational vertical transmission ranged from 
28.9% to 38.4% (Wang et al. 2005; Zheng et al. 2000; Zhuang et al. 2003).206 The 
conservative estimate shows that blood contamination caused around 300,000 cases of 
HIV infection (Ministry of Health 2010). Although infection by selling blood appeared 
in most provinces, southeastern Henan provinces were the most seriously affected by 
the epidemic—specifically, Zhumadian, Kaifeng, Shangqiu, Zhoukou, Xinyang and 
Nanyang.207 Among a total of 18.3 million commercial plasma donors in Henan, more 
than 80 percent concentrated in those areas.208  
 
ii. Domestic Obstructions to Mobilization 
 
Large-scale HIV/AIDS infection occurred in many countries209 in the same 
period of time, provoking immediate grassroots outrage in most contexts. In China, 
however, there was no widespread mobilization surrounding the blood scandal. In 
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general, existing literature recognizes that the formation of high-risk activism in 
authoritarian contexts relies on whether self and collective interests, identities, and 
solidarity can be redefined in a way that translates group experiences into mobilizing 
forces (Calhoun 1994; Loveman 1998). Chinese peasants’ anger towards the state was 
submerged for years and did not surface until much later. Without external intervention, 
the dominant construction of AIDS by the Chinese state deterred the development of 
collective actors around blood-related AIDS issues.  
As discussed in the last chapter, AIDS was constructed as a western disease 
caused by individual behaviors associated with sexual immorality in the 1990s. This, in 
turn, silenced the issue of blood contamination and discouraged mobilizing efforts. 
According to Ferree (2005), silencing and stigma serve as a form of repression and “a 
deliberate strategy of excluding social movements” (148). Local health departments 
were trying to cover up the epidemic outbreak because, as one official explained, 
“social disorder would occur if people knew they were sick and started to run around 
(for outside help).”210 In fact, any connection with AIDS was a source of discredit and 
devaluation because “only foreigners or people who committed promiscuous sexual acts 
would get it.”211 Stigma and discrimination generated such intense and contradictory 
emotions within AIDS communities, especially in rural areas, that they damaged the 
“sense of self” of individuals (Calhoun 1991). Every activist living with HIV/AIDS 
whom I interviewed talked about how they were fearful and ashamed when they first 
found out they were infected. When YHS, who later became an activist, found out she 
and her husband were HIV-positive, she became suicidal:  
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I did not know anything about AIDS before. AIDS sounded so very far away 
from our life. You know, people stopped talking hearing this word because it 
felt like a very dirty disease. The doctor gave me the bad news and asked me to 
have my children examined. How would I have that courage? I was completely 
broken. Nobody could be imagined as getting AIDS. I did not want to live. I 
could not sleep. All I was thinking about was how my whole family was going 
to die: gas poisoning or taking sleeping pills.212 
  
Local peasants were not aware of the existence of HIV infection until a mass of infected 
peasants in hard-hit villages had passed through asymptomatic, early, and medium 
symptomatic stages and progressed from HIV to the AIDS stage after 1998. Referring 
to AIDS as “unknown fever,” many peasants chose to go to the provincial capital or 
Beijing to get tested secretly as word began to get around. One interviewee, RKH, 
talked about his family and his own response to AIDS: 
The first case of death happened in 1998. We did not know that was AIDS. We 
thought that man was a devil. Everybody was scared when more and more 
people died. One of my uncles was the first diagnosed one in Beijing. Nobody 
talked to him any more after he told us. [I sold blood before too.] So I seized on 
another uncle’s leg injury as an excuse to go to Beijing with him and get my 
test.213   
 
Twenty five percent of villagers died of AIDS infected via contaminated blood, making 
RKH’s village one of the hardest hit areas in Henan. One of his aunts lost four out of six 
children to AIDS. And still, peasants were too afraid to tell their families. Self-isolation 
was prevalent given “fear of discrimination”214 and “guilt feeling.”215 Infected 
individuals told of feeling guilty not just for themselves, but more importantly, for their 
families’ reputations, which were seen as tarnished by AIDS, decreasing their children’s 
chances of finding someone to marry. XL told me how peasants who sold blood before 
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did not want to get tested: “They were afraid of what [positive] results would do to their 
families. You would die of AIDS anyway. Why bother? Many of them did not want 
treatment or medicine so nobody would know they were infected. Four villagers died 
that way.”216 
Isolation stopped infected people from identifying themselves as victims and 
recognizing their collective sufferings, which blocked the formation of what Polletta 
and Jasper (2001, 285) describe as a collective identity: “an individual’s cognitive, 
moral, and emotional connection with a broader community, category, practice, or 
institution; it is a perception of a shared status or relation, which may be imagined 
rather than experienced directly.” A female activist described how infected people did 
not dare to speak to each other: “For example, I ran into someone at hospital so we 
knew we were both infected. Even so, we would pretend not to know each other. I 
would not even mention the word in his face because he would just act fool or get mad, 
needless mention of communicating. Now sick friends217 talk and communicate with 
each other about, like side effects of medicine. It was different back then.”218  
The silence surrounding AIDS was further strengthened by the stigma attached 
to selling blood, a practice which, despite being widespread, was considered despicable 
in rural areas, especially for men since it was equated with laziness, incompetence, and 
desperate poverty. One activist described his first experience: 
I came back home and wept all night. What are human bodies? Bones, muscles, 
and blood. With your blood drained, how can you be a human with just bone 
and skin? I was feeling weighed down with a heavy load mentally. Actually it 
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did not occur to me that I might get sick. I was just scared and frustrated with 
the situation. …But honestly there was no other option. We were running out of 
food and my child was hungry.219 
 
As a result, the disease was perceived as something determined by individual behaviors. 
Without creating common understanding of and meanings about the situation, infected 
peasants accepted the dominant image of AIDS as a foreign disease related to sexuality 
and struggled to differentiate themselves from this image. Understandably, it was 
impossible to maintain the kind of morale crucial for building cultures of solidarity and 
resistance in a highly restricted and repressive context (O’Hearn 2009). This, in turn, 
blocked the process of making attributions regarding who to blame and suggesting lines 
of action (Benford and Snow 2000). All of these factors became major obstacles to 
mobilization. The situation was not unlike what happened to gay communities in the 
U.S. when AIDS was first found (Gould 2001), but while gay men in the U.S. were able 
to organize self-help groups, infected peasants in China remained more isolated within 
their individual families, not realizing that they were not alone. For example, one 
leading activist, ZLW, recalled how the average death rate got up to seven per month in 
his village around 2000. He and the other villagers did not even make the connection 
between commercial blood donation and the disease that was spreading through the 
village. Thinking of it as a plague limited to his village, ZLW was not aware that a 
similar scene was happening in RKH’s village in the neighboring county. In fact, both 
villages went through similar processes of searching for medicine and coming to a dead 
end.220 
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Several village heads and party branch secretary chiefs, upon discovering the 
deadly infection, did immediately report the cases to town and later county 
governments. Afraid of using the term AIDS, they chose to refer to it as an “unknown 
fever” or “strange disease.” When officials at higher levels required them to keep the 
outbreak under wraps, peasants were abandoned in isolation. In order to maintain 
absolute secrecy, Henan governments refused to provide voluntary counseling and 
testing services, or medical care and treatment. With no doctors or medicine, villages 
were left on their own to fight against HIV/AIDS. 
In the 1990s, a few public health professionals did attempt to take action, but 
with no success. Just like other institutional activists, they mainly targeted the state and 
relied on their institutional resources to conduct activities. Wang Shuping tried to 
appeal for the government’s attention to the AIDS epidemic caused by the blood 
industry in Henan as early as 1995. She was a doctor and researcher of hepatitis at the 
time, working for the Office of Medical Affairs in the Health Bureau. After sensing the 
scale of the epidemic, Wang tested 409 blood donors at her own expense and found an 
HIV-positive rate of 13 percent. She then suggested that the Health Department of 
Henan begin conducting HIV testing at fractionation stations but was rejected. Wang 
sent 62 blood samples to Beijing for testing and then revealed the results to the Chinese 
Academy of Preventive Medicine.221 The Ministry of Health took measures to regulate 
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the blood industry in 1996, but Wang was beaten, removed from her position, and 
forced to leave her home and then the country in 2001.222    
 Dr. Gao Yaojie was another extraordinary example. She became aware of the 
AIDS epidemic for the first time when a female farmer was diagnosed HIV-positive 
only a few days before she died of AIDS; she had been infected by a blood transfusion 
she received during a surgery in 1996. Dr. Gao, a retired gynecologist in Henan, 
realized that people were not aware of HIV-transmission through blood and so she 
started education campaigns to spread knowledge about AIDS.223 She gave lectures on 
AIDS and compiled and distributed education materials among peasants and health 
professionals in villages. While mostly relying on her own personal financial resources 
to fund these activities, Dr. Gao was also able to mobilize her institutional networks to 
support her campaigns. For example, the provincial anti-epidemic station and women’s 
federation helped her to circulate education pamphlets.224 She traveled in rural areas on 
foot or by bus, visited infected villagers, and sent them money and medicine. 
AIDS activism in rural areas confronted impediments caused by the socialist 
infectious disease control model discussed in the previous chapter. Activism was so 
local and fragmented that it developed in parallel with, yet was isolated from its 
counterpart in urban areas in the 1990s. While activists relied on the state for policy 
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improvements, it became increasingly clear that existing domestic health institutions 
would not change. For example, Zeng Yi, the president of the Chinese Academy of 
Preventive Medicine, was one of the first senior public health officials who noticed the 
epidemic outbreak in Henan as early as 1996. In fact, he gave asylum to Wang Shuping 
and protected her from the political retaliation of the provincial government. Even so, 
when he called for the state’s attention to AIDS, he continued to refer to what happened 
in Henan as “isolated cases”225 and insisted in public that “the main cause of AIDS in 
China was shifting from drug injection and shared syringe to sexual transmission”226  
 
II. Activating the AIDS Movement:  
External Intervention and State Coercion, 1999–2001 
 
Faced with various dilemmas in the late 1990s, how did AIDS activism 
overcome all these difficulties and evolve into a movement in the early 2000s? The 
answer lies in a close examination of the occurrence of external intervention. This 
section illustrates two major forces underlying this process that drove the formation of 
AIDS activist actorhood around blood: one is the politicization of China’s AIDS 
situation at the international level, while the other is the state’s escalation of hard 
coercion.  
The abrupt increase in international attention to AIDS issues in China came as a 
shock to the Chinese state as well as activists. As transnational social movement studies 
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predict (Sikkink 2005), the establishment of transnational AIDS institutions around the 
early 2000s certainly shifted the power dynamics between the Chinese state and AIDS 
activists. But contrary to the usual narrative offered by this literature, this was not a 
process in which local activists made a conscious decision to seek the help of 
transnational institutions in order to increase pressure on the Chinese government. 
Rather, as this section will show, Chinese activists were not aware of the changes at the 
transnational level. In fact, it was the intervention of external forces that drove domestic 
AIDS activist to become engaged with political resources at the supranational level.  
At first, intervention from abroad actually provoked heightened repression 
before it helped AIDS activism. Although being targeted with international “naming 
and shaming” increased the costs of continuing coercion (Hafner-Burton 2008), the 
Chinese central state took immediate coercive action to deny the extent of AIDS 
epidemics caused by contaminated blood, close off infected rural communities, and 
preempt potential domestic resistance. The rising suppressing force was so out of 
proportion to the scale of domestic AIDS activism that the former became the catalyst 
for, rather than response to increasing local mobilization.  
 
i. Politicizing AIDS at the International Level 
 
 
Despite the pivotal role they played in the first wave of AIDS movement, urban 
activists did not pay attention to infected peasants or consider them as victims of an 
injustice. This neglect was all the more surprising as urban activists were aware of the 
existence of blood contamination – indeed, the first campaign related to AIDS 
infections via blood actually took place in Beijing. Song Pengfei, a sixteen-year-old 
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boy, received an HIV-infected blood transfusion during a surgery in 1998. He and his 
family were forced to move to Beijing to seek medical help after they were kicked out 
of their local community. Wan Yanhai and Li Dan, an undergraduate student majoring 
in astronomy at Beijing Normal University at the time, took part in Song’s legal 
campaign against the hospital. But this was the only case Wan and Li collaborated on 
before they came together to help infected peasants in 2001. Wan admitted that he 
turned down many other similar cases because he wanted to avoid direct confrontation 
with public health institutions. In fact, he did not want to get involved in issues related 
to blood at all: 
I knew it was a group phenomenon. But I only wanted to help that specific 
individual case [Song]. As for collective action, many people asked me for help. 
But I dared not. …Some people who got infected via selling blood also came to 
me in 1999. But I had a prejudice against them. I was also afraid of being related 
to blood selling in public. At that time people thought only those who used 
infected blood as innocent victims of those who were selling blood. I had a 
similar bias. I could not understand why peasants would sell blood and spread 
the virus.227 
 
Therefore, Wan continued to focus on homosexual groups even though Wang Shuping 
met him and told him of the epidemic in rural areas.228 It was clear that urban activists, 
subject to the influence of the socialist contagious disease control, lacked a well-
elaborated collective framework to understand and interpret the AIDS epidemic of 
tainted blood, let alone take mobilize around it in the 1990s.  
At the same time, activists were reluctant to engage with international actors 
regarding blood issues. For example, Gao Yaojie was the only local activist who was 
willing to talk to domestic journalists to draw attention to the blood issue. But even she 
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would feign illness to avoid meeting with foreign journalists.229 Song Pengfei’s father 
felt the need to explain specifically why his family would accept help from the Phelex 
Foundation based in the United States: “I really did not want to expose this – and I’m 
attached to the country, the Party, the people. But we are at a critical juncture – the 
medicine we have is about to run out and I have to think about my child.”230 Far from 
initiating bottom-up efforts to solicit international intervention then, domestic activists 
in China actually avoided external exposure and/or sought to downplay such interaction. 
But a new turn occurred in 1999 as the AIDS outbreak caused by tainted blood 
started to draw the attention of international media. The Washington Post ran the first 
story on blood contamination and AIDS in China,231 though the scale of the epidemic 
was still unclear at the time. Elisabeth Rosenthal, a correspondent for the New York 
Times who specialized in medical matters, heard about Song Pengfei and his campaign 
in 1999.232 She finally convinced Gao Yaojie to agree to an interview, which resulted in 
a series of groundbreaking reports233 between August and December 2000 that exposed 
the Henan blood scandal, revealed the difficulties facing activists, criticized the central 
government’s lack of commitment to the AIDS issue, and blamed the Henan provincial 
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government for its attempt to cover up the blood scandal. A proliferation of foreign 
media attention soon followed from the U.S., Australia, Canada, France, Germany, and 
Britain. In 2001, journalists from the Washington Post, Ottawa Citizen, Routes, Daily 
Telegraph, The Guardian, Sydney Morning Herald, The Age, The Australian, and the 
French daily Libération were able to visit peasants infected via blood donation, despite 
not receiving authorization from the government. 
This was not actually the first time the New York Times had published reports on 
blood contamination and AIDS problems in China. As early as 1996, it was one of the 
foreign journals that raised serious concerns about blood supply safety in China after 
learning that serum albumin produced by a military-run factory was contaminated with 
HIV.234 The reports exposed the problematic blood supply and products caused by 
commercial blood collection and criticized the government for not enforcing testing and 
quality control measures. They did cause concerns inside the United Nations (UN). 
In China, the Ministry of Health attempted to simply deny the issue, but when 
this failed, it painted over it by using a health education campaign and a National 
Conference on HIV/AIDS Control and Prevention to emphasize that the problem was 
limited to illegal blood collection conducted by bad individuals.235 The state displayed 
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compliance with the UN by stating that it recognized it was a critical time for AIDS 
control in China.236 At the same time, the Minister of Health reiterated that drugs and 
prostitution were the primary transmission modes and the government “should give first 
priority to STD control in the battle against AIDS.”237 Accordingly, the director general 
of the Disease Control Department announced that the growing pace of infection during 
the mid-1990s would be curbed as the central government was starting “a large-scale 
campaign to promote cultural and ethical progress among Chinese.”238  
In the end, the international media’s attention only lasted for four months 
without generating wider reactions. Only the health department in Hong Kong warned 
its citizens against using blood products from the mainland China.239 Therefore, it was 
not surprising when in 1998 the State Council blamed the southwestern areas bordering 
other countries for the spread of AIDS where “there is a very large floating population, 
uncontrolled drug use, and rampant prostitution.”240 Meanwhile, the United Nations 
Theme Group on HIV/AIDS and WHO continued to claim that sexual intercourse 
would constitute a major threat without knowing the presence of an AIDS epidemic 
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caused by blood.241 This explained why international collaboration projects heavily 
concentrated in the southwestern China in the 1990s.  
Things were totally different by 2000, however, when not only international 
media, but also important international political actors mobilized around this issue. The 
United States’ embassy in Beijing had been observing the blood industry and the AIDS 
epidemic in China since 1998.242 Mainly relying on different newspaper reports, the 
Environment, Science, Technology and Health office of the embassy discovered 
contradictions within China’s official statistics and began to gather information on 
blood contamination accidents. In April 2000, the office found a report in a local 
newspaper243 that introduced the work of Dr. Gui Xien and described an AIDS outbreak 
in the Shangcai county, Henan village of Wenlou.244 Though the report generated little 
interest domestically, the U.S. Embassy sensed the presence of a potential large-scale 
AIDS epidemic in Henan.245 After releasing the English version of the report, the 
embassy sent officers to the Shangcai County to investigate.246 In 2000 alone, the 
embassy released six reports on the topic, including a letter from an anonymous public 
health official in Henan that exposed how the provincial government’s greed for money 
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was behind the frantic expansion of the blood economy at the risk of peasants’ life, and 
named specific government officials responsible for repressing criticism and covering 
up the blood scandal.247  
After the silence was broken, AIDS in China became established as a political 
issue at the supranational level. This process involved two dimensions. First, 
transnational AIDS institutions emphasized the political significance of the AIDS 
epidemic in China as extending beyond the geographic boundaries of the country, thus 
legitimizing the broadening of policy responses to the global level. This framework then 
laid the foundation for criticizing China’s socialist contagious disease model from the 
outside. As UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan emphasized the urgency of 
strengthening AIDS intervention during his visit to top leaders in Beijing in early 2001, 
UNAIDS China started an independent investigation into the AIDS epidemic after their 
request to conduct a joint assessment of AIDS situation with the Chinese Ministry of 
Health was declined (Wu 2005).  
The severe harm caused by China’s AIDS epidemic to the world was articulated 
around two major themes: first, that the epidemic posed a security and development 
threat to other countries, and second, that the epidemic constituted a human rights crisis. 
UNAIDS determined that the number of HIV infectious cases in China was around 1.5 
million,248 while other UN officials put this number as high as 10 million.249 These 
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figures were repeatedly quoted at different meetings, directly contradicting the 22,517 
figure announced by the Chinese Health Ministry.250 In his May 2001 address to the 
African summit on HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Other Infectious Diseases, former 
United States President Bill Clinton said that China could replace Africa as having the 
highest infection rate if no action was taken.251 Accordingly, AIDS was placed on the 
foreign policy priority list of the American government. Laying out plans for how to 
battle such a nontraditional terror threat, then Secretary of State Colin Powell listed 
AIDS as part of a renewed policy of constructive engagement with the Chinese 
government.252 Testifying to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he said 
Washington and Beijing had shared interests in fighting AIDS.253 Powell cited a CIA 
report and detailed the negative effects of the pandemic in China as one of “America’s 
largest export markets and sources of supply included political instability and slow 
democratic development.”254  
Other UN agents emphasized the AIDS outbreak in China must be treated as a 
human rights issue, instead of a medical issue. The United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP)’s resident representative stated that “in China, our biggest battle is to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
249 “China Facing Threat of 10m HIV Sufferers; Epidemic Poses Danger to Hong Kong, Warns 
Expert,” South China Morning Post, August 28, 2001. 
250 “China Health Ministry Officials Express Concern Over Rising AIDS Rates,” China Daily, 
March 1, 2001. 
251 “Global Partnership Against HIV/AIDS,” African News, May 12, 2001. 
252 “Powell Says U.S. Foreign Policy Not Stuck on a Single Issue,” Agence France-Presse, 
September 27, 2001; State Department, “Transcript: Powell Rejects Charges of U.S. 
Unilateralism; Secretary interviewed February 17 on CNN,” February 17, 2002. 
253 “Statement for the Record, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell to the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee,” Congressional Testimony, February 5, 2002 
254 “PanAfrica: Annan Urges Business Leaders to Join Fight Against HIV/AIDS,” Africa News, 
June 4, 2001. 
	   154	  
get AIDS out of the context that this is just another disease that the health department 
ought to deal with.”255 UNAIDS described China as “on the verge of a catastrophe that 
could result in unimaginable human suffering, economic loss and social devastation” 
and criticized the state for its “weak response” to AIDS.256 UN officials also openly 
criticized the government for playing down the seriousness of its AIDS epidemic and 
keeping epidemiological data from the UN system when they expressed their concerns 
to various governments. 
The politicization of China’s AIDS problems created opportunities to call the 
socialist contagious disease control into question and shift the attribution of blame from 
individuals to the state. While the AIDS epidemic in China was described as “a 
holocaust on the scale of sub-Saharan Africa,”257 UN agents publicly singled out 
China’s AIDS governance for criticism. They shattered the foundation of the existing 
disease control model that was based on asserting AIDS was a western immoral disease 
by affirming that AIDS was taking hold in the general Chinese population.258 Peter Piot, 
executive director of UNAIDS, criticized China’s top leaders for failing to make the 
disease a priority: “There is lack of a sense of urgency at nearly all levels… They do not 
seem to see what a problem this is going to be for China.”259  
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Furthermore, international actors clearly recognized the injustices to which 
peasants were subject, highlighted the economic and health structure as the cause of 
problems, and identified the state as the culpable agent. Instead of focusing on peasants’ 
poverty and their personal choices to sell blood, various reports for the first time built 
the connection between infections, blood contamination, and the central government’s 
role in driving the development of the blood industry. Some reports went so far as to 
blame the Chinese Health Minister and even the army for encouraging people to sell 
blood to increase the profits of the blood industry.260 UNAIDS stated that it was a 
priority for the government to be open about the extent of the problem,261 and criticized 
the government for undermining the seriousness of the epidemic and doing little to help 
people living with HIV/AIDS.262 
Attribution of blame was related to marking the urgency as well as opportunities 
to overcome the unjust situation in need of change, which made the highlight of 
Chinese activists’ struggle necessary. Song Pengfei and Gao Yaojie became the face of 
Chinese AIDS activism, despite the fact that neither had ever reached out to 
international actors. William Stewart, the program coordinator for the China-United 
Kingdom HIV/AIDS Prevention Project, became Song’s mentor and described him as 
an “icon” of the Chinese AIDS movement.263 With the help of some American NGOs, 
Song became one of a few people able to receive antiretroviral therapy in China. 
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Meanwhile, Gao Yaojie’s influence broadened as international outlets portrayed her as a 
Chinese Mother Teresa. She won the Jonathan Mann Award for Health and Human 
Rights in 2001 and became the most famous AIDS activist in China.  
Through the politicization of blood contamination, the AIDS problem in China 
was increasingly represented and understood in light of transnational AIDS norms. This 
process of politicization highlighted the opposition between the logics of transnational 
AIDS institutions and China’s AIDS governance, exposed the latter’s failures and 
defiance of transnational norms, and called for action to overcome injustice. This 
process did not rise from within China but took place at the international level. The next 
section examines how this provoked the state to respond with hard repression. 
 
ii. Denial of the State: Escalation of Hard Coercion 
 
Attention from abroad did not actually affect AIDS activism until later, but what 
it did change immediately was the Chinese state’s perception of the definition and 
magnitude of the threat of AIDS activism. This must be understood in the context of the 
Chinese state’s preferred method of responding to accusations about the blood scandal 
with denial, as predicted by the spiral model. Cohen (2001, 99) distinguishes between 
three forms of denial in governments’ official responses to allegations of human rights 
abuse: literal denial (“nothing happened”); interpretive denial (“what happened is really 
something else”); and implicatory denial (“what happened was justified”). While local 
governments relied heavily on literal denial, the central government mainly utilized 
interpretive and implicatory denial when confronted with external criticism. It denied 
that human rights were being violated by the state, claimed that the government had 
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taken effective measures to control AIDS, and emphasized that blood contamination 
was no more than an accident caused by illegal blood collection by corrupt individuals. 
As one Beijing-based UN official commented, recognizing the extent of the AIDS 
problem was not a medical issue but “was extremely tricky at the political level.”264 
At the international level, the Chinese state opposed the international framing 
that identified infected peasants as victims of the authoritarian state and attempted to 
fashion a counterframe that would “rebut, undermine, or neutralize the movement’s 
collective action frames” (Benford 1987, 75). When the United States Embassy first 
started its investigation in Henan, public health officials told embassy officials “there 
have been no AIDS cases in Shangcai County. That is because our prevention work has 
been so effective.”265 Countering the UNAIDS estimate, in May 2001, the Ministry of 
Health took the occasion of a joint European-China Training Program to announce that 
China had only 880 full-blown AIDS cases in total since 1985 and only had 22, 517 
HIV/AIDS cases. The Ministry also stressed that the number of STD cases had reached 
4 million.266 After the New York Times reports were published in August 2000, the 
central government denied the presence of any major AIDS outbreak for almost a year, 
though it did mention the existence of a hidden black market for blood collection, 
especially in Henan.267  
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The UN General Assembly Special Session on HIV/AIDS in June 2002 
represents the watershed in the Chinese state’s interaction with the emerging 
transnational AIDS institutions. As discussed in Chapter 2, China was a major opposing 
force against the politicization of HIV/AIDS at the international level. It voted with 
Russia against politicizing HIV/AIDS as an international security issue at the UN 
Security Council Meeting held in January 2000.268 Later, it tried to contest the globality 
of the AIDS threat and rejected the possibility that East Asia might replace Africa to 
become the epicenter of the disease.  
Despite these efforts on the part of the Chinese state, AIDS was officially placed 
on the Security Council’s agenda when the UN General Assembly Special Session on 
HIV/AIDS was held with the Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS approved in 
June 2001. As Prins points out, the Declaration established a new concept of security 
that granted precedence to the rights of individuals before the state. This resolution thus 
went directly against the core of the institutional logics of the socialist contagious 
disease model—namely, sovereignty. Even though the Chinese state did not want to 
obey such a rule, it could no longer ignore its significance after the Special Session.  
The state articulated a counter-diagnosis of China’s AIDS situation that insisted 
the socialist contagious disease control could be reformed to resolve the problem. This 
counter-diagnosis had three core components. The state downplayed the scale of the 
epidemic and blamed various high-risk groups as the primary AIDS transmitters. It 
attributed the blame for blood contamination to illegal businessmen’s individual 
behaviors in the past. And it attempted to focus attention on how AIDS control was 
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steadily progressing under the leadership of the Party and the government at all levels. 
The State Council used this counter-diagnosis to try to overcome negative publicity, 
emphasizing instead the state’s proactive approach to the AIDS situation.  
Right after the Special Section was over, China’s Health Minister reached out to 
western press to articulate the nature of and solution for the AIDS problem.269  He 
readily admitted the UN’s estimate of the overall scale of the AIDS epidemic in China 
and announced the highest estimate given yet by the government: 600,000. But he also 
claimed that the HIV/AIDS cases related to selling blood that were found by western 
reporters were isolated occurrences concentrated in a few locations; he identified, 
instead, intravenous drug users as the primary AIDS transmitters responsible for the 
upsurge in infection.270  
Throughout the rest of 2001, the Ministry of Health strove to show the 
international audience its changed attitude and renewed commitment to AIDS, without 
actually admitting the severity of the problem. Deputy Health Minister Yin Dakui 
visited Henan and then hosted the central government’s first official press conference 
on AIDS in August. This international PR campaign was praised by many as signaling 
that the Chinese government had woken up to the AIDS crisis. Yin noted that “China 
was facing a very serious AIDS epidemic just “like many other countries in the world.” 
He also disclosed that some illegal blood stations did not abide by standard procedure 
and caused a high rate of HIV infection among some blood sellers, but he provided no 
specific details, nor did he mention Henan. He went on to say that “the way of thinking 
of people living in these places [villages in Henan]” was responsible for the spread of 
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AIDS and “it is not appropriate to blame the Chinese Government for suppressing 
information.” In fact, Yin angrily denied any accusation that implicated the Health 
Ministry’s involvement in the cover-up of the AIDS epidemic.271  
Further, he countered the UNAIDS’ estimate by announcing that the 
accumulated number of confirmed HIV/AIDS cases was 26,058 since 1985, with only 
584 patients dying of AIDS in total. This accelerated spread of HIV/AIDS was “mainly 
due to drug use and unsafe sex in spite of the country’s redoubled efforts to prevent and 
control the disease.”272 According to Yin, more than 70 percent of HIV/AIDS sufferers 
were infected by needle sharing among drug users, 6.8 percent were caused by 
heterosexual sexual contact, and only 0.81 percent were caused by blood or blood 
products. In his presentation, the statistics did not even include a category for 
commercial blood donation. Instead, there were 4,891 cases caused by “unknown 
reasons” that accounted for 21 percent of HIV cases. In the end, Yin argued that the 
problem was that China had “a poor record of education on how to prevent AIDS” that 
could be fixed by investing more money in education campaigns.273  
The Chinese state’s rhetorical rejection of human rights interference made it 
even more imperative to conceal the blood scandal and preempt oppositional forces. 
The state sought only to release itself from international pressure, while rejecting the 
domestic legitimacy of the transnational AIDS regime, and putting an end to grassroots 
groups. Infected villagers were prevented from seeking, receiving, or imparting any 
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information about the virus, in addition to being denied prevention and treatment—all 
of which the Chinese government justified as “necessary for preventing upheaval.”274  
Hard coercion was mainly executed through domestic laws that deprived people 
of the freedom to self-organize. The state aimed to eradicate horizontal 
(international/national/local) and vertical linkages (across work units and regions) by 
deploying hard coercion. Heralded by a nationwide crackdown on the Falun Gong 
movement275, the release of “Regulations on the Registration and Administration of 
Social Organizations”276 erected excessive legal obstacles for bottom-up organizing. 
While the 1998 Regulation largely followed the previous 1989 model,277 this new 
regulation increased the complexity of preparation and application procedures for social 
organizations, and specified in detail the supervision and guidance of such 
organizations’ activities.  
There was a crackdown on domestic journalists who attempted semi-
independent reporting on the AIDS and blood contamination problems. A few local 
journalists in Henan conducted investigations as early as 1999. But under the 
supervision of the provincial Communist Party Propaganda Department, their reports 
were banned and all the associated pictures and written materials destroyed.278 Zhang 
Jicheng, one of the journalists who published the report found by the United States 
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Embassy discussed above, was working for the Henan Technology News at the time. 
Facing the same resistance when he first completed his report, he was forced to publish 
it in Henan Technology Internal Reference Documents (Nei Can), which could only be 
accessed by government officials in Henan. Zhang did not give up but went over the 
head of his immediate supervisor and sent the report to Huaxi City Newspaper, an 
influential regional newspaper based in Sichuan province.279 Not only was Zhang fired 
after the report was published, but half a year later in August 2001 he was forbidden by 
the provincial propaganda department from working for any media in Henan. This 
ruling cost him his new job and left him no choice but to leave Henan and work as an 
anonymous correspondent for a different newspaper.  
Journalists at national newspapers suffered similar treatment. China News 
Weekly and Southern Weekend took the lead among domestic media in covering the 
blood contamination story in Henan. Although their reports did not identify the 
government as responsible for causing the problem, provincial officials from Henan 
complained to the State News and Publishing Bureau that the journalists took advantage 
of the fact that they were not based in Henan to explore misdeeds there in May 2001.280 
The acting chief and front-page news editors of Southern Weekend were removed in 
June, while the editor of China News Weekly was suspended three months later.    
The central government also issued an internal document stating that any 
popular resistance that connected places or work units, or that involved support from 
overseas would be regarded as political and, hence, intolerable, answerable by armed 
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suppression if necessary (Cai 2007). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs required foreign 
journalists to ask for permission to leave Beijing. It quickly banned foreign journalists 
from leaving Beijing for any coverage of the AIDS epidemic since “there was sufficient 
information in the Chinese press.”281 The Ministry warned New York Times 
correspondent Elisabeth Rosenthal not to continue her “illegal interview” of Gao 
Yaojie.282 In August 2001, two German journalists who managed to travel without 
permission were arrested when they were found near a village in Henan.283 Song Pengfei 
was one of the first Chinese persons living with HIV/AIDS who spoke to foreign media. 
When he attended the 5th International Congress on AIDS in Asia and the Pacific, the 
Health Ministry launched an investigation to determine how this teenage boy was 
allowed to leave China and whether he was working with anti-China forces.  
Mounting international pressure led to a number of cosmetic gestures on the part 
of the Chinese government to comply with human rights. The State Council issued 
several announcements to western press regarding a Five-Year Action Plan on 
HIV/AIDS Prevention and Containment and a new central fiscal budget increase for 
AIDS intervention. On the eve of World AIDS Day in 2001, Minister Zhang shook 
hands with patients at an AIDS clinic in Beijing and called on the public to give more 
care and compassion to those infected.284 
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In reality, however, these forms of window dressing only served to further 
increase the degree of hard coercion. Local public security offices began to collaborate 
across jurisdictions to block not only the flow of epidemic information, but also 
medicine and life supplies for infected peasants. Whereas in the past AIDS activism in 
Henan was subject to disciplinary warnings or punishment,285 such responses were 
quickly replaced by the actual or threatened use of sanctions against personal physical 
integrity to keep journalists, medical workers, and other urban activists from entering 
into infected areas. Local authorities often recruited village cadres or peasants to stop 
journalists from contacting villagers.286 They also threatened villagers not to talk to 
outsiders or used other coercive strategies to ensure silence. For example, one official 
from Kaifeng Security Department told villagers to call him the next time an activist 
came to visit because he said they needed to protect him.287 Some local residents were 
beaten up after they helped reporters.288 Stalking, harassment, batteries, and detention 
became so prevalent that urban volunteers would be put in custody for delivering winter 
clothes for orphans.289 Infected local communities were under such iron-clad guard that 
even charitable organizations were denied access.290 A 14-year-old girl who lost both 
her parents to AIDS was accused of helping anti-China forces abroad only because she 
told a reporter unanonymously that “the government does not do anything for me or my 
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family.”291 As the Minister of Health later recognized, “local governments not only 
concealed, falsely reported or hindered any individual from reporting AIDS epidemic 
information but also refused to take prompt action to stop the spread of this epidemic 
out of fear that AIDS would affect the local image and economic development.” 
In sum, the domestic strategy of the Chinese state remained completely focused 
on hard repression during this time period. By disallowing any form of activism, the 
state denied the political and legal legitimacy of bottom-up initiatives, which, in turn, 
dissolved the capacity of social movements to mobilize. This strategy has proven to be 
effective, as current literature finds that the dominant forms of activism in China remain 
small-scale, local, reactive, and non-organized, where they exist at all (Perry 2008; Ying 
2011). The difference with the AIDS issue, however, was that external forces gained 
much greater authority and resources, forcing the Chinese state to further transform its 
repression strategies. Ironically, such hard coercion fueled a series of escalating 
conflicts between 2002 and 2003 that provided the catalyst for the first wave of AIDS 
activism.  
 
III. “Using Blood to Defend Rights”: The Formation of the First Wave AIDS 
Movement, 2001–2003 
 
In 2001, the first wave of the AIDS movement started to emerge in Henan. A 
local activist described it as the start of “using blood to defend rights” (Xianxue 
Weiquan).292 The intervention of external forces brought transnational AIDS 
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institutional logics and the socialist contagious disease control model into explicit 
opposition, and marked an opportunity to recognize China’s AIDS situation as unjust 
and in need of change. This process put into motion the formation of two major AIDS 
activist actors—nongovernmental individuals in urban areas and mutual aid groups of 
infected villagers in Henan—and fueled a very unusual alliance across urban and rural 
divisions. In turn, when domestic activists began to actively engage with external 
forces, their struggles, even more than the blood scandal, drew extensive international 
interest for they were seen as evidence of China’s so-called civil society, something 
highly valued by transnational AIDS institutions. It was these dynamics that propelled 
the transnationalization of AIDS activist actorhood 
 
i. Nongovernmental Individuals and Mutual Aid Groups 
 
Because formal grassroots organizing is a political taboo, urban volunteers who 
joined infected peasants’ fight referred to themselves as “nongovernmental individuals” 
to emphasize that they were not affiliated with any formal organization. The term was 
coined by individual activists from journalists, scholars, social workers, college 
graduates, students, freelance writers, artists to other volunteers. With nongovernmental 
individuals’ help, infected peasants formed mutual aid groups organized on the basis of 
family, household, and kinship, combined with the communist agriculture cooperative 
model of mutual aid teams.  
The battle between external forces and the state propelled the rise of 
nongovernmental individuals in 2001. Many of these actors were already involved in 
various kinds of advocacy activities, they just weren’t focused on AIDS. As late as 
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2000, Wan Yanhai, who would go on to become one of China’s foremost AIDS 
activists, was planning to leave for the U.S. to pursue a completely different career. But 
by 2001, external intervention was transforming the disease from something determined 
by individual behaviors to a public health crisis associated with citizens’ rights. When 
Gao Yaojie won the Jonathan Mann Award for Health and Human Rights in April 
2001,293 she was denied a passport by the police department to attend the awards 
ceremony with Secretary General Kofi Annan. Provincial officials ask her to decline the 
award since they feared it would give more publicity to the AIDS issue and cause 
trouble with “anti-China forces such as [the] WHO and the American government.”294 
The incident received widespread international press coverage throughout 2001 as 
evidence of the state’s efforts to block her message of AIDS prevention. In Gao’s 
thank-you speech, which was read at the ceremony, she was sharply critical of the 
socialist contagious disease control model, dismissing it as a failed attempt to “build an 
AIDS Great Wall” to stop the virus from entering. She described her actions as part of a 
global AIDS movement related to human rights and called for more bottom-up 
grassroots mobilization in China.295 In a series of related interviews, she further argued 
that the AIDS outbreak could not simply be attributed to greed, but also hinged on 
health workers’ ignorant construction of AIDS as an immoral foreign disease related to 
promiscuous sex.296  
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The controversy around Gao became an important trigger igniting action in 
urban areas. Wan Yanhai was one of a few who met Gao in 2000. That meeting 
changed Wan’s personal views on blood and AIDS.297 Further encouraged by rising 
international interest, Wan started to publish articles to expose the government’s cover-
up. 298 It was not until summer 2001 that Li Dan and Hu Jia agreed to join Wan’s AIZHI 
Action Project because “Wan knew Gao Yaojie.”299 They recruited a small group of 
college volunteers to visit Henan villages. Wan and Li had previously worked together 
on the campaign to help Song Pengfei. Hu was an environmental activist at the time. 
After graduating from the University of Economics and Business, he was introduced to 
Wan by Wang Lixiong300 in 2000 and became interested in public health. Both Li and 
Hu went on to become major figures in the subsequent AIDS movement; Zhang Jicheng 
also joined them when he came to Beijing in exile. The fieldtrip to Henan villages 
opened direct connections between urban volunteers and infected peasants and officially 
raised the curtain on the first wave of the AIDS movement. 
The first group of nongovernmental individuals formed in the latter part of 2001. 
As part of its PR campaign, the state hosted its first national conference in November 
2001 to demonstrate its efforts to tackle AIDS. Conference organizers required special 
approval for any paper on the subject of AIDS transmission through blood, while most 
journalists were not allowed to observe conference sessions. Two HIV positive persons 
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were permitted to attend the conference, thanking the Communist Party and the 
government for “giving me the courage to survive.”301 At the same time, 9 HIV positive 
peasants and children from Dongguan village in Sui county where Hu and Zhang had 
visited that summer came to Beijing seeking the conference’s help to obtain treatment. 
But they were admitted to a government hospital on the day the meeting started and not 
released until the day it ended. Nongovernmental individuals used this as an opportunity 
to host a special press conference for those villagers and announce an open petition 
letter to the conference organizers. The campaign immediately attracted several 
journalists to visit the village. As local authorities harassed and detained the journalists 
and threatened villagers, villagers surrounded the county government and conducted at 
least three protests and sit-ins in just one month, the story of which was covered by 
international media.302 Two villagers became messengers, traveling and passing news 
between Beijing and their home villages. In addition to facing obstruction from the local 
government, these messengers were also detained and repatriated by the Beijing police. 
Still, despite the government’s efforts to cut Henan off from the outside world, the years 
2001 and 2002 saw the emergence of a network when Henan villagers and scattered 
individual activists in cities linked up and began working together.  
The campaign to help villagers from Sui county made “AIDS activists become 
recognizable and something beyond personal efforts became possible… once 
individuals began voicing their discontent and an international audience began 
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listening.”303 More and more people, including Duan Hongqing (journalist) and Fu Xi 
(writer), joined the AIZHI Action Project and participated in activities, such as releasing 
a list of villagers killed by AIDS at Dongguan and making a short video to record 
villagers’ lives.304 Both of Duan and Fu were already aware of the AIDS crisis; Fu Xi 
had even visited several Henan villages in 2000. But it was not until now that they were 
exposed to the presence of other nongovernmental individuals and became connected to 
a larger movement.   
This emergent network of nongovernmental individuals challenged the 
association between AIDS and immorality. Wan illustrated the distinctiveness of this 
group of activists: 
This group of activists was dramatically different. You know, usually AIDS 
movements in different countries were made up of people who were suppressed 
and marginalized as immorally corrupted or problematic. You know, people 
who were related to sex, drugs, and so on. But those suppressed groups in China 
did not stand up at the time. What emerged was a group of activists who were 
considered as people with nobility. This group was able to provoke a strong 
reaction from the public in resonance.  
 
Nonetheless, the fact that none of the nongovernmental individuals was infected was 
crucial in establishing the legitimacy of the AIDS movement during this period.  
In turn, collaborative efforts between urban activists and peasants infected with 
HIV stimulated the formation of around forty grassroots groups as mutual aid groups by  
2004. It should be noted that establishing grassroots organizations outside the current 
official infrastructure in China is usually banned as one of the biggest threats to the 
political regime. Infected peasants formed mutual aid groups on the basis of family, 
household, and kinship, combined with the communist agriculture cooperative model of 
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mutual aid teams. Mutual-aid teams were established by the Communist Party during 
the 1950s Mao era as the organizational foundation of collective economy in rural areas 
(Walker 1966). In the simplest mutual aid team format, poor peasant families would 
help each other by gathering each other’s tools and animals and working jointly. 
Though this agricultural model collapsed after market economy reform in the 1980s, 
peasants capitalized on it as a familiar organizational form that already had legitimacy. 
Activists explicitly invoked this legacy by using “mutual aid” in their group names 
when no other organizational resources was available.  
Rural grassroots leadership rested with heterosexual males who had formerly 
occupied high status positions in local village networks as village cadres, members of 
influential families, or former soldiers. For example, ZLW,305 the head of a large 
family, was one of the first local leaders of an AIDS-related mutual aid group; when he 
was arrested, the whole village turned out to mob the police.306 Villagers like ZLW held 
positions that gave them the ability to access local information, promote group 
solidarity, participate in collective action, and put pressure on local officials (Erickson 
and Smith 1999; Kim and Bearman 1997; Passy 2003; Zhao 1998).  
Villages in Henan province, the most afflicted area, became the center of early 
activism. Here, mutual aid groups and nongovernmental individuals adopted three 
modes of action: health advocacy, collective petitioning, and direct disruptive action. 
Health advocacy activities developed with the help of urban volunteers, ranging from 
health education, mutual care and support (especially for orphans), and 
disease/mortality-information collecting and dissemination. Collective petitioning made 
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use of institutional channels to advance claims to higher-level authorities to pressure 
local officials to respond to infected peasants’ needs.307 And direct disruptive action 
included demonstrations, blockades, or interceptions against government officials at the 
county and township level.  
As fierce as these actions were, early AIDS activism generally remained local, 
fractional, and informal. It aimed at pushing local governments to find local solutions 
that were within the boundaries set by the central state. Most petitions were made to 
governments at the municipal level or lower. Activists were careful to blame only local 
officials, while expressing faith in the central state’s laws and policies. In their 
petitioning letters, peasants focused on “local problems and bad cadres” and called for 
social relief and medical assistance without making demands for wider changes. The 
few petitions that were addressed to the central government were delivered only as 
letters, not in person via protests or sit-ins. No collective actions took place in Beijing 
during this period.  
Meanwhile, mutual aid groups were concentrating on bilateral negotiations with 
local officials, as they were scattered in different areas. The forms of mobilization they 
adopted were “disorganized” in the sense that their transgressive acts relied heavily on 
preexisting local social ties, rather than any formal means of organization. Several 
activists laughed at me when I asked them how their acts were organized. SY provided 
a typical common answer: 
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Nothing was organized. All you need to do was to spread “rumors.” When word 
about the time and location got round people would head for the spot. Nobody 
knew anything about it except from hearsay from families or friends.308    
Even when they took transgressive action, mutual aid group participants were careful 
not to coalesce into anything that the Chinese state could perceive (and, thus, forbid) as 
a formal organization. Drawing on resources was risky in this respect. Two mutual aid 
groups, for example, collaborated with a private foundation from Taiwan to establish 
orphanages for children who lost their parents to AIDS. To forestall interference by the 
village officials and obscure the link to the foundation, one group constructed a story 
about a villager who made a fortune in the city and provided the funds for the project. 
Their members ascribed their success in evading state repression to the special care they 
took to ensure the orphanage itself was run informally, more family-style, and 
compared their fate to that of another group, which had adopted a more formal 
orphanage form and was shut down.309  It is this backdrop of localized, fragmented, and 
cautious early AIDS activism that must be understood in order to appreciate the 
dramatic shift that took place after transnational intervention.  
Although external intervention served as a driving force behind the formation of 
urban-rural alliance, nongovernmental individuals and mutual aid groups did not 
automatically focus on seeking support from abroad. The newly formed urban-rural 
alliance worked to mobilize and reframe domestic laws and policies authorized by the 
central government as positive symbolic resources. Given the vacuum of directly AIDS-
related laws and regulations, nongovernmental individuals compiled a range of laws, 
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party documents, and State Council regulations310 in a handbook to address the interests 
and rights of people living with HIV/AIDS. Authoritative government pronouncements 
were turned into symbolic leverage. Whenever the central government issued policies to 
appease international outrage, activists always tried to interpret them creatively and 
transfer those words into concrete demands for local officials. For example, the state 
council’s “Action Plan on HIV/AIDS Prevention and Containment” was criticized by 
the UN and other international organizations for falling short of measuring up to 
transnational multisectoral norms. But nongovernmental individuals did not waste time 
using this plan to request that the Henan provincial government provide free 
medication, by referring directly to the indicator in the Plan that expected half of AIDS 
patients to receive medical treatment and care in local communities and families.  
Interacting with local governments was much more complicated given the divide 
between different institutions, as well as the tense financial relationship between the 
central and local authorities. Once again, however, activists sought to utilize the gaps 
between jurisdictions of different regional governments strategically, in order not only 
to make use of monitoring problems and information slippage, thus protecting their own 
ability to survive and act, but also to search for alliance within governments. The 
layered structure of the state was particularly fragmented in the area of public health, 
which also enabled activists to seek influence among local officials. Starting in 2002, 
activists began to cultivate relationships with public health departments in Beijing, like 
the Beijing municipal health bureau, the Beijing Association of STD and AIDS 
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Prevention and Control, and so on.311 AIDS activist never attacked the policies of the 
Beijing government, which contributed to turning Beijing into the base for activists and 
organizations. At the same time, activists dialogued with and tried to establish private 
relationships with officials in Henan’s provincial department of public health and in the 
Henan CDC, in order to develop channels of bilateral communication and negotiation 
across governmental levels. For their part, health departments in Henan hoped to craft 
local resolutions when villagers went to Beijing with petitions or proposals were ready 
to be submitted to the People’s Congress and Political Consultative Conferences; their 
aim was not necessarily to go public with the issue, unlike the activists.  Furthermore, 
regional and/or county governments in Henan did not have a unified stance vis-à-vis 
these activists. Some officials in certain regions were more sympathetic with villagers’ 
situation, while others remained indifferent.  
 
ii. Upsurge of the Boomerang Effect 
 
Although external intervention served as a driving force behind the formation of 
urban-rural alliances, nongovernmental individuals and mutual aid groups did not 
automatically choose to focus on seeking support from abroad. Instead, they both strove 
to stick to the form described in the current literature as “rightful resistance” (Lee and 
O’Brien 1996; O’Brien and Lee 2006). Rightful resistance strategically exploits 
divisions within the state by targeting local governments, employing central-
government-approved rhetoric, and relying heavily on officials at higher levels to 
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articulate interest and curb political or economic power. As discussed above, AIDS 
activism in this period thus remained fragmented, as the state is more tolerant of small-
scale actions that do not target the central government (Bianco 2001). The new alliance 
chose to attack local governments and sought patronage from the central government in 
order to address infected people’s immediate needs, such as free testing, medical 
treatment, and tuition reduction or exemption for children affected by the epidemic. It 
also framed these issues as being caused by the corruption of local officials and as 
capable of being resolved through the intervention of high-level authorities.  
However, starting in late 2001, international attention that was first triggered by 
the blood selling and contamination scandal was exacerbated by the state’s repression 
against AIDS activists. External intervention not only defeated a series of hard 
repressive efforts, but also increased the authority of transnational AIDS institutions. 
This process further contributed to the growth of the AIDS movement and its 
transnationalization. Hard repressive tactics were first thwarted with the controversy 
around the arrest of Wan Yanhai in August 2002 for political offense. The Beijing 
Security Department shut down the AIZHI Action project, and subjected staff and 
volunteers to interrogation. The Xinhua News Agency claimed Wan was detained on 
suspicion of illegally leaking state secrets because he delivered classified documents to 
overseas individuals, media sources, and websites.312 This led to a transnational “rescue” 
campaign. UNAIDS staff in Geneva, American State Department officials, and activists 
at Human Rights Watch, Act-Up, and other organizations demonstrated their concerns 
and demanded Wan’s release. The Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network gave the first 
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international Award for Action on HIV/AIDS and Human Rights to Wan during his 
detention. International AIDS and human rights activists even staged protests in front of 
the Chinese consulates in New York and Paris (Human Rights Watch 2003). As a result, 
the Beijing Security Bureau dropped the charges and released Wan without any 
restriction on his future activities less than one month later. The intense international 
attention of making a “great noise” about the case with “ulterior motives” came as a 
surprise to everyone. As Wan stated, 
Our government got a lesson about health and AIDS issues. They learned that 
international communities consider AIDS as important. I was arrested not 
because of we were doing work related to AIDS, but because the government 
was convinced that we were organizing villagers to act against the government 
and endanger the public. My imprisonment raised the profile of our work. The 
government started to pay much more attention to us. We became an illegal 
organization with contacts in the US. The government spread the news to 
prevent people from joining us, even in AIDS education in rural areas.313 
 
A month before Wan was secretly detained, the UN had issued an unusually critical 
assessment report, officially announcing that its estimate of HIV/AIDS cases in China 
was between 800,000-1,500,000.314 It warned the country was “on the verge of a 
catastrophe” (7) like a ship heading towards an iceberg. It publicly condemned the 
Chinese government’s inaction surrounding the Henan blood accidents, and stated that 
China’s AIDS-related strategies were not up to the rule of multisectoralism, especially 
when China continued to present HIV/AIDS as a purely medical problem. This was the 
first time that the legitimacy of the Chinese state’s public health governance was 
officially challenged.  
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When the report was released, a Chinese health official angrily questioned “the 
comparison of the government to the crew of the Titanic and asked ‘whether the United 
Nations intended to stand by and watch China sink like the ship.’”315 The Ministry of 
Health denied the accuracy of the report, stating “the information they have is not 
sufficient and cannot be fully trusted… The situation of AIDS control in China should 
be analyzed and understood from different angles. Unfortunately, UN officials saw this 
issue only from their own angle.”316 Three months later, China’s AIDS problem was 
listed by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency as a national security threat to the United 
States.317  
The campaign for Wan’s release was a remarkable success. It compelled both 
the central government and Chinese activists to recognize the significance of AIDS in 
China as an international issue. Right after his release, Wan won a Defenders’ Award 
from the International League of Human Rights. At the same time, he and the AIZHI 
Action Project were invited to attend publicity activities organized by various ministries 
and commissions of the central government in the Great Hall of the People, where the 
National People’s Congress holds meetings.  His release was followed by a surge in 
material resources, technical support, and activist guidance for local movements from 
abroad. Starting in 2002, Chinese activists received large-scale grants from the George 
Soros’s Open Society Institute, the Ford Foundation, the Canadian International 
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Development Agency, as well as the British and American Embassies.318 More than 
simply advancing local activities, this process drew Chinese activism into forms of 
sponsored interaction with formal organizations and networks overseas. Chinese 
activists were invited to many international conferences and meetings held by 
international organizations, as well as meetings organized by western governments like 
the U.S. Congress House Hearings, and the EU roundtable.319 An increasing number of 
international NGOs and foundations—like the Salvation Army Hong Kong, the Chi 
Heng Foundation (Hong Kong), the Harmony Home Association (Taiwan), the Clinton 
Foundation, and then Ford Foundation—began to collaborate with nongovernmental 
individuals and mutual aid groups to conduct activities. It boosted not only cultural, but 
also relational ties (Strang and Meyer 1993) linking Chinese AIDS activism to 
transnational AIDS institutions. 
The erosion of state hard repression by external intervention further provoked 
mutual aid groups to take more disruptive action. The village with the highest number 
of incidents according to existing records had at least 32 events that involved activists 
besieging government compounds, sacking offices of local bureaucrats, and rioting 
between 2002 and 2004 (Li 2009). As one activist put it, “the whole region caught in 
fire” in 2003.320 Take ZLW’s mutual aid group, for example, which was founded in the 
village of Shuangmiao in Tuocheng county. This village was not put on the map of 
AIDS epidemics until villagers formed connections with nongovernmental individuals 
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in Beijing, which led to international media coverage. Once this happened, the village 
received more financial and medical resources from not only the government, but also 
international NGOs. Even so, it was remained common for villagers living with 
HIV/AIDS to have to fight county and township governments for medicine and to be 
subject to detention. In general, infected villagers did not turn to large-scale disruptive 
strategies in 2002, even when AIDS deaths peaked.321  
But in 2003 alone, they staged about eight large-scale direct disruptive actions 
with at least 100 participants each time. ZLW described how they accumulated 
“fighting experience” over time, learning, for example, how to intercept senior officials 
by identifying their cars and or how to gather non-public information about officials’ 
working hours and offices.322 One of the organized actions aimed to bring a local 
“blood-head”323 to justice. The mutual aid group submitted a letter of accusation to the 
county government. When there was no response, the group took 150 villagers to 
petition the provincial government. Four hours later, county government officials 
arrived with the police force and tried to take villagers back by force. The fight forced 
the county government to arrest the blood-head, but he was only sentenced to six 
months at the detention center. When the mutual aid group attempted to protest again, 
its members made banners saying “give me back my blood, give me back my health,” 
“give the afflicted their rights back,” and so on. Making banners was a very bold move 
since it was strictly forbidden by the central government. The county government had to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
321 Interview 123 (Activist), June 3, 2013. 
322 Interview 123 (Activist), 14 (Activist), June 2, 2013.  
323 Blood-heads (Xue Tou) refers to people who organized illegal blood collection. They usually 
had connections with and were supported by local public health facilities.  
	   181	  
put together a team of officials to reside in the village, set up screening stations to 
control traffic out of the village, and paint huge signs readings “petitions bypassing 
local authorities is a crime” in order to block these organizing efforts.324 
Conflicts reached a boiling point when the WHO sent an inspection team in 
2003 to epidemic areas in order to allow direct contact between WHO officials and 
people living with HIV/AIDS. An activist recorded the clash as follows:   
Part of Shanghai County325 had been under martial law since May 17th. The 
county government ordered doctors to set up some temporary stations to show 
how intensive intervention among HIV/AIDS-infected areas was. The secretary 
of county Party committees along with leading cadres sent lots of basic medicine 
to the homes of AIDS virus carriers. This never happened before. Officers then 
asked all villagers to stay home when the WHO team arrived. The next morning 
more than 200 plainclothes police sealed off the street and pretended to be 
villagers. …We were talking to villagers on phone. They saw some foreigners in 
the inspection team from a distance. But they could not approach any WHO 
official…. Several villagers went to the village clinic for medicine. Policemen 
told them to leave or to be detained. Yang Nidan, a 40-year-old villager, insisted 
to stay at the clinic to wait for “high-level officials.” Four policemen grabbed 
her arms and legs and took her to the police station several miles away. She was 
forcibly held until 5 pm. What were allowed to stay at the clinics were several 
obedient patients. They were trained beforehand to talk to the inspection team. 
But one village cadre forgot the infectious rate given by the county. She was 
worrying about getting into trouble.326 
One month after the WHO’s inspection, a violent conflict broke out in the Xiong village 
in the same Shangcai county. Several hundred government personnel and policemen 
raided the village, wounding dozens and arresting thirteen petitioners (Li 2009). This 
riot took place right before the Ministry of Health signed the first grant agreement with 
the Global Fund. Activists used the riot to expose the corruption of the Henan Bureau 
and threatened to appeal for the suspension of the Global Fund grant. Several U.S.-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
324 Longwei Zhu, “Unknown Disasters in My Village,” Personal statement (Chinese), 2004.  
325 Shangcai county in Henan province was mostly covered in international media.  
326 Jia Hu, “Shangcai Events,” Aizhixing Institute e-mails (Chinese), July 9, 2003.  
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based NGOs, American public health experts, and Chinese scholars joined the rescue 
campaign to parlay appealing letters and reports in western media into pressure from 
international organizations, as well as American and European governments.327 All 
detainees were released within a few months of their arrest.  
The spike in international pressure generated a boomerang effect as the central 
government finally acknowledged the magnitude of the AIDS epidemic in 2003.328 On 
World AIDS Day in 2003, Prime Minister Wen Jiabao first visited the Beijing You’an 
Hospital and shook hands with AIDS patients on national TV.329 In the same month, Wu 
Yi, Deputy Premier and Interim Minister of Health, visited villages of high AIDS 
prevalence in Henan.330 This displayed, for the first time, a top political commitment331 
to fight against the epidemic, a significant symbol especially in the political context of 




This chapter examines the first wave of the AIDS movement that emerged out of 
transnational AIDS institutions challenging the socialist contagious disease control 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
327 Petition letters and e-mails among activists (Chinese), 2003. 
328 “China Shows It Is Responsible,” China Daily, June 30, 2003. 
329 “Premier’s first shaking hands with AIDS patient,” Xinhua News Agency, December 2, 2003. 
330 “Vice-Premier Visits AIDS Village,” Xinhua News Agency, December 23, 2003. 
331 Political commitment refers to the extent to which top-level government leaders 
acknowledge the HIV/AIDS crisis and support AIDS as a priority on the national agenda. While 
it is considered one of the most crucial elements in the AIDS Program Effort Index (API), 
political commitment is commonly indicated by whether the head of the state and/or other 
senior officials publicly mention AIDS issues (USAID, UNAIDS, WHO and the Policy Project 
2003). 
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model in China. Prior to external intervention, AIDS as a disease was not able to 
generate mobilization, especially around infections through blood, since it was 
constructed by domestic AIDS institutions as a western disease caused by individual 
behaviors associated with sexual immorality. The intervention of transnational AIDS 
institutions politicized AIDS by turning individual suffering into a battle over who 
should and could be held responsible for an epidemic. It was this shift that made the 
Chinese state the major object of attack when AIDS was no longer a disease determined 
by individual behavior, but a public health crisis associated with citizens’ rights to life.  
The fact that transnational AIDS institutions promoted local mobilization 
regardless of tightening state repression fits the overall contours of the traditional 
boomerang argument. However, the way that this process unfolded differed 
significantly from the accounts offered by existing approaches in the social movement 
and international relations literature. While the literature would lead us to expect a 
bottom-up process that starts with local-level actors going around recalcitrant states in 
pursuit of international support of the “third party,” I show how transnational AIDS 
institutions were the top-down driving force that called for not only mobilization, but 
also the very formation of activist actors at domestic and local levels. After external 
intervention started to increase in 1999, a very unusual informal network of AIDS 
activism grew across urban-rural divisions, whereby nongovernmental individuals and 
infected villagers formed groups and linked up. These networks were decentralized and 
loose coalitions, founded on voluntary, reciprocal, and horizontal patterns of 
information and service exchange. Collaborative efforts created around forty grassroots 
mutual aid groups and generated a surge in the material resources, technical support, 
	   184	  
and activist guidance for local movements from abroad, which pushed AIDS activism to 
its first climax in 2003. 
Meanwhile, this chapter also demonstrates the micro-dynamics of strategic 
interaction between international organizations, the Chinese state, and AIDS activists, 
through which global precepts were actually transmitted to local actors. I pay particular 
attention to how this process shaped the constellations of local actors, their interests, 
their power differentials and resulting conflict dynamics, and how these shaped, in turn, 
the characteristics of domestic AIDS institutions that constituted the context within 
which the second wave of AIDS activism took place.   
  








After the Boomerang: The “NGO-ization” of the AIDS Movement, 2004–2007 
 
 
This chapter seeks to explain the expansion and transformation of the AIDS 
movement—specifically, the rise of NGOs as the dominant organizing strategy of the 
movement—in the high-risk, authoritarian context of China after what is commonly 
understood as the boomerang effect. As predicted by Keck and Sikkink, the boomerang 
did, indeed, bring material resources, technical support, and activist guidance for the 
AIDS movement from abroad, which drove the formation of the second wave of AIDS 
movement. But how these changes were effected, why they took the specific form they 
did, and what happened after the boomerang’s initial impact are questions not answered 
by Keck and Sikkink, and which must be specifically investigated in the Chinese 
context. Rather than simply moving domestic activism forward along its own trajectory, 
international engagement transformed the movement. The second wave of the AIDS 
movement adopted an unusual western advocacy NGO model as its dominant 
organizing form. This was a drastic departure from the decentralized web of individual 
activists, informal groups, and local campaigns that characterized the first wave of the 
AIDS movement. The goal of the movement also shifted from seeking socioeconomic 
justice at the local level to demanding freedom of association and institutional access to 
policymaking and implementation at the national level. Additionally, since 2003, AIDS 
activism in China has developed formal organizations and networks across national and 
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local levels covering 22 out of 23 provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities. 
Along the way, the center of gravity of the movement has shifted from rural to urban 
areas. How and why did increased external support translate into a new trajectory and 
even new forms of actorhood? 
The nonlinear, contested, and sometimes unintended impact of the boomerang in 
non-democratic contexts challenges us to understand it not as the end of a process, but 
rather as one phase in an ongoing set of relations. Although there has been an 
abundance of research on the boomerang effect of transnational advocacy networks, 
much less attention has been given to what happens to social movements after the 
boomerang. Scholars conceptualize the boomerang as a result of emerging global 
politics that circumvent the authority and power of national governments; in turn, many 
studies tend to assume the effects of the boomerang are positive and encouraging for 
domestic activism (Finnemore 2003; Schmitz and Sikkink 2002; Smith and Fetner 
2010). Empirically, this inattention to the precise dynamics and longer aftermath of the 
boomerang is surprising since evidence suggests that domestic activists might 
experience a backlash of heightened government repression in response to the 
boomerang (Gränzer 1999; Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2007; Hill 2010). Transnational 
coalitions manifested in the boomerang can take national authorities by surprise, but 
such coalitions are rarely durable (Tarrow 2005). This oversight is also theoretically 
costly because the global-local interaction is cast as a unidirectional process whereby 
the global empowers the local to tackle the state. In this chapter, I will examine more 
closely the dynamics between international institutions and states that affect the 
constitution of activist actorhood in the aftermath of the boomerang.  
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This examination requires us to develop a better understanding of how 
interactions between international institutions and states shape the form assumed by 
domestic challenges. The boomerang concept was originally developed to acknowledge 
and understand more seriously the idea that global politics matter. Scholars using this 
concept adopt either a political structural or resource dependency perspective and focus 
on the direct interaction between local actors and international institutions. These 
accounts explain the development of domestic activism as an immediate response to or 
result of emerging political, economic, or symbolic power and resources made available 
by transnational institutions. Most scholars assume that domestic activists will endorse 
international agendas and resources either because those resources and frameworks are 
necessarily effective in their local context (Frank et al. 2009; Hafner-Burton and Ron 
2008; McAdam et al. 2001; Smith and Fetner 2010), or because domestic actors will do 
anything to gain leverage against repressive states (see Liu 2006) 
Accordingly, we might have expected Chinese AIDS activists in the 1980s to 
automatically adopt the form of advocacy NGOs that became prevalent within 
transnational AIDS advocacy networks at that time. Yet, as Chapters 3 and 4 showed, 
Chinese AIDS activists were apprehensive about engaging support from overseas 
because such engagement was considered politically intolerable by the state and 
answerable by armed repression if necessary. Even when transnational AIDS 
institutions did intervene in China, the AIDS movement took on episodic, localized, and 
informal forms precisely because the creation of formal organizations was (and still is) 
a high-risk strategy rarely pursued in China (Berstein and Lu 2003; Cai 2004; Diamant 
et al. 2005; Ho and Edmonds 2008; Lee 2007; Michelson 2007). With few exceptions 
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(Yu 2003, 2006), scholars agree that resistance in China has avoided formal 
organization, as the Party vigorously guards its monopoly over organization (Cai 2008; 
O’Brien 2003; O’Brien and Li 2006; Wu 2007; Ying 2007) and, hence, state opposition 
is more intense vis-à-vis formally organized and/or cross-regional activism than 
episodic, localized, and informal action (Lee and Seldan 2007; O’Brien and Li 2006; 
Perry 2001). 
What accounts, then, for the fact that NGOs have become the dominant 
mobilizing structure of the still relatively young AIDS movement in China, at the same 
time that the state has become increasingly repressive? I argue that much of the 
literature ignores an issue critical to understanding the relationship between 
international support and high-risk social movements—specifically, what makes 
external opportunities and resources a viable repertoire from which domestic activists 
can draw? As Liu (2006) and Loveman (1998) point out, domestic actors may or may 
not endorse transnational agendas and resources in authoritarian regimes. This is an 
empirical question that can only be addressed in specific historical contexts. 
I argue that ascendance of the NGO form was not an outcome of internal 
movement development. Neither did it result directly from external intervention. 
Transnational AIDS institutions, beyond providing political opportunities and resources, 
shaped social movement actorhood itself by affecting the rules of the game in the 
domestic arena where mobilization takes place. Such rules regulate how state power is 
maintained, operated, or lost in a particular arena (Steinman 2012; Thornton and Ocasio 
1999), and constitute a focal point of both domination and resistance. In the specific 
case of Chinese AIDS activism, the success of the boomerang did not defeat the 
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Chinese state. Rather, it pushed the Chinese state to change its institutional 
arrangements and organizational practices with regard to disease control in 2003, 
specifically replacing the socialist contagious disease control with a comprehensive 
public health governance model. This shift allowed the state to play international norms 
to its advantage in order to gain access to external resources and legitimacy, without 
having to stop repressing AIDS activism. It was this change on the part of the Chinese 
state, rather than increasing resources and opportunities alone, that elicited and drove 
the adoption of AIDS NGOs among activists in two ways: (1) it altered the conflict 
objects deemed legitimate in political struggle around AIDS; and (2) it prescribed what 
transnational organizing resources and strategies were politically viable in the highly 
repressive context.  
Instead of focusing on actors’ choices of strategies, this chapter shifts attention 
to what constituted and authorized local actors’ interest in the idea of creating civil 
society in the first place, and examines the transnational dynamics that led to new forms 
of action that challenged the authoritarian state. In what follows, I first describe the 
adoption of AIDS advocacy NGO actorhood in China in terms its goals, constituency, 
mobilization structures, and resources, and why these changes are so noteworthy and 
puzzling. Second, I borrow from critical juncture analysis (Mahoney 2001)332 to 
illustrate how the boomerang effect produced permissive conditions and productive 
conditions for the adoption of the NGO model by AIDS activists. Third, I unpack how 
those conditions set in motion not only the diffusion of NGOs among activists, but also 
the transformation of state repression to curb grassroots organizations—what I call 
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  According to Mahoney, critical juncture analysis is “a specific type of explanation that 
unfolds through a series of sequential stages” (2001, 112).  
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counter-diffusion. It was this conflict between diffusion and counter-diffusion that 
drove the development of a new form of AIDS actorhood and effected a consolidation 
of the AIDS NGO form in China. 
 
I. Towards NGOs as An Alternative Form of Actorhood 
 
NGOs constitute a significant departure not only from the first wave of AIDS 
movement, but also from domestic activist practice prevalent in general in China. As 
discussed in the last chapter, informal activist networks served as the major organizing 
form before 2004. Rural grassroots activists and urban voluntary groups were the major 
constituents of the decentralized networks and loose coalitions founded on voluntary, 
reciprocal, and horizontal patterns of information and service exchange. This is 
consistent with forms of popular contentions in other issue areas in China (Bernstein 
and Lu 2003; Shi and Cai 2006; Wright 2008), as the state has been more tolerant of 
small-scale actions that do not target the central government (Bianco 2001).  
Figure 1.1 shows the rising tide of grassroots AIDS NGOs in China. After the 
first NGO was founded in 2002, NGOs quickly became major actors in the Chinese 
AIDS movement in 2004 and took over the whole movement by 2006. As Chapter 2 
discussed, underlying AIDS NGOs as an organizing form is a entire genre of civil 
society politics promoted by transnational AIDS institutions. Contrary to informal and 
local networks, new NGOs are formal organizations with cross-regional, official, and 
public connections to one another. Formalization refers to the fact that AIDS NGOs 
have at least an explicit scheme of formal organization, such as a clear division of labor 
that is enacted in their routine activities (Lofland 1996). They draw most of their 
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material, organizational, and technology resources from transnational AIDS institutions. 
Financial resources originating from overseas constitute most of the funding for AIDS 
NGOs in China. It is estimated that they were awarded about 15 million USD between 
2004 and 2008 from abroad (Yu 2011). Organizational resources also include access to 
transnational advocacy networks, while a transnational AIDS epistemic community 
(Haas 1998) of scientists and policy experts provides knowledge, expertise, 
technologies, and skills related to AIDS intervention. 
As Table 5.1 shows, the actorhood of NGOs has drastically different properties 
from that of earlier organizational forms. The goal has shifted from improving the local 
welfare of infected communities to promoting the civil society norms of transnational 
AIDS institutions. Similarly, the target of activism is now the central government rather 
than local governments. Grassroots AIDS NGOs operate from the premise that change 
comes from the top, and thus creating a civil society recognized by the state is seen as 
improving the political environment for various local communities to gain institutional 
access to AIDS-related policymaking and implementation. Accordingly, NGO activities 
are organized around three epidemiological intervention categories: (1) internal 
organizational and outside alliance building, (2) intervention implementation, and (3) 
policy advocacy.  
Grassroots AIDS NGOs may be differentiated in terms of what kind of AIDS 
intervention activities they conduct: treatment versus prevention. This division has 
created two identity categories authorized by transnational AIDS institutions: people 
living with HIV/AIDS (hereafter, PLWHA), and men who have sex with men 
(hereafter, MSM). PLWHA organizations focus primarily on care and treatment such as 
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drug adherence enhancement, peer psychological support, peer high-risk behavior 
intervention, life relief, CD4 test and viral load test333 assistance. MSM organizations 
prioritize prevention activities such as health education, condom distribution, voluntary 
counseling and testing assistance, and HIV antibody tests. Since 2006, these two types 
of organizations have become not only mutually exclusive, but also exhaustive—in 
other words, one cannot participate in AIDS activism in China without becoming a 
member of one of these two types of NGOs.  
The geographical center of the whole movement has moved to large cities such 
as Beijing and provincial capitals with more organizational resources. Large-scale 
campaigns have been conducted mostly in urban areas, making it increasingly costly for 
rural activists to participate. Accordingly, villagers began to withdraw from direct 
participation and switched to more indirect strategies such as signing petition letters. In 
other words, they became more and more reliant on NGO leaders to mobilize on their 
behalf. As one rural patient put it, “She [an NGO leader] has always been on the run. 
I’ve never been to Beijing. I cannot stand the racket or the traveling cost.”334 The 
movement leadership had also shifted as rural activists’ family lineages no longer serve 
as an effective basis for mobilization; there has been a surge, instead, in the 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
333 CD4 cells are a type of white blood cell crucial for the immune system. CD4 tests examine 
the level of CD4 cells and are administered to those who are HIV-positive, even carriers with no 
symptoms. Viral load tests measure the amount of virus in the blood of AIDS patients.  
334 Interview 2122 (Activist), June 16, 2012.  
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Table 5.1 The Transformation of AIDS Activist Actorhood in China 
AIDS Activist 
Actorhood 2002 2007 
Goal Community welfare Implementation of a global AIDS governance  
  framework 
   
Central Actors Non-governmental individuals 
Infected peasants only in 
Henan 
Gay communities:  
Information Clearinghouse for Chinese Gays and 
  Lesbians, and Tongkang Gay Group  
 
People living with HIV/AIDS communities: 
Infected peasants 
Organizational members of HIV/AIDS 
Community-based Organization Network, AIDS  
  Care China, and Beijing AIDS Arc Information 
  Support Network 
Membership Direct individual participation Organizational membership 
Internal 
Structure 
Informal networks Centralized 
Formalized  
Activities Mutual help 
Direct confrontational action 
Organizational capacity and infrastructure building 
Implementation of AIDS intervention (prevention   
  and care) 
Policy advocacy 
   
Resources Domestic (moral, local 
relationships) 
Transnational (normative, material, organizational,  
  technological, and human) 
Technologies Minimum knowledge about  




   
Targets  Central Government 
Local Governments 
Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention  
  at different levels 
Office of the State Council Working Committee to    
  Combat AIDS 
Global Fund  
Audiences Governments Governments 
International media 
International organizations, international NGOs,      


















Regular transnational interactions both inside and  
  outside borders 
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So, what prompted this dramatic transformation? In the sections that follow, I 
argue that this transition towards civil society politics was driven by the transformation 
of domestic AIDS governance, which was, in turn, driven by transnational AIDS 
institutions, and how both this domestic change and transnational intervention 
intersected with various forms of AIDS activism. 
 
II. Critical Juncture after the Boomerang 
 
Even after the initial impact of the boomerang effect, NGOs did not emerge as a 
natural or automatic choice for AIDS activists; NGOs still constituted a major 
organizational departure from the first wave of AIDS activism. Rather, this change was 
the culmination of particular events between 2004 and 2005 that changed the trajectory 
of the AIDS movement in China. This section argues that the macro-level domestic 
political factors and micro-level interpersonal factors highlighted by current literature 
are of limited use in understanding this critical historical moment.335 I argue, instead, 
that change in the larger, global sociopolitical environment—specifically, the drastically 
increased effectiveness of transnational AIDS institutions vis-à-vis China—was crucial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
335 In order to capture historical causation, I borrow the concept of critical junctures from 
historical institutionalism (Mahoney 2001; Thelen 2004) as an analytical approach, rather than a 
substantial theory. This analytical approach highlights a series of sequential stages as “(1) 
antecedent condition (historical factors that define available options and shape selection 
processes); (2) critical juncture (selection of a particular option from among multiple 
alternatives); (3) structural persistence (production and reproduction of institution or structural 
pattern); (4) reactive sequence (reactions and counterreactions to institution or structural 
pattern); (5) outcome (resolution of conflict generated by reactions and counteractions)” 
(Mahoney 2001, 113). It is subject to debate whether this approach can be used in non-path-
dependent explanations.  
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in shaping key actor choices within China that set into motion the ascendance of AIDS 
NGOs. Figure 5.1 summarizes the overall historical process outlined in this chapter. 
 




I borrow Soifer (2010)’s concepts of permissive conditions and productive 
conditions to illustrate different factors at work during the critical juncture. The 
boomerang produced a series of permissive conditions, loosening structural constraints 
and allowing divergence from the past to emerge. These conditions propelled the AIDS 
movement to expand, but did not determine the form it was to take next. In the presence 
of such conditions, it was the efforts of key institutional entrepreneurs to promote 
transnational AIDS institutions in China that provided the productive conditions that 
drove the unprecedented wave of NGO-building in China, despite the continued 
existence of domestic conditions that made this a high-risk activity.   
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i. Permissive Conditions: Creation of Comprehensive AIDS Governance 
 
Towards the end of the first wave of AIDS activism in 2003, the Chinese central 
government was forced to put HIV/AIDS on its political agenda as a result of 
international pressure, as examined in Chapter 4. It is important to note, however, that 
newly enacted policies were, I argue, no more than a tactical concession to transnational 
AIDS institutions. These policy developments did not give rise to identifiable political 
opportunities (McAdam 1996; Tarrow 1994). If we follow a broader definition, political 
opportunity structure refers to “consistent but not necessarily formal, long-lasting or 
national signals to social or political actors which either encourage or discourage them 
to use their internal resources to form social movements” (Tarrow 1996, 54). According 
to a survey conducted among Chinese AIDS activists, those encouraging signals were 
not perceived (Hildebrandt 2009). Scholars generally agree that the Chinese political 
leadership has paired politically conservative moves with renewed and incremental 
restriction and crackdown on dissent since 2003 (Gallagher 2005). In other words, the 
domestic environment remained hostile to the further development of AIDS activism.  
Nonetheless, the boomerang effect did put the socialist contagious disease 
control under scrutiny, reflecting the extent to which transnational AIDS institutions 
were endorsed by a critical mass of countries at the time, including strong state actors in 
global health such as the United States and Britain. As illustrated in Chapter 2, 
transnational AIDS institutions are characterized by non-state actors’ direct 
involvement in and contribution to not only policymaking and implementation, but also 
the provision of public goods. While the civil society participation norm is not legally 
binding, in 2004 transnational AIDS institutions were equipped with much higher 
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capacities to mobilize huge levels of financial resources than most other issue-oriented 
transnational institutions, such as human rights institutions. The boomerang effect 
showed to the Chinese state that civil society participation was no longer a rhetorical 
statement, while NGOs became authorized as legitimate actors with specified roles and 
positions relative to the government. 
The year 2004 marked a pivotal watershed in China’s response to AIDS, with 
the state shifting from a socialist contagious disease control model to comprehensive 
AIDS governance. The Chinese premier, Wen Jiaobao, publicly endorsed this model in 
his statement opening the first international AIDS conference held in Asia.336 As 
Chapter 2 showed, by transnational AIDS institutions’ definition, comprehensive AIDS 
governance integrates AIDS surveillance and voluntary counseling and testing with 
behavioral intervention in high-risk populations. It elaborates the normative frameworks 
of transnational AIDS institutions and makes civil society participation norms concrete 
and material. It is premised on a strikingly different diagnosis of the AIDS problem and 
prescription of solutions than those underlying the state-dominated socialist contagious 
disease control model. In short, the introduction of a comprehensive AIDS governance 
model from overseas changed the interpretation of reality around AIDS and power in 
China.  
The Chinese comprehensive public health governance model evolved around the 
fact that the state was no longer the only source of power and legitimacy in the AIDS 
issue domain, as authority had now been ceded to transnational AIDS institutions. The 
concession of the Chinese state weakened the legitimacy of the central government and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
336 “Wen Jiabao: The Entire Society Must Attach Great Importance to Preventing and 
Controlling AIDS,” People’s Daily Newspaper (Chinese), July 10, 2004. 
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rendered local governments more vulnerable within the larger AIDS governance 
structure. Legitimacy is recognized as the primary obstacle to social movement 
organization formation in China (O’Brien 2003; Ying 2004). As the Party-state holds a 
monopoly of legitimate authority, Chinese citizens do not have access to rights such as 
the general freedom of association and the right to strike without government reprisal 
(Goldstein 1978). Social movements thus rely heavily on the state for legitimacy, which 
restricts them to conducting more local, informal, and unorganized forms of resistance 
(Perry 2006).  
The boomerang effect, however, had two major effects.  First, it revealed the 
fact that the state’s socialist contagious disease control was not legitimate in AIDS 
governance. The state publicly displayed submission to the authority of transnational 
AIDS institutions. For example, the Ministry of Health listed the involvement of NGOs 
as a key measure to achieve China’s UNGASS objectives.337 Top health officials also 
emphasized the need for NGO involvement in multiple public speeches—a stance that 
was unique to the area of AIDS during the mid-2000s and that stood in sharp contrast to 
what was advocated in other issue areas. Though ambiguous, this rhetorical 
commitment not only made it possible for Chinese AIDS activists to probe the limits of 
the permissible (O’Brien 1996), but also rendered the central government more 
vulnerable within the larger normative framework. As a result, the government’s 
restriction of formal organizing was partly alleviated in the AIDS issue domain, despite 
the fact that the new Party leadership after 2003 took an increasingly coercive stance 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
337 Ministry of Health, “Progress on Implementing UNGASS Declaration of Commitment in 
China 2005,” Office of the State Council Working Committee on AIDS (Chinese), 2005.  
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against other forms of public-interest and/or political advocacy and activism (Saich 
2006).  
Second, the boomerang effect transformed AIDS from something determined by 
individual behaviors to a public health crisis associated with citizens’ rights. As noted in 
previous chapters, the Chinese state had previously defined and stigmatized AIDS as a 
foreign disease associated with immoral conduct. The establishment of comprehensive 
AIDS governance partly removed the shame attached with AIDS. The contrast after the 
boomerang effect was remarkable. RKH, the activist mentioned in the previous chapter, 
lived in a village with an infection rate above 30 per cent. Even so, when RKH and his 
group first took action, they found little support for the infected peasants. Those who 
were infected dreaded exposure, especially as they were already seen as complicit in the 
blood-selling behaviors driven by poverty that led to the outbreak in the first place. But 
after the boomerang, RKH’s village was “bathed in high feelings” as “calling upon 
hundreds of people was easy any time in 2004 and 2005.”338 This awareness of 
collective suffering did not exist prior to the first wave of AIDS activism. Villagers’ 
feelings about self and disease were transformed as they participated in post-boomerang 
activism, which further incited local mobilization.  
However, the state’s approval of comprehensive AIDS governance did not 
signal the end of the dispute over the validity of transnational norms, but instead the 
start of a dispute over the substance and implementation of those norms. Institutional 
pressure leads to the decoupling of stated intentions and actual practice (Meyer and 
Rowan 1977). Transnational AIDS institutions’ comprehensive AIDS governance 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
338 Interview 242 (Activist), June 14, 2012. 
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model with its decentralized structure stood in sharp contrast to the Chinese state’s 
traditional concerns of hard sovereignty and national security (Huang 2010). External 
intervention certainly constituted a disruptive challenge to authoritarian order when the 
central government finally had to start to work with the Joint United Nations 
Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) to issue joint epidemic reports after refusing to 
share information with international organizations for a decade. The government was 
forced for the first time in 2003 to allow the WHO to directly inspect the provinces 
hardest hit by AIDS. But since going back to public non-compliance was not an option, 
the state sought instead to decouple its actual practices from its rhetorical conformity 
with transnational norms.  
The central government considered comprehensive AIDS governance an 
expansion rather than replacement of its previous socialist contagious disease control. 
Indeed, the Chinese state, forced to recognize that AIDS could not be disconnected 
from security and foreign policy concerns (Huang 2005), started to invest heavily in 
AIDS initiatives in order to develop a policy domain around the issue (Cui et al. 2009; 
Wu et al. 2007).339 But the national health ministry’s efforts still aligned with the old 
model, in that they concentrated on establishing a sentinel surveillance system340 and 
providing basic treatment only in the geographic areas with the highest prevalence rates. 
Sentinel surveillance was added to the previous notifiable infectious disease report 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
339 In response to international pressure, the Chinese government announced five commitments 
at the United Nations high-level special meeting in 2003, known as the “Four Frees and One 
Care” policy. These commitments included free first-line antiretroviral therapy to AIDS patients 
in rural areas, free voluntary counseling and testing, free drugs to HIV-infected pregnant 
women, free schooling for AIDS orphans and children from HIV infected families, and 
economic assistance to the people living with HIV/AIDS (around 2-5 USD per person per 
month).  
340 See Chapter 3 for more detailed information.  
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system and primarily depended on mandated HIV tests of female sex workers and 
injection drug users in detention centers, instead of monitoring the general population.341 
Effective prevention measures such as condom promotion, peer education, and harm 
reduction were considered either not feasible or too sensitive to be implemented in local 
municipalities, which received little support from the central government for such 
efforts.342 Even treatment was limited to distributing first-line antiretroviral therapy 
(hereafter, ART) without necessary long-term support such as treatment literacy and 
adherence assistance.  
As three activists pointed out in their interviews, the national health minister 
was more interested in taking temporary measures to calm domestic dissent and 
improve the state’s international image. SJ recalled how untrained health officials were 
splashing medicine about without knowing baseline characteristics of the infected 
cohort in 2004.343 This was one of the contributing factors to the high mortality rate at 
the time and the high cumulative treatment failure rate (Zhang et al. 2008). ZLW stated, 
“People got mistaken conceptions about what the government did for us who were 
infected. Actually they (officials) were only busy putting out fire by giving out 
medicine. Those new policies looked good. But they were mostly temporary.”344 While 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
341 Office for Disease Control and Emergency Response, “Strengthening Infectious Disease 
Report and Surveillance System in China,” China Center for Disease Control and Prevention, 
November 6, 2007. 
342 Yuanli Liu and Joan Kaufman, “Controlling HIV/AIDS in China: Health System 
Challenges,” in AIDS and Social Policy in China, ed. Joan Kaufman, Arthur Kleinman and 
Tony Saich (Harvard University Asia Center, 2006), 75–95; Hui Li, Xue Hui, Hui Liu, et al.,  
“Resource Allocation Analysis for International Cooperation Program for HIV/AIDS 
Prevention and Control,” China Journal of Preventive Medicine (Chinese) 42, no. 12 (2008): 
888–91.  
343 Interview 14 (Activist), June 4, 2012.  
344 Interview 123 (Activist), June 5, 2012. 
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the Chinese state decided to develop a national AIDS response, it was committed to a 
form of comprehensive AIDS governance only as an emergency response system 
grafted onto the old governance structure and organizational actors in public health.  
Therefore, although it gathered momentum for the formation of comprehensive 
AIDS governance, the boomerang effect did not give rise to a unitary and cohesive 
model overnight. Instead, it generated an on-going political project that involved 
conflicts and negotiations between transnational AIDS institutions and the Chinese state 
over what the trajectory of comprehensive AIDS governance ought to be. The aftermath 
of the boomerang brought a drastic influx of AIDS intervention practices and policy 
models along with financial resources. International donors doubled their contributions 
to 18.964 million USD, which accounted for 59.13% of the financial resources allocated 
to AIDS intervention at the provincial level.345 This was the start of a rapid expansion of 
international AIDS programs in China. The Global Fund alone has approved over 800 
million USD for anti-AIDS efforts in China since 2003.346 As one activist described, 
“they (international actors) were holding high hopes. Without really understanding the 
Chinese government, they came in very passionate and aggressively and had all kinds of 
good visions.”347 
At the focal point of the contradiction were conflicts between transnational 
AIDS institutions and the Chinese state regarding who and what constituted civil 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
345 Hui Li, Xue Hui, Hui Liu, et al., “Resource Allocation Analysis for International 
Cooperation Program for HIV/AIDS Prevention and Control,” China Journal of Preventive 
Medicine (Chinese) 42, no. 12 (2008): 888–91; Jiangping Sun, Hui Liu, et al., “Contributions of 
International Cooperation Projects to the HIV/AIDS Response in China,” International Journal 
of Epidemiology 39 (2010): 14–20. 
346 Based on data from the Global Fund China Country Coordinating Mechanisms. Available at: 
http://www.chinaccm.org.cn (accessed August 2012).  
347 Interview 41 (Activist), June 23, 2012. 
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society, what roles civil society could and should play, and what position civil society 
had in relation to the state between 2004 and 2008. These conflicts did not give rise to 
identifiable political opportunity shifts (McAdam 1996; Tarrow 1994). Rather, they 
changed the foundation upon which rightful resistance was based: the centrality of the 
Chinese state. With transnational AIDS institutions recognized as another source of 
power and legitimacy in the AIDS issue domain, the form of AIDS activism began to 
change. The next section shows how the shape of those conflicts between transnational 
AIDS institutions and the state drove the civil society politics of a new wave of AIDS 
activism.  
 
ii. Productive Conditions: The Importation of the AIDS Advocacy 
Organizational Form 
 
Whereas the initial impact of the boomerang lifted some political structural 
constraints and made it possible for the movement to keep growing, it was productive 
conditions that set in motion the specific path along which the AIDS movement in 
China developed when activists were still presented with multiple competing 
alternatives when it came to organizing.  
The diffusion of NGOs to China was activated by international NGOs, private 
foundations, and non-World Health Organization (hereafter, WHO) entities such as 
UNAIDS. These organizations acted as the institutional entrepreneurs of transnational 
AIDS institutions to promote the model of civil society. Building a civil society sector 
in AIDS governance goes beyond providing domestic groups with “access, leverage, 
and information, (often money)” (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999, 18), as recognized by 
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current transnational social movement literature. Urban AIDS activists in China were no 
stranger to the concepts of NGOs and civil society, as they were exposed to the AIDS 
movement in the U.S. during the 1990s. However, the dominant development model at 
the time only considered local NGOs as a means to implement AIDS intervention, not 
as participants in decision-making. With the institutionalization of transnational AIDS 
institutions, the designated role of NGOs shifted from purely operational to normative 
terms. Participatory democracy was emphasized, and NGOs were authorized as integral 
actors that fulfilled the role of representing civil society in opposition to both the state 
and the market (see Dodgson et al. 2002). Building a civil society sector became a 
major goal in implementing transnational AIDS institutions in China, and the issue of 
forming NGOs rose to the top of the agenda in 2003.  
Transnational institutional entrepreneurs translated the model of civil society 
sectors into a concrete project that involved endorsing the normative frames of 
transnational AIDS institutions, building NGOs, and forming inter-organizational ties 
among NGOs, social movements, media, and power holders such as foundations, 
international organizations, and western governments. Their efforts crystallized in the 
formation and development of a key Chinese AIDS advocacy organization, the Beijing 
Aizhixing Institute of Health Education (hereafter, Aizhixing), which grew into the 
largest incubator for NGO-building and expansion during the second wave of AIDS 
activism. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the precursor of Aizhixing, the AIZHI Action 
Project, was an informal group when it was founded in 1994. Up to 2002, this group 
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had identified itself as an independent project instead of “a formal organization,”348 as 
Wan Yanhai, its founder, explained that “the international society did not notice us” 
throughout the 1990s.349 But by 2002, even Wan’s arrest did not deter urban activists; 
instead, they realized the profile of their work was raised when “international 
communities consider AIDS as important.”350 Upon his release, Wan and his friends, 
with assistance from the U.S., decided to establish Aizhixing as a formal NGO.  
2003 saw a sudden surge in the number of overseas programs, events, and 
institutes to which Aizhixing members were invited. These included four fellow 
programs, five international conferences, and twenty-two organizations ranging from 
the Congressional-Executive Commission on China to Yale University. For example, 
two of the co-founders of Aizhixing were identified as promising young activists by the 
National Committee on United States-China Relations and chosen to participate in a 
two-month training program in the U.S. tailored to their needs. As one of the co-
founders remembered, “we met with many American NGOs, which immediately 
broadened our horizons. Although much of their experience could not be copied and 
applied in China right away, we got the vision and learned roughly how to run a 
NGO.”351 Not only were they assigned to various AIDS NGOs352 in the U.S. to study 
organizational management and operation as well as outreach activities, the two young 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
348 Yanhai Wan, “A Reply upon Questions about Aizhixing,” Personal Statement (Chinese), 
October 5, 2003.  
349 Interview 342 (Activist), July 1, 2007. 
350 Interview 342 (Activist), July 19, 2007. 
351 Interview 31 (Activist), May 22, 2007. 
352 They included the Asian and Pacific Islander Coalition for HIV/AIDS, the Chinese-
American Planning Council, AIDS Services for Asian Communities in Philadelphia, and 
Massachusetts Asian AIDS Prevention Project in Boston. All of these NGOs serve Asian 
American communities, thus Chinese is one of their working languages.   
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activists were also exposed to a larger network of government agencies, medical 
specialists, media, foundations, and local communities.353 In the same year, some 
members of Aizhixing attended the Sixth Annual United States Conference on AIDS 
(USCA). This conference in particular focused on cultivating national NGOs’ 
connections with “community organizations, federal government agencies, private 
industry and others.”354 As part of its traditional program to promote international AIDS 
organizations, USCA collected a donation for Aizhixing, a part of which was earmarked 
for administrative costs. This grant enabled Aizhixing to start hiring paid staff.355 This 
process began with the Train-the-Trainer Program on HIV/AIDS medical intervention 
hosted by the Yale-China Association based in the U.S.356 
Guided by an American AIDS advocacy organization model, Aizhixing carried 
out a formalization process that had both structural and relational aspects. It established 
internal structure, a board of directors, and rules regulating the board. A basic financial 
management and staffing system was also introduced. Meanwhile, Aizhixing was 
actively identifying and developing connections with important organizational actors in 
transnational AIDS institutions, as well as within the domestic AIDS policy domain. 
For example, Aizhixing not only met with a dozen international NGOs and foundations, 
but also tried to develop routine interactions with domestic health departments in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
353 National Committee on United States-China Relations, “Annual Report 2003” (Chinese), 
2003; Aizhixing Institute, “A Report on a Trip to Washington D.C.” (Chinese), August 4, 2003.   
354 The Sixth Annual United States Conference on AIDS, one of the most widely attended 
gatherings of HIV/AIDS service providers in the United States. Available at: 
http://www.procaare.org/eventview.php/80/ (accessed October 9, 2011). 
355 “Aizhixing: A Long Journey,” Charity Weekly (Chinese), December 12, 2003; Aizhixing 
Institute,  “Aizhixing Annual Report 2003 (draft)” (Chinese), January 4, 2004. 
356 Yale-China Association, “Biennial Report 2001-2003,” 2003; Aizhixing Institute, “Annual 
Report 2003 (draft)” (Chinese), January 4, 2004. 
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2003.357 By mid-2004, Aizhixing had become an AIDS advocacy organization with a 
team of three full-time and five part-time staff members, more than $20,000 in 
operational funds from the West, a small membership base, and a primary focus on 
representing the interests of people affected by HIV/AIDS and pursuing social change.  
 
III. The Contested Path to AIDS NGOs 
 
The growing influence of transnational AIDS institutions enabled the 
importation of AIDS advocacy organizations, which generated the diffusion of this 
organizational form. This was not, however, a linear and smooth process as the Chinese 
state and many domestic activists questioned the model of AIDS advocacy NGOs. 
These responses constituted what I refer to as a form of counter-diffusion.358 The 
conflict between diffusion and counter-diffusion processes shaped the formation of 
AIDS NGOs in China, and culminated in the transformation of the AIDS movement in 
China during the second wave of AIDS activism. 
Contrary to what much of the literature would argue, processes of diffusion and 
counter-diffusion were not preceded by an existing network of channels (McAdam and 
Rucht 1993). Instead, these processes became organizational and networking 
mechanisms in themselves that generated ties among otherwise unconnected activist 
groups throughout the country and recruited individuals and communities. Both 
processes gave rise to transnational networks that connected “disprivileged Third World 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
357 Aizhixing Institute, “Annual Report 2003 (draft)” (Chinese), January 4, 2004. 
358 Diffusion and counter-diffusion correspond to response and counter-response analysis in 
historical institutionalism. They constitute the reactive sequences of events triggered by the 
critical juncture (Mahoney 2001). 
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groups and communities to political actors and areas that can affect decisions in 
hegemonic global networks” (Evan 2000, 231), and more importantly, enrolled those 
groups into the project of implementing the transnational AIDS regime in China.359 In 
the following sections, I explore these processes of diffusion and counter-diffusion in 
greater detail.  
 
i. Diffusion of AIDS NGOs 
 
Applying an advocacy organization model in AIDS activism in China was 
effected through two processes: adoption, the process of using the imported NGO 
model to create new NGOs and recruit more people into AIDS activism; and 
adaptation,360 the act of modifying existing organizational forms to enact the diffused 
organizational form. Diffusion was initiated by transnational institutional entrepreneurs, 
but adoption and adaptation were actualized on the ground, respectively, by two groups: 
gay communities and HIV/AIDS victims infected via contaminated blood.  
As discussed in Chapter 4, conflicts within gay communities in China in the 
1990s inhibited them from fully getting involved in the AIDS issue. However, male gay 
communities were quick to seize upon the more permissive organizing conditions 
generated by the boomerang. There were dual advantages for gay activists to form 
grassroots AIDS NGOs. On the one hand, forming NGOs enabled gay communities to 
gain access to transnational AIDS institutional resources. Indeed, as one activist serving 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
359 This concept is borrowed from Bartley (2007) who utilizes it for field-level analysis.  
360 I borrow the concept from Haveman and Rao (1997) and apply it to this transnational 
diffusion context.  
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children explained, a visit to the U.S. in 2003 left him with the impression that “there 
was more international money for issues related to homosexuality because AIDS was 
very much linked to it there.”361 On the other hand, the organizational form of AIDS 
NGOs was recognized not only as an umbrella shielding this population from political 
persecution, but also as a source of socio-political legitimacy enabling gay male 
communities to interact with government officials and the general public. In short, it 
was through this public health issue that gay communities in China were able to 
advocate for legal and sexuality rights in general. In 2004, more than 40 leading 
activists from 15 provinces gathered in Shanghai to discuss the issue of building gay 
communities. This meeting centered on specifying AIDS NGO-formation as a means to 
promote gay men’s legal rights and interests.362 Activists formulated a meeting 
resolution, “An Initiative to Strengthen Health and Legal Work among Gay 
Populations,” and sent it to the central government and National People’s Congress. 
This was the first initiative to ask the state to recognize and approve gay organizations.  
Most gay groups were only receptive to forming AIDS NGOs in order to claim 
their cultural or social sexual identities in the public sphere without politicizing the 
issue. Unlike their counterparts in the West who endeavored to disassociate sexual 
danger from homosexual identity in public discourse, leaders of these groups 
intentionally equated the concept of “gay” with men who have sex with men (hereafter, 
MSM)363 in order to claim sovereignty over this category in AIDS intervention work. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
361 Interview 31 (Activist), July 14, 2007. 
362 Chinese Society for the Study of Sexual Minorities, News Digest 185 (October 15, 2004). 
363 The term “MSM” was invented by epidemiologists to describe sexual acts without reference 
to identity. The category, however, excludes homosexual women, which caused a rift in 
communities after 2008.   
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Further propelling the rapid expansion of AIDS NGOs within gay male communities 
were the specific intervention techniques promoted by transnational AIDS institutions, 
such as peer education and diffusion of innovation models designed for sexually-high-
risk groups. Peer education “involves the use of members of a given group to effect 
change among other members of the same group” (WHO 1999, 5), an approach that has 
proven to be especially effective in affecting behavior such as condom use. The 
“diffusion of innovation” approach relies on influential community leaders “whose 
action, attitudes, and views influence those of other members through interactions in 
existing social relationships” (NIMH 2007, 4). These two approaches sheltered a variety 
of activities unrelated to AIDS from police harassment and granted a new form of 
legitimacy to AIDS NGOs and, indeed, to gay male communities in general.  
The diffusion of AIDS advocacy organizations took a different road among 
victims of contaminated blood. For gay communities, AIDS activism developed through 
a relatively straight-forward adoption of the existing forms and processes of the AIDS 
NGO model that began “from scratch,” so to speak. Such a “wholesale construction” 
can lead to “relatively immediate institutionalization of practices, technologies and 
rules” in terms of building a civil society sector (Lawrence and Suddaby 2008, 228). 
Unlike the linear and progressive organizational expansion among gay groups, the 
diffusion process among people infected via contaminated blood was dubious and 
contradictory. Because this group had already developed certain forms of AIDS 
activism, the adaptation of the AIDS NGO model was shaped significantly by how this 
western advocacy model and the existing one worked together. As a result, the 
transnational AIDS regime played a peculiar role in this pathway. 
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AIDS-related collective action arose rapidly in 14 provinces and 
municipalities.364 Besides former plasma donors, victims of blood and/or plasma 
products also began to take action. This primarily included hemophiliacs,365  women 
who were infected during labor or family planning surgeries and who then transmitted 
the virus to their partners and children,366 and people infected in surgeries after traffic-
related and other accidents.367 While hemophiliacs largely lived in urban areas, the latter 
two groups tended to concentrate around county-level hospitals in rural areas, as did 
plasma donors. These spatial differences led to divergent modes of action. Concentrated 
in villages and linked by family connections, plasma donors developed more 
confrontational strategies and tended to mobilize large-scale protests and 
demonstrations against local governments at county and township levels. Infected 
villagers’ demands were mainly limited to minor financial and medical assistance.  
On the other hand, hemophiliacs’ easy access to central and provincial 
governments located in Beijing or other central cities allowed them to utilize strategies 
such as lawsuits, open petitions to the central government, and small-scale protests in 
large cities. Most of the other victims of blood products who took action—women with 
pregnancy-related infections, and accident victims given infected blood—were situated 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
364 These were Beijing, Guizhou, Hebei, Heilongjiang, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangsu, Liaoning, 
Shanxi (山西), Shandong, Shanghai, Shanxi (陕西), and Xinjiang.  
365 It was estimated that around 1,000 hemophiliacs became infected with HIV/AIDS in the 
1990s because they were dependent on domestically-produced clotting factor VIII after the 
Ministry of Health banned the import of all blood products. 
366 Family planning-related surgeries refer to terminations of gestation and performance of 
ligation operations.  
367 Given low government financial subsidies since the marketization reform of public health 
system in the mid-1990s, hospitals depended heavily on fees for drugs and other services to 
cover costs in developing areas, which caused hospitals to invest heavily in the blood industry, 
including collecting blood and encouraging patients to use more blood products regardless of 
their medical conditions. 
	   212	  
in less developed areas with limited health resources.368 Petitioning high-level 
governmental authorities was their main strategy since local governments and hospitals 
were unwilling or unable to respond to victims’ requests for economic compensation. 
The common thread across all these groups was that their forms of mobilization were 
embedded in local networks.  
Interestingly, the diffusion of AIDS NGOs among people living with HIV/AIDS 
was prompted, in part, by the state’s resistance to the penetration of international NGOs 
and private foundations in general. As discussed in Chapter 2, international NGOs, 
especially those based in the U.S., have a long history of working in the public health 
area in China. But under the old international health framework, these external non-state 
actors only acted as implementing agencies or technical advisors of bilateral and/or 
multilateral projects (Ruger 2007; Thomas and Weber 2004). The institutionalization of 
the transnational AIDS regime allowed international NGOs to be admitted into the 
AIDS area in China as independent organizations on their own missions.369 Still, most 
local governments were determined to keep overseas organizations from entering into 
the areas hardest-hit by AIDS. There was large-scale joint and concentrated action 
whereby provincial authorities united different administrations in an effort to banish 
overseas organizations. For example, one interviewee related waking up one day and 
realizing that every car belonging to an international organizations was gone from the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
368 It is difficult to tell whether residents in developed areas were less exposed to contaminated 
blood or they were less motivated to take action because of better access to health resources 
and/or the pressure of stigma.  
369 Zunyou Wu, “International Non-governmental Actors in HIV/AIDS Prevention in China,” 
Cell Research 15, nos. 11-12 (2005): 919–22. 
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county.370 Activists recounted guiding members from international NGOs around when 
they visited to assess local needs and set up projects, and helping them to avoid 
detection by the local authorities.371 Three other interviewees echoed this, explaining 
that the direct operation of outsiders in local communities was nearly impossible 
between 2003 and 2006. International NGOs and private foundations had to establish 
AIDS NGOs in local communities in order to carry out other programs and activities. 
This process gave rise to AIDS NGO incubators in central urban areas. Larger 
international NGOs and foundations anchored resources in key AIDS advocacy 
organizations in large cities and relied on them to build and train AIDS NGOs. 
Aizhixing was one of the major incubators that initiated, financed, and trained AIDS 
NGOs in epidemic areas during this time period. Aizhixing usually singled out local 
activists among HIV/AIDS patients in Beijing and then helped them to form NGOs.  
ZLW was one such activist. Like most local communities, his village was 
already fighting on its own with local officials for basic medicine in 2003 and 2004, 
without being aware of the existence of similar struggles in other areas. Without access 
to medicine, ZLW and many peasants from his village took part in drug experiments at 
Beijing Ditan Hospital. Later, they recognized that these experiments had involved 
many deceptive practices and they sought to take legal action, but again, were limited 
by their lack of resources. ZLW describes standing outside the hospital in 2003, holding 
all his materials in support of a lawsuit, when he met Wan Yanhai, one of the co-
founders of Aizhixing:   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
370 Interview 41 (Activist), June 23, 2012. 
371 Interview 14 (Activist), June 3 and 14, 2012.  
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My wife and I went to a law firm but the lawyer wanted 3000 RMB and I can 
only pay 200 RMB. So we came back and were resting in a corner of the street. 
It was at this time Wan saw us. We started to chat and I showed him my 
materials. You know, nobody knew anything about it so I hired the owner of an 
internet bar to search for and download some information. That was how I wrote 
stuff about patients’ informed consent right, research ethics, and so on. Wan 
asked who wrote this. I said me. Then he asked what I did. I answered that I was 
a peasant. Right there Wan said that leave the lawsuit all to him and he would 
help us. So he asked me for a phone number. We did not have a phone. So he 
said that he would sponsor us one.372  
Aizhixing paid for the cost of phone installation and invited ZLW to Beijing for its 
annual meeting followed by a training section for “NGO capacity building” in 
Shanghai. This was part of a Rural Health Fellows Program in which fellows were 
taught health-and care-related skills by doctors, media communication skills by 
journalists, social work concepts by scholars, legal education by lawyers, and internet 
training by engineers.373 When ZLW came back from Shanghai, he decided to set up an 
AIDS NGO. Through methods such as these, Aizhixing provided activists scattered 
across fifteen provinces with funds, equipment, technical and educational support, and 
opportunities to attend domestic meetings in 2003 and 2004.374 
 Beijing was a key site converting and adapting international resources because 
of its location in the epidemiological and political structure of China. There were only 
two medical centers in China that specialized in AIDS in the mid-2000s: Ditan Hospital 
and You’an Hospital, both in Beijing. These centers drew HIV/AIDS patients who 
could not get diagnosed or treated elsewhere in the country. Meanwhile, Beijing was 
also the ultimate destination for petitioners with HIV/AIDS. Most victims infected via 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
372 Interview 123 (Activist), June 4, 2012. 
373 Aizhixing Institute, “About Training Henan Peasants,” Internal E-mail (Chinese), December 
12, 2003. 
374 Aizhixing Institute, “A Summing-up Report of Work for the First Six Months,” Internal E-
mail (Chinese), 2004. 
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blood products were in other parts of the country, but got in touch with AIDS activists 
in Beijing. Given the isolation of local communities, Beijing provided a central node  
where AIDS NGO incubators were able to identify, select, and recruit local activists for 
the project of making NGOs. This model eventually spread from Beijing to provincial 
capitals as more incubators were developed along with the establishment of provincial 
specialty hospitals.  
This diffusion process resulted in steady growth in the number of AIDS NGOs 
organized by people living with HIV/AIDS, and the formation of a particular group of 
local NGO leaders. Many scholars have indicated that social movement leaders in 
China tended to occupy higher status in local networks (Shi and Cai 2006), such as 
village cadres, heads of former production teams (Bernstein and Lu 2003) or influential 
families, or former soldiers (Bianco 2001). These descriptions were suited to the 
character of local leaders in the first wave of AIDS activism. During the diffusion 
process, however, many previously marginalized community members emerged as 
NGO leaders. They mostly came from relatively financially stable or affluent families 
that could afford medical treatment and/or petitioning activities in Beijing, but that did 
not have access to cultural and political capital based on kinship or lineage. Many of 
these emergent NGO leaders were previously migrant workers, so they were already 
exposed to urban life and had access to networks outside local communities. 
Importantly, if somewhat ironically, these new organizing strategies offered more 
opportunities for women, in particular, precisely because of their classification within 
their local communities as second-class members. As one activist explained: 
I was married into this family and village. Just like other women from outside 
the village, I sold my blood since my blood was less valuable than my 
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husband’s. Then I got infected and gave it to him. …I started to fight while the 
local did not. Their whole families were here so they had much more to lose. I 
was not afraid. …The village just offered my husband an accountant position. 
They wanted me to stop. But let’s wait and see.375 
Selling blood was considered despicable in rural areas, especially for men as it was 
equated with laziness, incompetence, and desperate poverty. But because women were 
already devalued, they had less at stake when it came to forming organizations based on 
a shared status of having sold blood, and revealing their HIV/AIDS status. Many 
activists explained that sustaining these more formal organizations also involved a great 
deal of routine work, and it was argued that women had more time available as they 
stayed in their villages for both housework and agricultural work in the field, while men 
went to work in urban areas.  
 
ii. Counter-Diffusion against AIDS NGOs: The Emergence of Soft Repression  
 
The boomerang effect did force the Chinese state to shift away from more 
traditional, hard forms of repression. The new comprehensive AIDS governance 
restricted the Chinese state’s ability to simply forbid domestic communities from 
organizing. As one security official explained: 
Overall, our regulations cannot go back to the 1990s unless we cut ourselves off 
from the outside world. Of course somehow stern measures should be taken but 
we would be under fire if we just ban NGOs. NGOs in AIDS area were mostly 
receiving help from abroad. They were used as an anchor point for international 
forces. As dangerous as they were, the old system just did not apply any more. 
Those NGOs would not be simply shut down. The situation was that difficult 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
375 Interview 242 (Activist), June 18, 2012. 
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that we were burying our head in the sand to some extent for a while back 
then.376  
The reduction of hard coercion was also confirmed by activists who stated in 2005 that 
they had been “on a good term with the state for two years.”377 It was not so much that 
the state no longer viewed AIDS activism as a threat, but rather it now viewed activism 
as a different kind of threat and sought to reorganize its repressive strategies 
accordingly. AIDS activism became imbued with subversive potential when it limited 
the authoritarian state’s institutional capability to fully exercise its policy autonomy and 
demand absolute obedience (Migdal 2001). AIDS activism was “an infiltrating force 
that conceals covert and political purposes with legal and open activities.”378  
Other officials’ statements can help explain why NGOs’ service-focused 
activities in remote communities constituted a political threat and why repression was 
still seen as necessary to forestall further penetration: 
They were doing nice things for local people. So people would be thankful to 
those organizations and forget about the state! You know, NGOs can totally win 
local communities over and mobilize them when something happens. We had to 
take control. Otherwise our government would fall in a few years. This was not 
about their activities per se. We have to look at what kind of influence those 
organizations can have on local communities. This is what we meant by 
people’s well-beings are important political issues (Xiao Minsheng, Da 
Zhengzhi).379 
 
Although its original perception of AIDS activism was underpinned by a Cold War 
mentality, the Chinese state strove to adapt specific repressive means to the new 
organizational and interactional forms imposed by transnational AIDS institutions. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
376 Interview 122 (Government), July 29, 2009. 
377 NGO Meeting Minutes, 06/2005. 
378 Interview 241 (Activist), June 19, 2009.  
379 Field notes, July 8, 2009.  
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Once it identified AIDS activism as “a blank spot in our administration system,”380 the 
Chinese state aimed to adapt its existing repressive apparatus to a context in which “the 
western countries prevail over the East and socialism is currently at a low ebb across the 
world.”381 While existing repressive agents, such as security and police departments, 
were reorganized, new agents and strategies were also generated by adopting some of 
the structural devices offered by transnational regimes.  
The previous hard repressive agents, especially security departments, were 
reconfigured as special engineering corps (Gong Bing) assigned the task of studying 
transnational activism in 2005. As a “prerequisite for most other activities” (Marx 1979, 
208), information gathering operated in three ways. First, intelligence was gathered to 
assess the situation and determine exact numbers. Rather than relying on local 
departments, special working teams were sent from the central government to conduct 
investigations.382 Second, security agents accumulated a list of key targets for 
monitoring who were actively engaging with networks abroad.383 Third, security agents 
started to develop closer working relationships with not only other traditional repressive 
agents, such as police and security police, but also the departments of civil affairs and 
industry and commerce for possible legal or administrative prosecutions. Although the 
planted informants occasionally caught activists’ attention, most of these activities were 
successfully covert and remained unobserved. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
380 Interview 212 (Activist), June 16, 2009. 
381 Interview 122 (Government), July 29, 2009. 
382 Interview 3144 (Government), June 16, 2009. 
383 Interview 31122 (Government), July 16, 2009. 
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Meanwhile, the state began engaging directly in transnational institutional 
spaces, as a way to cope with Chinese activists’ advocacy activities there. As one 
official put it:  
We participated in events like NGO parades at many international conferences. 
We would carry different banners according to the overall diplomacy policy of 
the state. There were only NGOs’ voices in the past. Now the international 
society can hear what we get to say. Of course we [the government] have 
problems. But we have also conducted a lot of work. So we cannot just let 
NGOs talk about us. We should speak up by ourselves.384  
This process started with the international publicity campaign, the China Red Ribbon 
Action. The central government launched the campaign by sending a so-called non-
governmental organization delegation for the first time along with the government 
delegation to the 15th World AIDS Conference385 in 2004. International/world 
conferences as “transnational social space” (Pries 2001) have recently attracted much 
interest among social movement scholars (Smith et al. 2008). As seen in other issue 
areas, transnational AIDS advocacy networks successfully used world conferences and 
meetings as forums to interject their agendas and perspectives, share information, 
increase media coverage, and build identities and coalitions. Chinese grassroots groups 
attended the 15th World AIDS Conference with support from different international 
organizations. They set up their displays at the NGO exhibition booths, distributed fliers 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
384 Field notes, June 16, 2009. 
385 Beginning in 2003–2004, the rapid spread of the epidemic in Eastern Europe and Asia 
emerged as a growing concern, with government authorities’ denial of the extent of the problem 
identified as one of the primary challenges. For the WHO to achieve its “3 by 5” goals by 2005, 
HIV-infected people in Asia were identified as a major priority. The 15th World AIDS 
Conference recognized the central task as expanding access to proven therapy and prevention 
strategies. The conference also framed community participation as central in developing 
sustainable infrastructure for prevention, care, and treatment.  
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to introduce their activities, and participated in panel discussions, particularly those 
regarding policy and law.  
While most scholarship focuses on the local-global nexus and horizontal 
transnational flows, the Chinese case shows how the state remains a crucial actor 
attempting to defend hierarchical politics in the tradition of nation-states. The state tried 
to infiltrate and use transnational space to combat and cope with the threats posed by 
Chinese activists occupying the same space. The state did so by appropriating the form 
and activities of grassroots groups, but employing them with opposite intentions. The 
state-affiliated NGO delegation aimed to directly limit Chinese activists’ efforts to 
frame and contextualize blood issues, and to indirectly affect the efficiency of activists’ 
strategies. The delegation arranged several larger NGO booths at the Global NGO 
village to display the central government’s accomplishments. A poster standing 32-feet 
high showed Prime Minister Wen Jiabao visiting AIDS patients, while handicraft items 
made by HIV/AIDS carriers were used to demonstrate their happy lives.386 Some 
officials as NGO delegates attended the protest staged by local and international 
activists, alongside members of Chinese grassroots groups. When Li Dan, an activist, 
passed out flyers and shouted slogans such as “Henan Government = Nazi” and “silence 
= murder,”387 the Vice-Director of the Henan Provincial Department of Health tried to 
persuade him to stop. In short, world conferences as transnational arenas have become 
key contested spaces for distinct forms of organizations, where vertical and horizontal 
hierarchies meet and contradictory political purposes clash.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
386 “The Chinese Red Ribbon Overseas,” People’s Daily (Chinese), July 9, 2004; “Chinese 
NGOs Made Their First Appearance in Fighting AIDS,” July 22, 2004. 
387 Aizhixing Institute, “A Response to the Declaration of Action Aid International China,” 
Announcement, April 7, 2004.   
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In addition to obscuring conflicts and disrupting grassroots activists’ activities, 
the state also took a more proactive strategy vis-à-vis transnational spaces. Rather than 
simply dismissing the legitimacy of NGOs as it once did, the state fashioned a specific 
definition of Chinese NGOs and local communities, as well as their importance under 
the leadership of the Party. The NGO delegation of the Chinese government was 
organized by the China NGO Network for International Exchange (hereafter, CNIE). 
CNIE was actually a bureau of the International Department of the CCP,388 but it 
obscured this by adopting a different set of organizational structures and constitutions in 
line with international models of NGOs, and using the term “network” because, as one 
official put it, “it is popular internationally.”389 The NGO delegation of the Chinese 
government included not only officials and medical professionals, but also 
representatives of a small grassroots group of AIDS patients, Positive Art, supported by 
the UNAIDS China office. It even invited a female HIV/AIDS carrier from a small 
village. In particular, this NGO delegation and grassroots groups handed out two 
different copies of the AIDS NGO inventory in China, respectively. The former’s state 
funding allowed it to produce mass amounts of professionally prepared literature, which 
did not mention any grassroots organization.390  
To play to the World Conference’s theme of “Access for All,” the state’s NGO 
delegation organized a NGO satellite symposium, “Facing the Challenge Together.” 
The symposium particularly invited the executive Director of UNAIDS. Wang Longde, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
388 Field notes, May 18, 2009. 
389 Field notes, July 8, 2009. Currently, CNIE is one of only two organizations in China that 
enjoys general consultative status with UN ECOSOC. 
390 The Aizhixing Delegation of Grassroots Groups. “A Compilation of Preliminary Sum-ups of 
Experiences with the World AIDS Conference,” Internal E-mail, July 14, 2004. 
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the Vice-Minister of the Ministry of Health, spoke at the symposium about how the 
Chinese government was mobilizing and organizing NGOs to participate in HIV/AIDS 
control. He emphasized NGOs’ roles in the area of education and praised the state-
organized All Women’s Federation and Chinese Youth League for assisting the 
government’s action. While the Vice-Minister promised that the Chinese government 
would offer more support to protect AIDS patients’ legitimate rights and interests, 
Xiashuqin, the HIV/AIDS carrier talked about how thankful she was to the government 
for taking care of her and her family.  
 
IV. Fighting Against A Counterfeit Civil Society: The Consolidation of AIDS 
NGO Actorhood  
 
Organizational formation became the key point of contention in 2003 among 
urban activists who had served as the backbone of the first wave of the AIDS 
movement. Although they all agreed to move the movement forward by making public 
interest claims and seeking related social changes, activists were divided on the next 
form organizing should take. Most of the conflicts concerned group structures, 
resources, participation, inter-group relationships, and the broader influence of AIDS 
activism. The rise of NGOs after the boomerang effect was, thus, not an automatic or 
foregone outcome of internal movement development. Neither did it result directly from 
activists’ efforts to respond to shifts in the immediate resources made available by 
transnational AIDS institutions. Rather, it reflected how civil society politics emerged 
in the tensions between the diffusion of AIDS NGOs and the counter-diffusion of state 
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repression, which together changed the institutional terrain in which AIDS activists 
operated.  
The conflict between diffusion and counter-diffusion centered over who should 
represent civil society in comprehensive AIDS governance. Transnational AIDS 
institutions focused on developing and strengthening an equitable role for key affected 
populations and communities in all aspects of AIDS intervention to improve health 
outcomes from the bottom-up. In contrast, the Chinese state, in its pursuit of AIDS 
intervention as a technical problem, intended to repackage its previous top-down 
approach in the format of comprehensive AIDS governance only to assuage an 
international audience. To this end, the central government set about constructing a 
version of civil society that was structurally and operationally subject to the rule of the 
state and supportive of authoritarianism. This counterfeit civil society was to be 
represented exclusively by government-organized NGOs (hereafter, GONGOs), 
especially mass organizations and their subordinate bodies that were created or licensed 
by the state to prevent bottom-up grassroots groups and activists from participating in 
AIDS intervention. Civil society politics thus centered around which actors were to  
count as legitimate NGOs—GONGOs or grassroots groups. 
These conflicts affected the actorhood of Chinese AIDS activism in two ways: 
First, they made NGOs a viable organizational option in an authoritarian context and 
activated NGO diffusion. Second, they provided a new focal point for AIDS activists, 
and led to their enrollment in institutional entrepreneurship for transnational AIDS 
institutions. This process marginalized other alternative options and entailed the 
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consolidation of NGOs as a new normative standard within the Chinese AIDS 
movement.  
 
i. NGOs: Newly Authorized Actors in Conflict 
 
The GONGO model employed by the Chinese state consisted of two primary 
elements: first, NGO activities were to support the Party’s leadership to assist the work 
of the government such as delivering welfare benefits; and NGOs were to serve as tools 
of social control by collecting and reporting local information and problems, thus 
making local communities visible to the administrative apparatus. As one activist 
explained, “their [GONGOs] activities are top-down handouts of charity. The purpose is 
to ask you to cherish gratitude for the state. The key is not what patients get, but the 
way we get it. Top-down or bottom-up.”391 The state rejected the term “grassroots” and 
insisted that registration with the Ministry of Civil Affairs was the only channel for civil 
associations and organizations to obtain legal and political legitimacy in China. Any 
group that seeks registration has to get a permit issued by a state or Party organization 
and a professional supervisory governing body. This two-tiered administrative system 
of regulation was set up to create institutional barriers for the development of grassroots 
groups (Hildebrandt 2012; Spires 2011). 
The GONGO model was an effort to repackage the existing old Leninist system 
in order to fashion a form of comprehensive AIDS governance in line (at least 
superficially) with transnational multisectoral norms. This approach aimed to block the 
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connections between transnational forces and grassroots organizations, as well as to 
deny the legitimacy of grassroots groups. The old Leninist approach had been invented 
and practiced by the Party since the 1950s. This approach was one of the earliest of four 
major political pillars for the development of health policies and institutions. It sought 
to influence key groups by binding them into organizations that became dependent on 
patronage through established mass organizations, which claim to represent people’s 
voices under the Party’s leadership. Created or recognized by the state, mass 
organizations (qun zhong zu zhi) are a small group of functionally differentiated 
organizations that are granted deliberate representational monopolies within their 
respective categories. All of these constitute a formal part of the communist political 
structure, which defends the state’s monopoly in every aspect of social life.  
The GONGO model assigned the role of civil society representatives to mass 
organizations—such as the All-China Women’s Federation, the All-China Federation of 
Trade Unions, the Communist Youth League, and the China Red Cross—to fulfill the 
positions and roles of NGOs in comprehensive AIDS governance. Not only did this 
model buffer the Chinese state against external pressure by furnishing the appearance 
of civil society, it also allowed the state to draw on resources designated for 
empowering local communities from transnational AIDS institutions. For example, the 
World Bank’s Ninth Health Projects was the first large international program designed 
to encourage local communities’ participation in AIDS intervention. The project 
agreement specified the number of NGOs to be involved in implementing interventions 
as a key requirement. Although GONGOs had no real connections with infected 
communities, the Ministry of Health used them to fulfill these program requirements 
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and all similar requirements of various major international grants.392 The organizational 
structure of GONGOs made them suitable for freezing out grassroots groups. The 
branches of all the major mass organizations were present in all the administrative and 
state-owned work units. Hence, they were able to play an important role in extending 
the reach of the state and keeping grassroots groups from entering into local 
communities. One activist talked about his first encounter with local mass organizations 
when his group was working with infected peasants:  
We went to several villages to visit sick children and their families during the 
Chinese New Year. There was a television crew waiting there when we arrived 
at one village. They started to shoot how we sent gifts to kids and talked to 
them. We did not know what was going on. A village cadre suddenly showed up 
and yelled at the crew, “Stop it! You got it all wrong!” It turned out that the 
television crew [had] obviously mistaken us as officials from mass organizations 
who were supposed to put up a show. Later they told us that our activities were 
not “professional” so we must stop working there.393 
 
Mass organizations were repurposed to conduct treatment and prevention activities and 
to discount the need for grassroots organizations to emerge. This strategy not only 
allowed local governments, especially in Henan province, to publicly evict activists 
from other areas, but also gave the state more power to resist the “socializing effects” of 
transnational AIDS regimes.  
Ironically, this was also the first time the terms “civil society” and “NGO” were 
included in the state’s official documents as a legitimate and essential part of 
comprehensive public health governance. This carved out a legitimate niche for AIDS 
activism carried out via NGOs. This political acknowledgement was first expressed by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
392 Examples include AusAID supported by the Australian Agency for International 
Development, the China-UK AIDS Project supported by the United Kingdom, Comprehensive 
Integrated Programs for Research on AIDS supported by the U.S. National Institute of Health, 
and the CDC-Global AIDS Program supported by the U.S. Center for Disease Control and 
Prevention. 
393 Field notes, May 16, 2009.  
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the central government when it formed the State Council AIDS Working Committee 
(hereafter, SCAWC) in early 2004. In its founding documents and policy frameworks, 
SCAWC stated that “governments at all levels should encourage greater civil society 
involvement” 394 and “it is required to further support the role of civil society 
organizations.”395 This endorsement granted socio-political legitimacy to NGOs as an 
organizational form (Rao, Morrill, and Zald 2005).  
AIDS activists seized the opportunity and came up with a grassroots AIDS NGO 
model –an antithesis of the GONGO model—based on the principles of independence, 
non-governmentality, and not-for-profit. In particular, activists rejected the validity of 
the state’s requirement for formal registration and emphasized that an NGO should not 
accept any order from or be subordinated to the government. More specifically, a broad 
consensus emerged among activists that a grassroots AIDS NGO should have five 
concrete characteristics: a clearly written constitution, operation for more than one year 
duration, more than two part-time or one full-time staff member(s), organizational 
contact information, and a track record of AIDS intervention activities. 
 
ii. A New Conflict Object: What is Civil Society?   
 
It was transnational AIDS institutions that placed the GONGO and grassroots 
models in direct conflict—a conflict that centered around the operation of the Global 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
394 State Council AIDS Working Committee Office and U.N. Theme Group on HIV/AIDS in 
China, “A Joint Assessment of HIV/AIDS Prevention, Treatment, and Care in China,” Beijing, 
Ministry of Health of China, 2007. 
395 State Council, “Notice on Strengthening HIV/AIDS Prevention and Control,” 2004. 
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Fund. In 2003 the Global Fund entered into China with the signing of a 283,911,005 
USD grant agreement. As mentioned in the previous section, the Global Fund was 
established in 2002 as the largest financial infrastructure396 to build “public-private 
partnership between governments, civil society, the private sector and affected 
communities”397 in line with transnational AIDS institutions at the country level. 
Following Global Fund requirements, the state set up the China Country Coordinating 
Mechanisms (hereafter, CCM) 398 and Secretariat to manage the Global Fund in China, 
with GONGOs used as civil society representatives. Under the control of the Ministry 
of Health, the China CCM stated that only organizations “legally registered to operate 
within China” are qualified to be included in the civil society sector.399 Violating the 
Global Fund rules, the China CCM also hid information such as progress reports and 
application announcements from local activists and infected communities. 
The Ministry of Health’s action did not engender an automatic response from 
grassroots organizations since the transnational civil society framework still seemed far 
removed from individuals’ experiences of bodily suffering. Rather, it was the initiatives 
from transnational AIDS institutions that drew Chinese activists into the conflict. 
Richard Feachem, the founding Executive Director of the Global Fund, invited two 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
396 The Global Fund provides 25 percent of all international funding for AIDS intervention.  
397 Global Fund Framework Document, Section 3. 
398 The China CCM is the head of the Global Fund at the country level, composed of 
representatives from governmental, civil society, and private sector groups. The CCM is meant 
to be the mechanism by which local stakeholders deliberate and collectively design grant 
proposals, design new health programs in line with current infrastructure, and tailor program 
implementation strategies in order to specifically allow “national ownership and [to] respect 
country-led formulation and implementation processes” (Global Fund Framework Document, 
2).  
399 China CCM, “China Country Coordinating Mechanisms Terms of Reference (Trial),” 
Clauses 2.1.3 and 2.5, March 27, 2006. 
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Chinese activists to attend his meeting with the Chinese government in December 2004. 
This meeting was crucial as it brought the Global Fund to the attention of domestic 
activists. UNAIDS also helped to circulate the principle documents of the Global Fund, 
and to gather activists to evaluate the working procedures of the China CCM. 
Recognizing that the Global Fund authorized NGOs to conduct advisory and 
supervisory work, Chinese activists quickly realized that taking on the form and role of 
NGOs enabled them to target public health officials and AIDS intervention programs, 
and to explicitly critique the government in ways not possible otherwise. An informal 
network gradually formed among activists to monitor the implementation of the Global 
Fund and to publicly condemn the corruption of local governments who embezzled 
funds, committed forgery in disregard of AIDS patients’ needs, and suppressed 
grassroots groups and their activities. While such problems were hardly new, activists 
were now allowed to push the boundaries of political critique by casting genuinely 
transgressive claims in the language of civil society, even when “the local Health 
Bureau threatened patients to shut up if they did not want to be arrested.” 400 
Transnational AIDS institutions further fueled the conflict between the Ministry 
of Health and activists when, first, the Global Fund Board threatened to cut the grant in 
order to force the China CCM to involve PLWAs and grassroots organizations.401 Next, 
the Global Fund further fortified ties with Chinese activists by establishing formal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
400 Aizhixing Institute, “An Open Letter to the China CCM and the Chinese Center for Disease 
Control and Prevention” (Chinese), March 7, 2005. 
401 Global Fund, “Country Coordinating Mechanisms (CCMs): Report of the Governance and 
Partnership Committee,” Ninth Board Meeting, November 18-19, 2004; China CCM, “China 
Country Coordinating Mechanisms Terms of Reference (Trial),” Clauses 2.1.3 and 2.5., March 
27, 2006. 
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channels for direct communication.402 As a result, the first campaign to question the 
transparency of the Global Fund operation in China and its exclusion of grassroots 
NGOs was launched when Global Fund expert Bernard Rivers came to Beijing to 
evaluate the China CCM in the early 2005.  
This so-called “grassrooting the Global Fund” campaign facilitated the progress 
of NGO identity-building by connecting the welfare of local communities to a broad 
political project of creating a civil society with “the expectation [that it] will act 
cohesively to bring about that change” (Rochon 1998, 11). On the one hand, the Global 
Fund granted political legitimacy and leverage to Chinese AIDS activists to attack the 
authority of the state. Twenty-seven grassroots NGOs and twenty-two individuals, 
mostly patients and lawyers, signed a public letter demanding that the China CCM 
remove the article depriving most grassroots organizations of the right to participate. 
However, the Ministry of Health refused to make any compromise and claimed that 
grassroots NGOs were not well-developed enough to be considered as AIDS NGOs.403 
Nationalist discourse was also used to warn grassroots groups against being disloyal to 
the state. For example, health officials publicly accused Wan Yanhai of being a traitor 
when he attended the Global Fund headquarters meeting, asking “How can you make 
the state lose face? Obviously you have ulterior motives.”404 The government’s rigid 
attitude only further angered the activist community and made the definition of a united 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
402 For example, Chinese activists were invited to attend the 11th Global Fund board meetings 
and its preparatory conference of the Developing Countries NGO Delegation in Geneva. A 
young activist, Liang Yanyan, was selected as a member of the 12th Global Fund Council 
Developing Countries NGO Delegation. 
403 Zhengfu Qiang, “Statement by CCM Secretariat” (Chinese), 2006. As the head of the CCM 
Secretariat, Qiang was also the chief of the Office for International Cooperation at the China 
Center for Disease Control and Prevention. 
404 Activists’ Meeting Minutes, Internal E-Mails, 2006.  
	   231	  
grassroots view and position on the definition and role of NGOs a shared primary goal 
for the whole AIDS movement community. In 2006, seventy grassroots groups held a 
three-day meeting in Beijing with the assistance of the National Endowment for 
Democracy in the U.S. and elected their own civil society representatives. This was one 
of only a few public grassroots elections in China since 2000. With the support of the 
Global Fund Board, this election eventually forced the Ministry of Health to 
compromise. After six months of negotiations, the Chinese state finally agreed to allow 
grassroots AIDS NGOs to participate in AIDS intervention without registration. 
The controversy over the Global Fund generated organizational and networking 
mechanisms that, in turn, generated ties among otherwise unconnected activist groups 
throughout the country and recruited individuals and communities to form AIDS NGOs. 
It sparked the first major wave of NGO-formation, in which the number of newly 
founded grassroots NGOs grew from 32 in 2003 to 175 in 2006—157 of which went 
through NGO training sponsored by the International Republican Institute (IRI) in three 
cities. Concepts such as human rights, citizen participation, political representation, and 
the rule of law became familiar terms to local activists. The first national alliance, the 
HIV/AIDS Community-Based Organization Network, was also founded in the 
campaign to counter GONGOs. It was at the end of this “grassrooting the Global Fund” 
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V. Conclusion 
 
Scholarly inattention to the paradoxical dimensions of the boomerang effect 
reflects a paucity of research examining the complex interplay among transnational 
institutions, authoritarian states, and social movements. Current studies of democratic 
contexts overwhelmingly conceptualize the organizational forms of a movement in 
terms of choices negotiated in a battle between social movements and the state. 
Transnational institutions affect this battle only by changing both sides’ access to 
economic, political, social, or symbolic sources of power. In response to the inadequacy 
of this political process approach, a different body of studies suggests that social 
movement actorhood is constructed, scripted, and adopted from a global institutional 
environment (Frank and McEneaney 1999; Shin and Tsutsui 2007; Schofer and 
Hironaka 2005; Soysal 1997). This line of research provides more theoretical 
expectations than empirical evidence in social movement studies, however, due to the 
well-known absence of attention to conflict (Beckfield 2003) and micro-dynamics in the 
world polity literature (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Hafner-Burton and Montgomery 
2006). I draw on and extend this work in order to examine how transnational 
institutions shape the actorhood of social movements on the ground.  
This chapter argues that the organizational form of AIDS advocacy needs to be 
understood as a cultural object constructed through conflicts among the transnational 
AIDS regime, the Chinese state, and diverse activist groups about the legitimate way to 
govern AIDS. These conflicts—unfolded through the diffusion and counter-diffusion of 
the advocacy NGO model—led to activist groups’ enrollment in institutional 
entrepreneurship for the transnational AIDS regime. This process, in turn, shaped the 
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form of AIDS advocacy by transforming the cultural constitution and authorization of 
the conflict object and activist actorhood itself. It was transnational multisectoralism of 
the global health regime, rather than domestic structural conditions per se, that 
transformed the trajectory of AIDS advocacy in ways and directions not seen before the 
boomerang. This chapter is a response to Walder’s appeals for more studies to study 
“the substantive content of a movement—the type of politics that it represents” (2011).  
This chapter traces the drastic shift toward formal organizing that resulted from 
changes in domestic institutional practices in governing AIDS, changes that altered the 
cultural terrain in which AIDS activists operated. While local AIDS problems and state 
repression remained constant in China, I identify a new political logic that underlies the 
newly established comprehensive AIDS governance model: civil society politics. 
Before the boomerang shook the Chinese state as the only source of power and 
legitimacy, the first wave of the AIDS movement was organized around citizens’ rights 
and focused on demanding economic and social benefits from the state. Even though the 
boomerang did not directly impact the political structure in China, it forced the Chinese 
state to replace socialist contagious disease control with a comprehensive public health 
governance model, formulate a new governing structure, and develop different 
governing organizations. AIDS could no longer be treated as a domestic issue caused by 
individual behavior; it was transformed instead into a public health issue that had to be 
administered with or through the Chinese state. In particular, comprehensive AIDS 
governance had to embrace a decentralized approach emphasizing community 
involvement and international collaborations; this required the national health ministry 
to share power and authority with international actors and domestic NGOs. The 
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boomerang effect thus served as an exogenous shock that interrupted existing public 
health institutions in China, loosened political constraints in China, and introduced 
American AIDS NGOs as an organizing form and norm. Transnational AIDS 
institutions opened the way for civil society politics by granting AIDS patients, as a 
group, equal status as the state in policymaking based on how AIDS should be governed.  
While civil society politics directly challenged the state’s monopoly of public 
health, the chapter also demonstrates the exact historical mechanisms that transmitted 
the AIDS NGO model from abroad to local communities. This was not a smooth and 
gradual process, but unrolled through a series of conflicts. On the one hand, 
transnational institutions promoted a specific set of AIDS intervention techniques 
through which NGOs were authorized as the legitimate representatives of civil society. 
Local activists oriented to NGO formation were afforded space to survive and grow in 
an otherwise hostile political environment. On the other hand, the specification of 
abstract multisectoralism propelled the Chinese state to decrease hard repression and 
adopt new strategies of soft repression to counter the diffusion of AIDS NGOs. 
The conflicts between diffusion and counter-diffusion reflected the disputes of 
transnational AIDS institutions and the Chinese state over how comprehensive AIDS 
governance would be configured. Although the Chinese state perceived transnational 
intervention as a disruptive challenge to authoritarian order, it could not simply go back 
to public non-compliance. The state thus sought to decouple its actual practices from its 
rhetorical conformity with transnational norms. In fact, a comprehensive public health 
governance model consists of highly universalistic and abstract schemata of institutional 
forms and modes of practices that individuals and organizations can specify and 
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elaborate on (Koenig 2011). Keywords such as “civil society” in transnational 
frameworks are not identified with a set of fixed meanings. They can be utilized and 
interpreted in multiple, even incompatible ways in actual state discourse and 
organizational arrangements. Not surprisingly then, the Chinese state sought to translate 
those abstract norms into concrete practices of comprehensive AIDS governance with 
“Chinese characteristics” by creating a version of civil society represented by 
GONGOs.   
This contestation and negotiation between transnational AIDS institutions and 
the Chinese state provided a focal point and collective project for AIDS activists, which 
culminated in the battle over the operation of the Global Fund. Domestic activists sided 
with transnational AIDS institutions by formulating grassroots advocacy NGOs against 
the central government. This process not only further authorized the legitimacy of 
NGOs as an organizational form, but also generated a new object of conflict—namely, 
struggles over how to interpret and employ multisectoralism in the Chinese context and 
what counted as legitimate NGOs—state-organized NGOs or grassroots groups. While 
this act offered AIDS activists the space and international resources to publicly 
challenge the state, civil society politics became the central foci of AIDS activism and 
promoting AIDS NGO-building and expansion became a primary goal. 
This chapter demonstrates how the diffusion of NGOs was a process through 
which local activists were essentially enrolled into a system of institutional 
entrepreneurship that implemented multisectoral rules for transnational AIDS 
institutions. Despite the fact that NGOs as an organizational form actually cut across the 
opinions of activists as well as different communities, NGO-building replaced local 
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issues and become the central foci of the whole movement by 2007. I thus argue that the 
adoption of AIDS NGOs reflected a transition from strategies rooted in local settings to 
the adoption of the putatively universal norms of transnational AIDS institutions. As the 
next chapter shows, this transformation of AIDS activism had an uneven impact across 
various local communities, which led to both the expansion and fragmentation of the 
whole movement.  
 
  








Authoritarian Consolidation: The Fragmentation and Decline of AIDS Activism, 
2008-2012 
 
Having successfully “grassrooted the Global Fund” in China, as detailed in the 
previous chapter, NGOs won the right to participate in formal AIDS governance in 
China in 2006 and began a period of high growth in 2007. These developments were a 
result of transnational AIDS institutions’ growing influence in promoting 
comprehensive AIDS governance in China. Optimism prevailed among international 
organizations and domestic activists, especially when the central government finally 
approved the operation of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation in AIDS intervention. 
As the impact of external forces deepened, multisectoralism—insisting on AIDS 
governance as a multisectoral partnership between government, civil society, and the 
private sector405—increasingly became the rule among China’s domestic AIDS 
institutions between 2008 and 2012. Grassroots AIDS NGOs were granted a formal 
position in these formal governance structures and procedures, which generated the 
proliferation of NGOs between 2007 and 2012. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
405 As Chapter 2 discusses, multisectoralism emphasizes that AIDS programs and decision-
making must utilize inclusive participation of civil society actors, especially people living with 
HIV/AIDS, as a way to bolster the effectiveness of intervention (Buse and Walt 2000). By 
promoting equal deliberation and participation of non-state actors, this rule contrasts with the 
more traditional form of the multilateral international health framework. 
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This trajectory was not one of unqualified progress, however; nor did it conform 
to the expectations of existing theoretical frameworks. The success of transnational 
AIDS institutions in promoting grassroots organizational mobilization in China is 
consistent with the predictions of world polity theory. From a world polity perspective, 
transnational institutions promote the creation of formal social movement organizations 
as isomorphic outcomes across disparate contexts (Frank, Hironaka, and Schofer 2000; 
Meyer, Boli, Thomas, and Ramirez 1997; Ramirez, Soysal, and Shanahann 1997). What 
a world polity approach does not explain, however, is how and why this process only 
empowered certain communities and activists, while displacing others—specifically, 
why gay male communities in urban areas rose to dominate AIDS organizing, while 
people infected through blood returned back to direct and informal action and the 
organizing impetus of female sex workers was displaced altogether. Furthermore, 
contrary to constructivist international relations theories, the increasing domestic impact 
of transnational AIDS institutions did not weaken the political apparatus of the Chinese 
state. Instead, the central government shifted from a defensive to an increasingly 
offensive stance, even going beyond its jurisdictional territory to suppress challengers at 
the international level.  
This chapter examines the paradoxical expansion and decline of AIDS activism. 
While transnational AIDS institutions were striving to further advance the development 
of comprehensive AIDS governance in China, their efforts to improve the standing of 
grassroots NGOs in public health collided with the state’s goal of strengthening its 
centralized regulation of every important aspect of social life. The resulting conflict 
between these two major actors produced what I describe as multisectoral AIDS 
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governance with “Chinese characteristics.” I argue that the organizational arrangement 
of this particular mode of governance not only gave rise to certain patterns of 
mobilizing and repressive behaviors, but also shaped the relationships between different 
governments and various activist communities. As one official stated, “I can tell as 
early as 2003 that AIDS was not their real purpose. Their purpose was to promote civil 
society in China. But did they really care about local communities or grassroots groups? 
No. They just wanted civil society and democracy.”406  
The chapter focuses on the Global Fund, the largest external donor and the 
primary impetus behind transnational efforts to build AIDS governance in China. First, 
I examine the influence of the Global Fund in shaping China’s multisectoral AIDS 
institutions, which established the building of civil society actors and mechanisms as a 
normative and functional goal for both the Chinese state and AIDS activists. Second, I 
demonstrate how the institutional characteristics of AIDS governance affected the 
actorhood of AIDS activism by comparing three communities: gay men, female sex 
workers, and peasants infected through blood. I conclude with a discussion of the 
Chinese state’s strategies to control AIDS activism through manufacturing civil society, 
and how these efforts have contributed to the fragmentation and decline of the AIDS 
movement since 2010.   
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
406 Interview 21 (Government), July 20, 2013. 
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I. Imposing Multisectoralism 
Since 2003, the Global Fund approved a total value of US$ 775,341,434 for six 
HIV/AIDS programs in China.407 This accounted for around one quarter of the total 
funding for China’s HIV/AIDS intervention since 1988 (Sun et al. 2010). But the 
impact of the Global Fund goes far beyond simply providing funds to make up for 
financial deficiencies and increase HIV/AIDS program resources. I argue that the 
Global Fund has affected the two primary environments within which domestic AIDS 
institutions operate: the resource environment and the cultural environment. The 
resource environment refers to available material resources, while the cultural 
environment refers to the regulatory structures and normative beliefs that prevail in 
domestic AIDS institutions. As Scott et al. (2000) point out, cultural environments 
mediate material environments because “cultural belief systems influence the goals that 
govern actions, the choice of means for accomplishing them, and the meanings 
associated with material artifacts” (149). Both resource and cultural environments shape 
the various state and non-state, domestic and international AIDS-related actors that are 
in routine contact with each other, bringing them together under a common frame of 
multisectoralism and in pursuit of a common goal of establishing AIDS governance in 
China. In short, thanks to the Global Fund, AIDS activists are embedded in a new 
institutional context. 
This section charts the formation of this new institutional environment and the 
establishment of multisectoral governance structures. Multisectoralism is the Global 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
407 China Center for Disease Control and Prevention, China Global Fund Programs Principal 
Recipient website, http://www.chinaglobalfund.org/en/index.html (last accessed May 3, 2013). 
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Fund’s founding normative principle linking policy effectiveness to inclusive 
participation. Multisectoralism, or public-private partnership, brings together a set of 
actors—such as government, civil society, the private sector and affected communities 
–for the common goal of fighting HIV/AIDS according to mutually agreed upon roles 
and principles. As the WHO defines it, such partnership is defined by non-malfeasance, 
autonomy, and equity.408 In particular, the involvement of civil society in all aspects of 
the work and governance of the Global Fund is a guiding principle in its organizational 
design to safeguard deliberative democracy.  
This section describes how the material and cultural effects of the Global Fund 
are channeled to the national and local levels through two pathways: the Global Fund 
governance architecture building, and AIDS intervention programs design and 
implementation.  I also focus here on the way in which the relatively abstract concept of 
multisectoralism was translated into the Chinese context—specifically, by focusing 
almost exclusively on the “capacity building” of grassroots NGOs. So-called capacity 
building, aimed at formalizing grassroots groups, is defined as enhancing skills in 
fundraising, accounting, human resource management, information technology 
networking, and developing formal working relationships with international donors, 
with other grassroots groups, and even with government agencies.  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
408 World Health Organization, “WHO Guidelines on Collaboration and Partnerships with 
Commercial Enterprises,” 1999. 
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i. Governance Architecture Building 
 
As Chapter 2 described, transnational AIDS institutions gained a high degree of 
legitimacy at the supranational level after 2006. The rule of multisectoralism was 
clearly established and a well-structured configuration of AIDS governance came to be 
defined. In the period of conflict between 2004 and 2007 examined in Chapter 5, it 
became clear that the Chinese state was a powerful incumbent intent on defending 
traditional state-centric AIDS institutions, while international and domestic non-state 
actors were challengers attempting to fight the status quo and promote multisectoralism 
(Fligstein 1997). The Global Fund created the possibility for international organizations 
to affect the shape of AIDS governance in China in ways that aligned with their own 
organizational interests and objectives.  
To briefly describe the working structure and procedure of the Global Fund: 
with the assistance of a secretariat and technical review panel, the Global Fund board in 
Geneva awards grants on a competitive basis to principle recipients (hereafter, PRs) in 
various countries, who then sub-grant to others. PRs are designated by Country 
Coordination Mechanisms (hereafter,CCMs) that are in charge of the operation of the 
Global Fund at the country level. In China, the PR is the Chinese Center for Disease 
Control and Prevention (hereafter, CDC). According to the Global Fund Framework 
document, the China CCM has three key components: the CCM Plenary to organize 
deliberation and make decisions, the CCM Secretariat for day-to-day operation, and the 
CCM Working Groups to provide technical support for organizations drafting program 
proposals. With new rounds of programs launched by the Global Fund board in Geneva, 
the China CCM solicits project proposals by organizations. The CCM Working Group 
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then reviews submitted proposals and combines endorsed ones into a single-country 
proposal for the Global Fund board. On approval, grants are received and disbursed by 
the China CDC. 
Programs were first approved for China in the Fund’s third round or “Round 3.” 
These programs sought to provide anti-retroviral treatment and care as well as support 
to patients in seven provinces in central China where HIV had spread primarily through 
contaminated blood. Each subsequent round focused on particular programs and 
populations: Round 4 aimed to intervene among injecting drug users and female sex 
workers in seven western provinces; Round 5 focused on interventions to reduce HIV 
transmission among men who have sex with men, as well as sex workers in 
north/northeastern provinces with low prevalence rates; Round 6 attempted to ramp up 
interventions to the most vulnerable within those communities through the 
empowerment and mobilization of NGOs; and Round 8 targeted the rapidly expanding 
sub-population of internal rural-to-urban migrants, who tended to be young and sexually 
active. In addition, the Rolling Continuation Channel Program intended to consolidate 
the previous five programs (Rounds 3, 4, 5, 6, and 8409).  
Promoting the CCM is one of the Global Fund’s primary means to ensure  
multisectoralism at the country level. This is where so-called local stakeholders from 
the government, non-government organizations, PLWHA, private sector, and 
international organizations are not only to be represented, but also to collectively create 
grant proposals, design locally sensitive intervention programs, facilitate a 
corresponding implementation strategy, and undertake program review and oversight. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
409 China’s applications were rejected by the Global Fund Board during Rounds 1, 2, and 7.  
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Under the auspices of the CCM, then, there is much institutional space for multiple 
organizational actors to emerge, each leveraging control and resources as conduits of 
power to weaken the domination of the state in AIDS intervention.  
It is important to note that the Global Fund was not equipped with adequate 
power to directly enforce the CCM, especially in an authoritarian context. Rather, it 
relies on institutional entrepreneurs working at the domestic level to ensure compliance. 
The China CCM410 was set up in 2002 and completely dominated by government 
members prior to 2007. In late 2004, the Global Fund Board began pressuring the China 
CCM to reform to comply with Global Fund requirements and guidance regarding CCM 
membership. The goal was to increase representation from civil society and PLWHA, 
and it was this effort that ignited the battle between the Chinese state and AIDS activists 
that was discussed in Chapter 5. As noted in that chapter, the battle ended in a victory 
for activists in 2006 when the China CCM set up a CCM NGO Working Committee 
(NWC) and CCM PLWHA Working Committee (PLWHAWC). Meanwhile, the battle 
also attracted the attention of many international  organizations and NGOs that saw it as 
an opportunity to challenge the central government’s domination and increase their 
influence in AIDS governance in China.  
By 2007, however, it became clear that the focus on the China CCM was 
somewhat misplaced. It was through not the CCM, but the CDC that the Ministry of 
Health controlled the operation of the Global Fund in China. Because the China CDC 
controls all the grants, the CCM’s power and role were almost negligible. Among CCM 
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members, only Chinese governmental officials had access to any detailed and concrete 
information on work plans, progress, and management of specific projects; all the others 
saw were vague and general reports. As one NGO member complained: “Only CDC 
officials know how money should be spent, how it is actually spent, how projects are 
executed, what the gap between expectations and realities are, and how much money is 
needed for the next round of grants. We did request details but they asked us to go look 
it up on the CDC’s website.”411 While the CCM Plenary was supposed to serve as the 
decision-making organ, its meetings mostly focused on the submission of country 
proposals or country progress reports. For example, compared to other representatives, 
government officials had the lowest attendance at CCM Plenary meetings, which were 
primarily seen as providing only a rubber stamp for official reports and proposals in any 
case. Therefore, building an independent and strong CCM through reform became 
important for nonstate actors to find a counter weight to contend with the government 
for the control of the Global Fund in China.412 
International organizations were the most enthusiastic supporters of the China 
CCM reform since they were struggling to establish leverage in their relations with the 
Chinese government, with varying degrees of success. Given the dominance of the 
socialist contagious disease control model in China for so long, foreign governments 
and international organizations had both been marginal in China’s AIDS governance. 
But in the early 2000s the former—especially the U.S. Center for Disease Control and 
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412 In fact, the CCM reform was promoted by the Global Fund Board, which considered 
strengthening non-state actors’ participation in CCMs as the only way to balance power. This 
was partly determined by the Global Fund’s focus on the format of AIDS governance at the 
national level.  
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Prevention and the UK Department for International Development—started to develop a 
much stronger working relationship with China’s Ministry of Health. As Chapter 2 
discussed, the emergence of AIDS as an international political issue captured the central 
government’s attention at the time, but not yet enough for the state to endorse 
transnational AIDS institutions. Instead, the Chinese state limited its engagement with 
external forces to dominant state actors in traditional international AIDS institutions. 
For example, the Ministry of Health’s Division of International Cooperation only 
recognized national ministries as important actors that warranted the government’s 
attention. As one official explained,  
A dialogue can only take place between entities at the same level, right? I mean, 
China’s Ministry of Health makes policy. Of course it focuses on other policy 
makers at the national ministry level… You mean UN organizations? They are 
on the operating or technical level. You would have to talk to CDC who might 
interact with those organizations more frequently. I don’t know what those 
organizations do.413  
For international organizations, developing a substantial working relationship with the 
Chinese government was much harder even after 2004. Perhaps recognizing the futility 
of the situation, the WHO China Representative Office adopted the role of a technical 
expert or consultant that limits itself to nonpolitical and medical issues in public 
health.414  
However, other UN organizations—especially UNAIDS or UNDP, whose 
missions are to promote democracy, human rights, and civil society—ad even less 
access to the policy-making process and less strategic tools to take action in an 
authoritarian country such as China, but they also had more reason to be dissatisfied 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
413 Interview 44 (Government), July 12, 2013. 
414 Field notes, June 9, 2009.  
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with such restrictions. UNDP China identified discrimination as a core problem in 
fighting AIDS and defending the rights of PLWHA, but the office’s several projects to 
advance legal reform ended up failing. A UNDP official ascribed the failure to the 
organization’s relations with the central government:  
UNDP started its work in AIDS in China as early as the 1980s. We were aware 
of the blood contamination issue in the 1990s and we did try to warn the central 
government. They ignored us. There was nothing else to do… UNDP is an inter-
governmental entity. What it means is that UNDP can only work with and rely 
on the central government to make any change. Fundamentally its agendas are 
always set top-down. We would meet with senior leaders at different meetings 
and workshops in order to bring our concerns to their attention with the hope 
that what we brought up will be incorporated in their work plans… Our tasks are 
assigned by the UNDP headquarter. But China is a UN member. Our office was 
set up to help the Chinese government to do things. This kind of approach is so-
called “one-to-one”: no matter what projects you want to conduct, you have to 
go through the central government and national health ministry. Unlike NGOs or 
foundations, we cannot really have [a] different voice from the Chinese 
government… 415 
Both UNDP and UNAIDS had to deal with organizational challenges facing most 
international organizations working in China. They are loaded with abstract missions 
along with limited budgets and bargaining power. Further, in addition to routine tasks, 
each office had to propose specific projects to solicit and secure grants and then allocate 
them. This operationalization process was crucial for their organizational input and 
output rate416 which was central to staff members’ concerns, as they constantly used 
those terms during my fieldwork and interviews.  
The WHO China Representative Office was successful because it was able to 
draw on its connections with various individual officials and departments not only at the 
central level, but also at local levels. Those connections were built through concrete 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
415 Interview 132 (International organization), July 15, 2013. 
416 By input, it mainly refers to net revenue. By output, it refers to their organizations’ mission-
driven impact across time.   
	   248	  
collaborative projects among medical professionals when WHO provided technical 
expertise as “products.”417 This approach not only consolidated WHO’s national impact 
in China’s AIDS institutions, but also strengthened the China Representative Office’s 
status in the whole WHO system.  
In contrast, the UNAIDS China Representative Office was struggling with its 
organizational identity in China. Its only routine contact with the central government 
was the Ministry of Health’s Division of International Cooperation that met the Office 
every three months. The Office’s work was largely limited to Beijing, as it had to go 
through the Division of International Cooperation to contact any official at the 
provincial or local level.418 One intern expressed his frustration: 
People here are like a heap of loose sand. Staff members rarely get together. 
They all have their own circles within the UN system. I don’t even know what 
UNAIDS actually does… Our representative is a politician. He is doing politics, 
not AIDS. He always beats around the bush. It takes hours to know what he 
actually means.419   
Another staff member had a more straightforward assessment: “Without the Global 
Fund, UNAIDS has no project to work on. People would just sit around doing 
nothing.”420  
My point here is not to undermine international organizations’ work in China, 
but to point out the institutional constraints they had to navigate. The Global Fund 
presented a collective project that was aligned with those international organizations’ 
internal goals; it thus provided a focal point for them to mobilize around in an effort to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
417 Field notes, July 12, 2009. 
418 Interview 13 (International organization), July 17, 2009. 
419 Field notes, June 11, 2009. 
420 Field notes, July 7, 2009. 
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increase their access to policy making and exert influence on AIDS governance in 
China.  
This reform had two major components: one was to remove the CCM Secretariat 
from the control of the Health Ministry, while the other was to build the institutional 
structure for the newly funded NWC and PLWHAWC inside the China CCM. The 
CCM Secretariat, which implements programs, convenes the CCM Plenary, runs day-
to-day tasks, and communicates between CCM members and the Global Fund Board, 
was under the control of the China CDC before 2007. The Director of the Office of 
International Cooperation, Qiang Zhengfu, doubled as the executive director of the 
Principal Recipient of China Global Fund Programs (hereafter, China PR) and the head 
of the CCM Secretariat. One UNAIDS staff explained the conflict: 
You know, the Secretariat is supposed to monitor the China CDC as the PR. But 
how can you do it when you are the one who implements programs as well as 
supervising programs at the same time? Meanwhile, since all the money was 
controlled by the PR, CCM did not get many resource. So CCM was too weak to 
have any impact. The problem is that CCM is where NGOs and PLWHA can 
actually participate in the operation of the Global Fund. Only through CCM they 
can tell the Global Fund what is going on in reality. So the Global Fund 
headquarter said that they wanted to strengthen CCM by empowering the 
Secretariat.421  
Headed by the U.S. Embassy, a special working group was formed in 2006 to separate 
the Secretariat from the China PR.422 The group achieved little progress, so the WHO 
China Office took over in 2007 and received a special grant of a total value of RMB 1, 
396, 329423 from the Global Fund to form an independent Secretariat separate from the 
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Secretariat,” March 20, 2009.  
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China PR.424 This was an unusual move since the Global Fund Board usually required 
different CCMs to utilize domestic resources to fund the Secretariat. Even though the 
grant was approved in August 2007, the special working group, comprised of members 
from the Ministry of Health, GONGOs, UNAIDS, WHO, and the UK Department for 
International Development, still could not come to an agreement for almost a year.425  
 Ultimately, it was decided to move the Secretariat office from the China CDC to 
the UNAIDS China Office and to hire staff members from outside the Ministry of 
Health. One staff member of the new Secretariat recalled the chaotic process: 
The old Secretariat was not organized at all. When I was interviewing for the 
job, there were many interviewers including several foreigners. Later, I got to 
know that one of them was chief country coordinator of UNAIDS who is the 
vice-president of China CCM. There were also persons from the Ministry of 
Health. I remember there was this government official who asked me one single 
question: when did you get your master’s? Three days later, the female staff of 
the Secretariat called me and asked me to attend the China CCM Plenary 
meeting. I was really confused so I asked her what it meant. She was like: you 
got the job! I actually had no idea what the Global Fund was at the time. Neither 
did anybody give me any training.426  
 
The new CCM Secretariat started work in May 2008 with a new executive secretary 
who had previously worked for the China office of the United States CDC, and another 
staff member who had just graduated from college. The China CDC immediately 
withdrew its resources, making it difficult for the Secretariat to carry out tasks, 
especially in its early stages. Again, a staff member described the struggles of basic 
operation at the beginning: 
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It was a total mess when we first started working. We had to do everything. I 
mean, literally everything. You know, the Ministry of Health is keeping our 
personnel files but it does not even give me a residence permit. We do not fit in 
their government system so they do not care. So the old Secretariat was part of 
government and all staffs were treated as officials. But nobody cares about us. 
Neither did anybody tell me what to do. We had to beg CDC for everything 
including our salary because the Global Fund only approved the grant without 
specifying how it should be allocated. CDC just wanted to hold on to it. In the 
end we actually lost some money because of the fluctuation of currency 
exchange rate. Back then we did not have anything. Nothing. Not a piece of 
furniture. When we moved to this new office space provided by UNAIDS, we 
had to get some desks and chairs from the UNAIDS conference room but those 
chairs were really uncomfortable. Eventually we bought some nice chairs and 
electronics. Nobody knew what to expect. For example, we bought a really 
small printer which cannot handle this much of work. This is what I am telling 
you: it was a complete chaos.427 
Despite this rocky start, as the new Secretariat settled into the office space next to the 
UNAIDS China Representative Office, the latter’s influence quickly increased and it 
fundamentally reshaped the Secretariat as an organization. Working with UNAIDS, the 
new Secretariat set out to standardize management procedures and clarify its 
responsibility and working mechanism with governments, international organizations, 
and grassroots NGOs. It did so by revising the “CCM Secretariat Working Mechanism,” 
drafting “CCM Secretariat Function and Management Rules,” and setting up a new 
filing system to record and distribute documents and information. Even though the 
Secretariat is not part of the UN, UNAIDS connected it with different administrative 
training workshops exclusively for UN employees and gave it access to other personal, 
technical, and financing assistance.428  
The Secretariat and UNAIDS recruited a sociologist from Beijing University as 
an independent consultant to review the structure and procedure of the China CCM. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
427 Field notes, July 4, 2009. 
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This review focused particularly on decision-making mechanisms and related power 
dynamics between Chinese government representatives and other CCM members. The 
Secretariat specifically provided a special grant for CCM members from grassroots 
NGOs and PLWHA communities to participate in the reviewing process. The 
evaluation report identified the domination of the central government and lack of 
supervision of the PR as major problems. However, recognizing the conflict of interest, 
the report prescribed an organizational solution for a political problem. For example, it 
noted that CCM members representing grassroots NGOs and PLWHA were excluded 
from substantial negotiation and decision-making processes, which were always 
conducted between powerful CCM members behind closed doors. The report pointedly 
summarized: 
The government is quite fully involved in China’s CCM. As a result, CCM 
members consider their short-term and long-term relations with government 
bodies over communication, information sharing and decision making. This may 
have a direct effect on the way members express their views and the choices 
they make. 
The report suggested that grassroots NGOs should “carry out capacity building and 
training, and also find ways of solving these issues, such as holding elections to select 
more capable personnel.” By capacity building, the report further specified that this 
referred to the “degree of formalization” of all the grassroots groups in NWC and 
PLWHAWC.429  
The report actually aligned well with the internal organizational development 
needs of UNAIDS. Starting in 2006, the UNAIDS China Representative Office adjusted 
its internal structure and shifted the focus of the work to five areas: (1) coordination 
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inside the UN team; (2) AIDS epidemic monitoring and evaluation; (3) publicity 
campaigns to raise consciousness; (4) civil society; and (5) human rights.430 While the 
first three were considered routine activities covered by the Office’s regular working 
budget, investing in building the capacity of NWC and PLWHAWC became the major 
theme of funding applications and project development under the category of advancing 
civil society and human rights.  
International organizations’ support for the suggestion to strengthen grassroots 
NGOs in order to promote multisectoralism in AIDS did not take place in isolation. 
Two important events in 2007 also contributed to the establishment of NGO capacity 
building as a central goal among Chinese AIDS activists. NWC and PLWHAWC 
members met with the task force on HIV/AIDS delegation of the Center for Strategic 
and International Studies (CSIS), a bipartisan foreign policy think tank based in 
Washington, D.C., in June 2007. This delegation produced a report, “China’s Civil 
Society Organizations: What Future in the Health Sector?,” that labeled Chinese 
grassroots NGOs as “low capacities” (19). This report noted how the Chinese state, by 
its nature, has “instinctive suspicion toward independent or pluralist societal influences” 
and claimed that the primary way to effect change would be to improve NGOs’ skills 
and turn them into “capable, respected and enduring entities that contribute in the health 
sector” (v). The report argued: 
[NGOs] can be seen as an asset and in some cases a necessity for the 
government to fill gaps in social service provision. They can be effective in 
delivering health care services to marginalized groups that Chinese health 
authorities find difficult to reach. According to this scenario, over time, even 
without any clear national policy guidance or decisions, many scattered, largely 
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local decisions will enlarge the space for civil organizations that are competent, 
entrepreneurial, and politically savvy.431 
This meeting was the first time that most NWC and PLWHAWC members, many of 
whom did not speak English, were exposed to international actors. Describing CSIS as 
the “top American think tank,” NWC and PLWHAWC were very proud of their 
contribution to the final report.432  
Following the meeting, the International Republican Institute (IRI) sponsored 
some NWC and PLWHAWC members to visit 24 government departments and NGOs 
in Washington, D.C. and New York. This 14-day trip in the United States was provided 
as a training process for capacity building; the visitors were introduced to professional 
American NGOs that could serve as examples in terms of both their internal 
organizational development as well as their relationships with the government. NWC 
and PLWHAWC produced a report describing the trip that was widely circulated among 
AIDS activists. In the report’s conclusion, the authors reflected:   
Through observing American NGOs, we have some final thoughts. Chinese 
AIDS NGOs have made rapid progress and had some success. But compared to 
our American counterparts, we still have a long way to go. We shall improve our 
capacities, strengthen internal organizational building and increase collaboration 
in order to grow stronger NGOs.433   
One PLWHAWC member, who used to be a leader of local protests of infected 
peasants, told me how this trip illustrated to him the importance of replacing direct 
action with organizational development: 
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432 China CCM NGO Working Committee, “Annual Report 2007,” 2008. 
433 China CCM NGO Working Committee and PLWHA Working Committee, “A Report of the 
China CCM NWC and PLWHAWC Delegation to the United States,” 2008. 
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I used to organize hundreds of people to fight the local government in public. 
But that was in the past. We must change. I have said it many times: Why do we 
infected peasants have to conduct petition on our own? Why cannot we mobilize 
other people to do it? For example, there are many retired government officials. 
If we can work on their sympathy, they can persuade the government to change. 
You know, I visited a student organization in the U.S..434 That student 
organization can mobilize different organizations to write to the government and 
change some law. Why cannot we do that? ...We should have a long-term plan. 
We should grow our own organizations and interact with other organizations in 
order to solve problems through institutional channels. It can minimize our risks. 
Why do we have to stand on the front line? ...My dream is that every grassroots 
group can change, get funding, and get formal recognition. …If we all become 
respected formal organizations, we can talk to the government on an equal 
footing. …To survive, your group has to have formal rules and regulations, 
management structure, financial and working rules. That is how you can get 
funding. Without funding, how can you conduct activities? How can you help 
other patients?435  
NWC and PLWHAWC mainly focused on formulating internal management structure 
and operation rules related to financial management, activity management, file 
management, work planning and implementation management and communication 
management. In fact, centering on NWC and PLWHAWC, the formalization of 
grassroots AIDS NGOs became the main focus of various institutional entrepreneurs’ 
efforts to realize multisectoralism in China. 
 
ii. The Political Economy of AIDS Intervention 
 
AIDS intervention programs’ design and implementation is the other channel 
through which the Global Fund influences domestic AIDS institutions. As demonstrated 
in Chapter 2, by 2007, AIDS as an independent policy domain was already established 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
434 The interviewee could not remember the name of the university, but he showed me a picture 
that I was able to identify as Georgetown University.  
435 Interview 41 (Activist), June 15, 2012.  
	   256	  
in China with a core group of government agencies with an interest in AIDS 
governance. But, as discussed in Chapter 5, the Chinese central government sought to 
maintain strict control of the issue. The state strove to develop centralized and top-down 
“comprehensive” AIDS governance in opposition to the model promoted by 
transnational AIDS institutions. All the officials I interviewed voiced the same 
evaluation of the Global Fund’s efforts to shape the development of the AIDS 
infrastructure in China. As one official put it, “The Global Fund definitely had political 
motives, you know, related to democracy and human rights. But our government is 
smart. I think it is successful in taking measures to limit the use of those grants to purely 
health areas.”436 Another official at the central level stated that “the central government 
strove to integrate the Global Fund into its own system as China has its own actual 
conditions,” so the Global Fund must be limited to “supporting and assisting roles.”437  
However, the application of the Global Fund generated unexpected 
consequences and caused a shift towards a project-based system. From 2007 onward, 
the institutional order of AIDS governance in China became increasingly state-centric 
and project-oriented. The former refers to how AIDS governance continued to work as 
a centrally planned and regulated system. The work of local public health systems was 
conducted according to the state’s direction. One official expressed her frustration with 
the gap between the working tasks assigned by the Ministry of Health and local 
epidemic conditions in reality:  
We are so overloaded with targets and tasks from above. The mandatory tasks 
assigned by the state are random. And the state never listens to what we have to 
say. Whatever indicators they come up with, you have to make it happen. It is 
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like the Great Leap Forward.438 Everything has to reach 90% or 100%, like 
prevention coverage for 100% of the prostitute population. How is it even 
possible? But you have no choice. Every year the China CDC ranks the 
performance of local CDCs based on how you fulfill the quota. So different 
CDCs just make up numbers. I can give you 100% when you want 90%. So 
honest people who take their work seriously definitely suffer.439  
The system also became more project-oriented, with AIDS intervention programs 
increasingly constituted of projects, each of which had its own independent target 
setting, budgeting and planning, fiduciary control, programme management 
imperatives, financial reporting and allocation, monitoring and verification.  
 It was the Global Fund that developed this results-based performance 
framework, which micro-manages the implementation of every specific activity. For 
example, one final report for every project is not enough. Every step throughout the 
whole process must be recorded with substantial evidence. Even with a working 
meeting, all the materials from the meeting announcement, received responses, 
registration form, to the final meeting minute, must be saved and translated in both 
Chinese and English. Approved grants are only disbursed upon prior performance and 
achievement of targets. In other words, grants would be withheld if targets are not met, 
regardless of the cause. In this system, even a small performance setback in one project 
can disrupt the financial flow of the whole program. And “performance” is narrowly 
defined in quantitative terms with a focus on meeting numerical targets. This project-
oriented system is a drastic departure from the former socialist contagious disease 
model that mostly relied on local systems to handle disbursement, compliance, and 
reporting with a relatively high degree of freedom.  
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The Global Fund thus played a central role in expanding and intensifying the 
bureaucratization of China’s system of AIDS control and prevention. As mentioned in 
Chapter 2, public health in China mainly depends on local financial revenues, while the 
CDC as a technical support organization has very limited financial resources. Serving as 
the PR for the Global Fund, however, granted the whole CDC system the stable 
financial resources needed to conduct project-based work, even without a governmental 
budget. In fact, at least 30% of the grants were applied to office management and 
operation instead of direct intervention activities. The Global Fund has thus had a 
significant impact on the organizational, programmatic, and especially managerial 
operation of CDCs. One official who has worked for both governments and 
international organizations remarked on how the Global Fund has improved 
bureaucratic professionalism: 
The Global Fund improved the whole AIDS intervention especially at the local 
level. Through conducting those projects, public health agencies gradually 
learned how to conduct work. Now the work of the whole CDC system is 
carried out as projects. The Global Fund provided training sessions, workshops 
and study tours so public health departments studied basics like how to figure 
out where high-risk groups are, what their intervention strategies are, how to 
make work plans, how to invest, how to make the targets, and how to write 
reports. The previous capacity of public health personnel is nothing in 
comparison of current situation.440  
 The Global Fund later “set up the standard of AIDS intervention.”441 At the 
central level, the State Council AIDS Working Committee Office, as the head of AIDS 
policy making, added a new Office of Planning and Monitoring based on the Global 
Fund model. At the local level, public health officials mainly adopted a set of 
intervention practices from the Global Fund: (1) policy advocacy and development of 
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strategic planning; (2) organizational and personal capacity building; (3) public 
information, education, and communication (IEC); (4) multisectoral cooperation and 
participation with NGO participation and community mobilization; (5) interventions 
with different target groups; (6) care and support for PLWHA; and (7) monitoring and 
evaluation and dissemination and replication. It is worth emphasizing that, even though 
they necessarily reflected what various CDC agencies were doing, these terms also 
became the (only) legitimate key words around which public health officers could 
organize their work plans.   
Among all seven major areas of AIDS intervention, areas (4) to (6) in particular 
carve an institutional space that requires public health officials to include grassroots 
NGOs in AIDS programs. However, this does not mean that grassroots NGOs have the 
ability to decide how they will participate, as the intervention areas are defined in terms 
of very specific procedures and practices. For example, the fifth area, “interventions 
with different target groups,” is divided into two categories: testing and behavioral 
intervention, while the sixth area, “care and support for PLWHA,” refers to the 
management of patients. For public health agencies, those categories are associated with 
drastically different organizational interests, something that had a detrimental effect on 
the relationships between different grassroots NGOs and the government.  
The primary focus of the Global Fund programs in China shifted from treatment 
(2003–2006), to behavioral intervention (2006–2008), to testing (2008–2013). 
Treatment is a complicated system composed of drug distribution, drug adherence 
enhancement, peer psychological support, regular CD4 test and viral load test, and 
opportunistic infections treatment. The CDC is in charge of the first four tasks while 
	   260	  
designated hospitals442 are responsible for the last one. All of the CDC officials with 
whom I spoke, especially those on the local level, complained that they were 
overloaded with patients. Not only was managing patients time-consuming and 
cumbersome, most treatment projects did not cover the human cost of CDC staff 
members such as their salaries. Local CDC agencies as organizations thus could not 
benefit from providing treatment. One official illustrated the grim contradiction 
between the interests of patients versus the interests of the CDC:  
The pressure is accumulating as patients live longer. The longer they live, the 
more people we have to deal with. Then your funding strains increase. Yes, we 
do have more funding to provide medicine. But treating AIDS is not that simple. 
You have to think about the operation cost. How do you distribute medicine to 
every patient? You need hands. Previously one public health workers served 10 
patients. Now one worker has to serve 50. You cannot just give them medicine. 
You also have to do testing, give patients training as well as other supportive 
services. None of those is included in the projects. So we are mostly short of 
human resources and funds in treatment.443  
In some extreme cases, local CDCs would give patients false testing results without 
actually conducting the testing in order to save money.444 
In contrast, behavioral intervention and testing can help CDCs to achieve their 
goals and complete their tasks in a fast and profitable way. Behavioral intervention aims 
at behavioral change, while testing aims at discovering HIV positive cases. The 
challenges of behavioral intervention depend on different target groups. Currently 
CDCs mostly focus on three target groups: intravenous drug users (IDUs), female sex 
workers, and gay men. While IDUs are considered a special group, health education and 
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443 Interview 24 (Government), July 21, 2013. 
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condom distribution remain the most prevalent intervention forms for female sex 
workers and gay men. CDCs can get money for every intervention they conduct, 
whether sending out one pamphlet or one condom. Testing is an even quicker way to 
gain high profits. One official was very critical of current testing practice, as he 
elaborated:  
What is testing? Testing should be voluntary counseling and testing. You know 
VCT, right? You provide people the opportunity to know their HIV status with 
quality counseling support to help them cope with the result. But in China, 
conducting VCT equates building a brand new building with a bunch of doctors 
sitting around, waiting for patients to show up. And then people who actually 
come for service would be judged by those doctors who don’t really give any 
post-testing service. This is why I am so against it. It is simply a way for CDC to 
spend money on more service space.445  
However, projects related to testing are arranged in such a way that CDCs can get about 
RMB 100-150 for each person they test. There is another RMB 500 for every HIV 
positive case they find. Meanwhile, by testing and locating HIV positive cases, CDCs 
establish their surveillance data set. One official was proud to claim, “Testing only 
requires a little investment. But if you need any data, you have to come to me. …No 
matter what you do, you need data to support your intervention.”446 Yet, he went on to 
admit:  
Since this is an anonymous interview, I can tell you the truth. The surveillance 
data I am collecting does not reflect reality. The computers in CDCs are 
processing false data based on which intervention work is conducted. Just 
imagine, what is going to happen in the future?  
          In summary, the Global Fund reshaped domestic AIDS governance in China, 
resulting in more project-oriented and state-centric institutions that define 
multisectoralism in terms of grassroots’ capacity building. The rest of this chapter 
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examines how these institutional characteristics have shaped state repression in AIDS 
areas and, thus, the actorhood of AIDS activism in three communities: female sex 
workers, gay men, and peasants infected through blood.   
 
II. The Expansion and Fragmentation of AIDS Activist Actorhood 
 
Multisectoralism was firmly established in AIDS governance between 2007 and 
2012. Such a shift in institutional logics limited the Chinese state’s ability to simply 
suppress or exclude grassroots NGOs. This section examines how this process had a 
paradoxical impact on AIDS activism. On one hand, the transformation of domestic 
AIDS institutions consolidated the legitimacy of civil society participation, which 
enabled AIDS activism to grow within the otherwise repressive environment by 
adopting the organizational form of AIDS advocacy NGOs. This explains the surge in 
the number of grassroots NGOs. On the other hand, transnational AIDS institutions 
authorized only a very particular, formal model of NGOs that required grassroots NGOs 
to focus on internal structural formalization and outside network development in order 
to become “partners” of the state and gain access to institutional power. As NGO 
capacity building took over and became the guiding rule, this NGO expansion project 
empowered some groups, but marginalized others. This section explains the rise to 
prominence of gay male groups in urban areas, and the simultaneous decline of activism 
among female sex worker groups and peasants who were infected via contaminated 
blood.  
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i. Gay Men in Urban Areas 
 
The community that benefited the most from the development of multisectoral 
AIDS governance was gay men in urban areas. Grassroots groups organized by gay men 
and gay women started to rise in large cosmopolitan areas in the early 2000s. The early 
diffusion of AIDS NGOs, as demonstrated in Chapter 5, supplied fuel to gay men’s 
groups. However, it was not until 2007 when project-oriented AIDS governance 
became the norm that there was a rapid expansion of AIDS NGOs organized by gay 
men. As discussed in Chapter 3, gay women participated in AIDS activism in the 1990s 
and started to organize in the same time period, but their organizing remained stagnant 
for almost ten years. As one lesbian activist put, “It has nothing to do with the disease 
itself. China’s gay men movement only took off because of AIDS. It was AIDS that 
brought out the issue of homosexuality. With so much money spent on gay men’s 
organizations, of course they enjoy sound development. But look at us, there are no 
more than 10 organizations of gay women nowadays.”447  
Gay men’s organizations mainly adopted what I call an “antagonistic symbiosis” 
strategy. Gay men’s organizations framed themselves as service providers to meet the 
administrative needs of local public health departments to carry out AIDS programs. 
Because local governments lack infrastructural power, they find grassroots 
organizations helpful to achieve their annual quota in AIDS intervention assigned by the 
central state. By collaborating with local state actors, gay men’s organizations were able 
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not only to gain asylum within the existing polity, but also to seek new benefits and 
policy change by targeting local health departments.  
This antagonistic symbiosis strategy emerged in late 2006 when AIDS activists 
noted local CDCs’ effort to conduct behavioral intervention among gay men, despite 
public health officials’ lack of necessary expertise and human resources. In the summer 
of 2007, four grassroots groups of gay men in Beijing that were searching for new 
programs met for a planning meeting. One leader outlined the situation:  
The Beijing CDC does not want to collaborate. You know, they are still 
following their old approach and trying to do everything on their own. But there 
are projects they cannot do like among gays. Some CDC officials actually want 
to do something rather than paying lip service so they do need us. …The Global 
Fund is not about money. It actually opened a project space at least at the 
discourse level. So we can just do projects. In the past, the Beijing CDC can just 
put money in its labs and claim whatever results they can get. Now with the 
Global Fund, [the] CDC has to adjust to a totally different set of language. 
Those officials would have to talk about how many outreaches and how many 
interventions are done. That is why they are trying to set up their own NGOs. 
This means now we have new space. And this space is related to political space: 
By participating in CDC projects, we can develop some connections with 
cops.448 
The groups decided to reach out to the regional CDC and offer to help CDC officials 
circulate education materials among gay men. In return, they wanted no credit for the 
work, but rather an affiliation with the regional CDC.  
There was certainly reason to believe that such an offer of assistance would 
eventually be accepted. According to the estimates of AIDS activists, for example, the 
Ministry of Health was only successfully distributing about 60,000 condoms per year 
throughout the country by 2007. In contrast, the Beijing Aizhixing Institute alone 
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disseminated between 200,000 to 300,000 condoms in just Beijing in 2006.449 The state 
bureaucracy did not have adequate means to develop prevention activities, let alone 
even locate gay communities. As one CDC official conceded, “We need grassroots 
groups because the nature of AIDS intervention among gay men is special.”450 He 
elaborated:  
Last time we were talking to a foreign expert about a funding application and he 
refused to put it in for us because [he said] there is no way you can do a project 
among gay men without gay men’s participation. But nobody in the bureau 
admits he is a gay. Now with so much money available for behavioral 
intervention among gay men, how can you pass out such a good opportunity? So 
the health bureau has to rely on outsiders.451  
 
Thus, ironically, homophobia and fear within the state bureaucracy created an 
opportunity for the increased participation of gay men’s organizations in formal AIDS 
intervention efforts.  
The diffusion process described in Chapter 5 generated several clusters of AIDS 
NGOs of gay men in cities such as Beijing, Xi’an, Chengdu, Shenyang, and Dalian. 
These NGOs disseminated the antagonistic symbiosis strategy, especially when Wan 
Yanhai and Zhang Beichuan, two of the most influential figures in gay communities in 
those areas, both supported the approach. The strategy actually has two components. 
The first involves enhancing the NGO’s skills by conducting AIDS intervention work 
and developing formal management structures; the second entails setting up working 
relationships with other formal organizations, including international organizations and 
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local public health departments. Both arms of the strategy serve to formalize gay 
organizations.  
Several gay organizations were highly successful in combining the antagonistic 
symbiosis strategy with identity politics by taking advantage of the fact that the state 
discourse and attitude regarding homosexuality was rife with contradictions—on the 
one hand demonizing it, on the other hand dismissing it. Public health departments 
continue to have severe prejudice against homosexuality. One former official explained 
why he left the CDC:   
Of course it is not allowed. Even a divorce is a big deal in the government, not 
to speak of tongzhi. I remember when a female colleague found out I am a 
tongzhi, she totally freaked out and went on and on about how I won’t be able to 
find a women to get married and my life would be ruined. There is certainly 
discrimination in CDC. Officers don’t even share restrooms with tongzhi. 
Tongzhi who go there for HIV testing have to use the restroom downstairs. 
Nobody in CDC even knows how to speak to tongzhi. You can tell how 
uncomfortable those public health professionals are uncomfortable when they 
conduct prevention intervention.452 
At the same time, homosexuality was continuously associated with promiscuous 
sexuality and perceived as a non-political issue. In fact, central government officials 
usually forgot about gay men during interviews. One official stated, “homosexuals are 
not dangerous. As long as the homosexuality is seen as deviation by the society, this 
group would not become a political threat to the state.”453 Accordingly, local public 
health departments were willing to turn a blind eye to and even facilitate gay 
organizations’ activities around identity politics as long as those organizations 
contributed to the departments’ AIDS programs.  
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For their part, gay organizations utilized the opportunity to assist the 
government’s efforts to also conduct their own outreach work and promote positive 
identity and community among gay men. As the leader of one gay organization 
described it:  
AIDS is only a small part of tongzhi communities. We are only doing health 
education and intervention stuff because they are what CDCs want. They want 
data. So we would conduct survey and collect information for them. But for me, 
what matters is not how this interviewee answers questions. What is more 
important is that this tongzhi and I could have a conversation after the interview. 
We can chat. He can unload some of his anguish and pressure. And he can also 
come to us in the future when he needs somebody to talk to about coming out, 
family, workplace, and so on. So this kind of work related to self-identification 
is actually what I want to do. You cannot be happy without a self-identity, right? 
We also have a magazine focusing on a higher level. You know, so we can have 
some culture related influences. Therefore we believe our work should have 
these two aspects. One is health stuff. The other is about tongzhi’s life quality.454 
There was an upsurge in public publications and cultural events for gay men in 2007. 
Gay magazines had always been a taboo because they were classified as pornographic 
materials. But now gay men were able to produce and circulate their own publications 
simply by including a few health-related articles. Cultural events also gained new 
momentum after taking several hard hits from police departments in the early 2000s. 
For example, I assisted in the organization of the largest singing competition of gay 
men in 2007. The planning and preparatory process was very stressful as gay activists 
feared potential police intervention. The day before the event, one activist told me:  
We heard a lot of rumors. Not sure if the event will be shut down. You know, 
we are talking about several hundred people in the same space. The police might 
charge us with unlawful assembly or even worse, something like Falun Gong. 
Sometimes policemen just sit there and watch you. Gay men are afraid of 
exposing already. Who can stand that? …If that happens, we are going to ask the 
regional health department to talk to the police. We are getting ready for that.455  
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In the end, the event was a success and activists happily announced to me, “Solidarity is 
strength! As long as we can get tongzhi together, we can conquer everything.”456 Other 
activists even described their AIDS outreach activities as “nothing more than a 
gathering so tongzhi can chat and get to know each other.”457  
The expansion of AIDS NGOs among gay men in urban areas gradually moved 
into high gear between 2008 and 2010, with the whole activist community concentrated 
on capacity building. One NGO leader described it as the “development of 
organizations toward the standardization of management and service.”458 His NGO had 
to participate in training—from organizational development, financial management and 
project management, to outreach techniques—up to four times a month. In the early 
stages of this rapid growth, many AIDS activists were, indeed, concerned about the 
power imbalance between the government and grassroots gay organizations and the 
possible danger that the existing polity would absorb those organizations, separate them 
from communities, and turn them into puppets. One activist stated, “It is a good thing to 
have money. A mere trickle of resources would have been much more helpful when our 
organizations are young and fragile. You know, we need to grow on our own. But the 
Global Fund comes like a flood and sweeps past the whole community. It is only going 
to destroy us.”459 
Unfortunately, such fears were quickly realized when testing became the 
dominant focus of AIDS programs in 2008. Compared to behavioral intervention, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
456 Field notes, July 9, 2007. 
457 Field notes, July 13, 2007. 
458 Interview 42 (Activist), July 26, 2013.  
459 Interview 11 (Activist), August 12, 2009.  
	   269	  
testing programs came with standard procedures that gave NGOs very little space to 
insert activities of their own. The coverage of AIDS programs rapidly expanded to more 
urban areas, which promoted the formation of gay organizations in those middle and 
small cities. However, the role of gay organizations was limited to mobilizing gay men 
to sell their blood samples to local CDCs.460 A typical procedure began to emerge: 
NGOs would set up an office where gay men could visit, fill out personal information, 
have their blood drawn, and then answer a few questions; a visit would usually take no 
more than 5 minutes. In 2007, a gay man could get 50 RMB for one blood sample. This 
price went up to 150 RMB in 2012. No consultation was provided since the amount of 
money NGOs can get depends on how many samples—especially positive samples—
they can collect. Most of the gay men who came in for this testing were only motivated 
by the cash incentive, though one volunteer complained about not being able to engage 
more with participants, as “many gay men want to talk and want friends.”461  
The expansion of gay organizations became a process through which grassroots 
NGOS became part of a top-down instrumental system that increasingly depoliticized 
AIDS, focusing instead on its efficient administration. Gay organizations essentially, 
albeit inadvertently, helped to turn gay male communities into objects of AIDS 
governance, and served as a bridge integrating them into the AIDS administrative 
system and subjecting them to prejudiced bureaucratic regulation. One gay female 
activist blamed gay men’s organizations for contributing to the stigmatization of the 
entire gay community: 
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For a very long time homosexuality was a taboo in China. We just pretended it 
did not exist. Then here came AIDS. Now AIDS became the trademark of gays. 
No matter you are male or female, you are associated with AIDS as long as you 
are a gay.462 
Offered cash incentives to get tested for HIV/AIDS on the one hand, gays are, at the 
same time, banned from blood donation.463 All the public health professionals whom I 
interviewed categorically described gay men as a high-risk group or target group. One 
official claimed that the government should invest in treatment instead of prevention 
because “we did try to work on increasing the use of condoms and decreasing the 
number of sexual partners but it is almost impossible to change their behaviors. Gay 
men would continue to practice unsafe sex.”464 
Through this process, gay organizations have become, for better or worse, model 
NGOs within the Global Fund system, yet they have also been defanged, so to speak, 
and regulated according to protocols that have little connection to their local contexts. 
Even though the Fund emphasizes human rights, this abstract framework was developed 
outside China with a particular concept of diseases, solutions, and politics, resulting in 
“politicization without the people” (Mowjee 2003; Reich et al. 2008; Seckinelgin 2002). 
An NGO leader describes what counts as a “good” NGO: 
You have to have excellent project proposals with specific target groups and 
clear intervention procedures. You need to have something new in your 
proposal. But you cannot go too creative because there are only that many in the 
application guidelines. At the same time, your organization needs to be 
recognizable: this is very important. You want everybody to know you in this 
circle.465  
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At the same time, he said that foreign experts “don’t really understand what Chinese 
gay men think and [their] behavior. Just look at the funding application guideline. There 
are lots of requirements or expectations that do not fit in the sexual behavior patterns of 
gay men here.”466 Other interviewees expressed similar concerns with how the Global 
Fund program’s focus on condom and testing does not actually address gay men’s 
vulnerability and powerlessness in their local contexts where the disease grows and 
spreads.  
In summary, between 2007 and 2012, gay organizations were turned into a 
disposable tool of the state to not only build AIDS governance, but also to maintain a 
relatively superficial façade of civil society participation. While the antagonistic 
symbiosis strategy generated an organizational boom, it also exposed gay male 
communities to economic corruption and political cooptation by the state.  
 
ii. Female Sex Workers 
 
NGOs working with female sex workers did not come into being until 2007 
when the large incubators of grassroots NGOs discussed in Chapter 5 attempted to 
promote NGO-building in the commercial sex industry. AIDS activists intended to copy 
the model of antagonistic symbiosis strategy from male gay communities. However, the 
state had already established an infrastructure governing female sex workers long 
before the AIDS movement even started. The intervention of transnational institutions 
in the early 2000s did not actually challenge the authority of the Ministry of Health in 
this area. The Chinese state was thus able to maintain a state-centric and top-down 
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AIDS governance structure over the heterosexual sex industry and exclude other non-
state actors from participating in AIDS control. As a result, the efforts of female sex 
workers to employ an antagonistic symbiosis strategy eventually failed. 
The socialist contagious disease control model has persisted in AIDS control 
among female sex workers. When the central government first started to build AIDS 
governance infrastructure, female sex workers was one of the first target 
subpopulations. Not only did public health officials continue to refer to female sex 
workers as “underground prostitutes” (an chang), but AIDS programs in this area 
remained resistant to international norms and practices and continued to ascribe the 
problem to infected women’s individual immoral conduct and to promote segregation as 
the solution. 
AIDS intervention among female sex workers is conducted in two ways. One is 
mandatory testing in detention facilities. Sex work in China is illegal, punished by fines 
and short periods of police detention rather than criminal penalties. The administrative 
punishment system against sex work—constituted by the “Public Security 
Administrative Punishment Law” (Zhi’an Guanli Chufafa)467 and the “Decision on 
Strict Prohibition Against Prostitution and Whoring” (Guanyu Yanjin Maiyin 
Piaochang de Jueding)468—is rather ambiguous and arbitrary. The law allows for “an 
educational coercive administrative measure” of six months to two years of detention in 
a Custody and Education (Shourong Jaioyu) facility.469 Sex workers who are caught by 
the police are forced to go through STD/AIDS tests. Positive testing results are used as 
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evidence of more severe prostitution and the infected sex worker is sent to the Custody 
and Education facility.470  
The other major approach is for CDC staff members to distribute condoms at all 
places of public entertainment. The Ministry of Health has specific high performance 
objectives for local CDC departments to promote condom use at appointed places. The 
locations are chosen by business owners and CDC departments without any 
epidemiological foundations. As one official admitted, “the option is kinda random… 
You know, it is not very scientific.” The official further elaborated on the difficulties of  
implementing these programs:  
The goal set by the state is not realistic. The state just wants 100 percent condom 
use to be implemented all at once… The programs we are conducting now are 
not effective at all. It would be impossible to achieve those goals without lying. 
Relying on CDCs to distribute condoms does not work. I think we medical 
workers should do stuff like surveillance or research. Direct intervention should 
be carried out by grassroots groups. In my opinions, we should allow 
underground prostitutes to organize just like gay men…471 
Unfortunately, AIDS intervention is subordinate to the state’s goal of regulating the sex 
industry. As one official explained, “cracking down on prostitution is a central national 
policy aim. AIDS intervention cannot hinder it.”472 Therefore, public health departments 
and police forces divide the work: the latter is the one really in charge of administrating 
the commercial sex industry, while the former conducts facilitating activities by 
conducting work in only certain areas in the overlapping areas between service industry 
and sex industry.  
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 The population theoretically targeted by public health officials, “underground 
prostitutes,”  refers to “adult women who engage in sex work on the streets, in public 
places such as parks, and in small brothels that masquerade as massage parlors and hair 
salons.”473 This female sex worker subpopulation is at high risk of HIV/AIDS 
infections. Their education level is very low, ranging from illiteracy to senior high 
education.474 The average income is around 2000 to 20,000 RMB (about 350 to 3,300 
USD) a month.475 In reality, however, public health departments actually monitor a 
totally different community. One official described how the category of female sex 
workers was established in public health: 
Back then we only knew underground prostitutes were high-risk groups. But 
what were underground prostitutes? Nobody actually knew. So we just set up 
surveillance system in public entertainment places like restaurants and clubs. 
Are there lots of girls who make money off their beauty there? Yes. But many of 
them are only waitresses who are trying to flirt to sell more food and drinks… 
All these years we have not really targeted at real underground prostitutes 
because it is way too difficult. You know, we have to meet our work quota 
assigned by the state.476 
Other officials also pointed out that “nobody cares about female sex workers in CDC. 
Even the CDC director asked his students not to study AIDS intervention focusing on 
female sex workers because the state does not care. You know, the director himself was 
one of the first who started working with female sex workers after graduating from the 
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University of California at Los Angeles. He could have been promoted much 
quickly.”477 
Grassroots groups working with female sex workers were shoveled into a formal 
NGO model before they even had a chance to develop their own goals. Formalization in 
this instance became a process to turn those groups into instruments utilized by various 
actors with their own agendas. In contrast to gay male communities which were able to 
establish their own bargaining power, the NGOs of female sex workers were far more 
marginal and disposable. The Angels with Broken Wings group (hereafter, ABW), the 
largest grassroots NGO in this area, serves as one example. The group was founded 
with the support of Aizhixing in 2008. FXF, a female activist who previously worked as 
a sex worker and pimp, was one of its primary founders. She recalled how they were 
showered with resources at the beginning: 
There were lots of foreign projects sponsored by some American or Pacific 
organizations? I cannot tell what exactly they were. But we had money back 
then. At the time we also had support from UNAIDS. For three years, we had a 
center. That was a two-bedroom apartment just for sex workers (Xiao Jie). They 
can come to get condoms and take a break. You know, like a safe space for 
them.478 
FXF’s original intention was just to get other female sex workers whom she considered 
her “sisters” free high-quality condoms and basic health information to avoid STDs.  
Aizhixing Institute served as an incubator for ABW and helped it to establish a whole 
set of standardized internal organizational structure and activities. As FXF recalled: 
You know, a project manager at Aizhixing wrote some constitution and mission 
stuff for us. She said that we must have one to become a real organization. (Q: 
Are they simply window dressing?) No, absolutely not. With a constitution, it is 
easier to apply for projects. You know, your group would look professional… I 
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did not apply for projects myself. Aizhixing would get money for us. All I 
needed to do was to find a target group and recruit some volunteers. With less 
schooling, I did not really know how to write a proposal.   
When Aizhixing met with difficulty in 2010, FXF was forced by the security 
department to suspend her work and leave the organization. The Chinese Association of 
STD/AIDS Prevention and Control then met with FXF and promised to support her 
work. Unaware of the association’s agenda, FXF was thrilled with the offer of help at 
first, but she soon realized the difference:  
In the past, we mainly focused on gynecological check-ups and treatment. We 
also provided legal aid, capacity building, and so on. I would talk to my sisters 
about their legal rights. For example, how to deal with unreasonable customers 
and so on. But now there is not much health education. All we are doing is to 
take blood from girls. I think I am being cruel. But I have to meet the project 
quota… All they want is blood. CDCs don’t provide anything else, like some 
care, something that warms my sisters’ heart.  
The leader of another organization, Fireflies, echoed FXF’s story.479 Both of them 
expressed their frustrations not only with the government, but also with gay male 
NGOs. In fact, as the leader of one NGO working with male sex workers described, “it 
is far more easier to frame yourself as a gay organization rather than a sex worker 
organization. Why? More money, more respect, and less trouble.”480  
Although activists working with female sex workers intended to form formal 
organizations to provide services to the health department—thus, mimicking the 
antagonistic symbiosis strategy used so effectively by gay men’s organizations, the 
strategy did not succeed in this case because the government already had a well-
established infrastructure of control in the heterosexual sex industry and was able to 
maintain this control without any assistance from grassroots organizations. Meanwhile, 
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the strategy of formal organizing actually put female sex worker groups in a 
disadvantaged position with less bargaining power and greater restrictions. 
 
iii. Peasants Infected through Contaminated Blood 
 
Unlike gay communities where a consensus about how to engage with the state 
emerged relatively quickly, there was more contestation among rural activists infected 
via blood contamination regarding the model of AIDS advocacy NGOs promoted by 
transnational institutions. Tensions culminated in the controversy over the formalization 
of the Aizhixing Institute. Wan Yanhai, the primary initiator and one of the co-founders 
of Aizhixing, was heavily influenced by the American advocacy AIDS NGO model.481 
He was a strong believer in professional advocacy organizations, and was convinced 
that formalized organizations could persist in an authoritarian environment full of 
threats and uncertainties (Staggenborg 1991). Wan was committed to making fixed and 
written regulative rules, and having Aizhixing interact with relevant actors in the field 
as an advocacy organization. For example, he criticized another co-founder for being 
too emotional and detailed when the latter gave a speech to NGOs and medical 
professionals in the U.S.482 He also discharged Hu Jia from the position of executive 
director because Hu blamed the central government in front of some organizations in 
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the U.S.483 Wan argued that the activities of an organization leader should not be 
conducted in a personal and emotional way.  
Wan’s views and actions put him in sharp opposition with other activists who 
held a traditional Chinese view of voluntary association (jieshe). According to this 
understanding, activists are bound by personal connections and moral values, rather 
than supervision and standardization. Some members of Aizhixing were apprehensive 
about the shift of focus to macro policy advocacy and AIDS NGO promotion, and 
feared losing direct contact with local communities.484 Many activists initiated other 
types of organizations. For example, Hu Jia, Zeng Jinyan, and Cheng Xiangyang 
established the Loving Source Education Institute and argued that urban activists should 
participate directly in local care and conflicts with local governments.485 Li Dan likewise 
set up the Dongzhen AIDS Orphan Project in Henan villages to provide education and 
shelter for orphans. Even as the remaining advisory board and members accepted a 
generalized and abstract concept of AIDS advocacy organizations, they could not reach 
a consensus on the practical implications of the western model and its organizational 
forms, such as issues related to training, volunteer networks, monitoring, and 
evaluation. Conflicts between the supporters and opponents of AIDS advocacy NGOs 
as an organizing model were left unresolved as activists disagreed over the specific 
roles and activities of NGOs in serving various goals.  
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It was the campaign around the Global Fund CCM in 2006 and 2007 that settled 
this conflict and transformed the issue of NGO organizing into a normative goal for 
rural activists. Similar to their counterparts in gay communities, the formalization of 
AIDS NGOs of infected peasants was promoted by the Global Fund, which aimed to 
standardize their internal organizational structure and activities and cultivate external 
working relationships with international actors and local governments. An initial  
organizational boom began to taper off in 2007, however, when it became clear that 
rural activists could not adopt this new form of actorhood. 
The Global Fund’s programs for PLWHA are mostly composed of drug 
adherence enhancement and peer psychological support. AIDS NGOs for PLWHA were  
formed with these two primary types of projects in mind. One rural activist described 
how their projects operated: 
You know, you had to decide how many infected people you want to visit in 
your proposal. Then we used the money to buy some gifts for each family and 
then we just chatted. You know, things about health, medicine, policy, etc. We 
usually asked patients how they were doing, how they reacted to their medicine, 
and if they were having other trouble. You know, they don’t know anything 
about opportunistic infections. We always asked them to adhere to the medicine 
on time and told them what kinds of side effects it had.  Then we asked them 
about their family members, children, and so on. We would tell them where they 
can get their CD4 tests done and whom they should talk to at the county CDC. 
We would also tell them about the minimum living allowance, tuition waiver 
and other policies. Rural patients are usually not aware of that policy stuff. So 
we would tell them how they could talk to the governmental officials in the 
county and village and what kinds of benefits they should fight for.486 
 
Between 2004 and 2007, as demonstrated in Chapter 5, forming AIDS NGOs served as 
a major driving force in mobilizing PLWHA. All the interviewees who started to 
participate in AIDS activism before 2007 were in agreement regarding the significance 
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of increased exposure to the outside world through forming NGOs. They were all 
excited to start drug adherence enhancement and peer psychological support projects in 
their villages because, as they noted, they were already doing this kind of work 
informally, but without any funding or support.  
Formal NGO activities like drug adherence enhancement and peer psychological 
support projects certainly had some positive consequences. For example, XL sold her 
blood in early 2003 for the first time and she tested positive for HIV several months 
later. But the local CDC kept this information from her until 2005 when they needed 
people to participate in their PLWHA caring project for the Global Fund. XL told me 
how getting to know other activists in Beijing and starting her own grassroots group in 
2006 totally changed her life: 
For a long time I did not know how to live my life anymore. My mother-in-law 
would not eat with us. My sister-in-law would not allow her kid to play with my 
young son who was only four at the time. I felt like that was the end of my life. 
There was no hope. I had to force a smile on my face during the day and then 
cried myself to sleep during the night. Who would have thought of today? … 
Accidentally I attended a NGO training workshop in Beijing. They offered me 
4000 RMB to form a grassroots group. I was very hesitant at first because it 
would definitely affect my family. But then I did feel much better when I could 
interact with other NGOs. You know, we often called each other and they 
always encouraged me. I became much more cheerful. So I thought that other 
patients were probably going through what I was going through. They also 
needed help, right? So I formed my group.487 
Nonetheless, it became increasingly clear between 2007 and 2009 that formal NGO 
activities like drug adherence enhancement and peer psychological support projects 
were not really addressing the needs of local communities. In fact, they began to block 
the development of AIDS activism in rural areas.  
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Newly developed multisectoral AIDS governance in China not only delimited 
the legitimate actions and scripts of local PLWHA NGO actors, but also forced informal 
groups to transform themselves and their relationships with various external actors. 
First, the project-oriented system that focused on quantifiable measures restricted the 
role of PLWHA NGOs to directly providing health services, despite the fact that 
supporting individuals to access public health institutions and improving the broader 
political environment were equally, if not more, important determinants of health. SY, 
an activist highly critical of the Global Fund, explains the problem:  
What are projects? Projects related to PLWH are all about tedious stuff. You 
cannot influence any policy. Neither can you change the larger social 
environment that is actually vital to our survival. I formed a NGO and we also 
conducted projects before. Patients were completely passive in this process. The 
projects define what patients want and what patients need. Our organizations 
should take initiative. We should press our demands. …The government 
admitted that we have 52,000 people infected with HIV/AIDS in Henan. Now 
16,000 of them are dead. How did they die? Where did they die? All of them 
died silently. For example, many of us are infected with not only HIV but also 
hepatitis C. The state does provide ART. Even though it is limited to the first-
line medicine with severe side effects and high failure rates, at least it is free. 
But hepatitis C is not. It is a very expensive disease. The government gives us 
390 RMB [about 62.4 dollars] every month for all the opportunistic infectious 
treatment. How is that enough? …Let’s talk about the minimum living 
allowance. The government always brags about how great it is, blah blah blah. It 
was 12 RMB [about 1.4 dollar] a month in 2003. It is 87 RMB [about 13.92 
dollar] a month [now]. Then we people have to be so very much thankful to the 
government. …It has been almost ten years. Every time they talk about any 
project, it is freaking drug adherence enhancement. I am just so sick of it.488  
Reduced to a channel for delivering top-down resources, PLWHA NGOs became an 
instrument that actually demobilized local communities and turned them into a passive 
object of AIDS administrative system.  
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In contrast, rural AIDS activists’ activities, to a great extent, evolved around 
assisting patients to negotiate and bargain with various governmental agencies in order 
to gain access to services and welfare benefits. For example, LGH took me to the 
county hospital where he conducted work. He started chatting with several patients 
there. One of them told us how the village cadres refused to give him the minimum life 
allowance. Other patients in the room explained how the distribution of minimum life 
allowances was a random practice and village cadres often take control of the funds as 
their personal resources. LGH told them which officers in the county government were 
more friendly and promised that he would accompany them to their government 
meetings. One patient’s daughter started crying and fell on her knees to express her 
appreciation for LGH’s help. LGH later told me that peasants were usually nervous and 
shy with little experience interacting with government agencies, so he tried to offer 
some institutional and policy knowledge to assist them in fighting for their own rights. 
He said: 
Peasants don’t know much about policy. Neither do they know how the 
government and hospital work. Officials often put infected peasants off with 
vague excuses and pass the buck to each other. Officials often tell peasants, 
“You want your allowance? Our quota is full. Come back in three months.” Of 
course there is no such thing as quota. Or if you need a leg surgery, doctors do 
not want to do it then they will tell you, “Based on your health condition, we 
recommend traditional medicine instead of surgery.” Then the traditional 
medicine doctor would tell you that they have no expertise in this area so you 
should go to doctors of infectious disease. But of course then you would be told 
that they don’t have whatever equipment they need. Then you just get stuck. 
What can you do? But we know this system inside out. We won’t be fooled.489  
Yet, as essential as this type of work is, it does not count as legitimate AIDS 
intervention activity. Instead, activists often had to make up project proposals based on 
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Global Fund guidelines regarding legitimate activities in order to obtain funding and 
resources. In the most extreme case, one activist described simply asking one of her 
friends in a foundation to write a proposal that she could submit without even knowing 
the content.490 
Grassroots groups of and for rural peasants infected via blood were thus forced 
to orient themselves to formal organizing that did not translate easily or effectively into 
local contexts. All of the rural activists I interviewed had attended multiple training and 
conferences, but none could recall anything they learned other than vague concepts of 
NGO constitutions and other organizational elements. They all talked about how 
conducting Global Fund projects was an honor, but also too time consuming. It was 
very challenging to maintain even routine activities as a NGO. For example, SHZ, a 
female activist who based her work in hospitals, described how she and other members 
of her organization felt incompetent conducting AIDS projects: 
It is very difficult. There are lots of forms to fill out. Like every time you visit a 
patient, you have to provide detailed information like the location, sex, etc. 
Those forms would be mailed for review. If those forms are not satisfying, you 
have to them all over again. Then there are things like pre-visit conditions, post-
visit conditions. Like their weight, medicine, symptoms, etc. I have cirrhosis 
now. I really want to recruit some young member with more than primary-
school level education to handle funding application, training, conferences, etc. 
You know, peasants like us were selling their blood exactly because we had 
little education… There is this one member who is not as sick as the rest of us. 
But she is very shy and afraid of going to cities alone. So I wanted to take her to 
various conferences and learn how to take meeting minutes and how to 
participate. But it costs too much money. 
During the interview, SHZ was always apologizing for how her group was not 
competitive enough in conducting intervention. Since she did not have a computer, the 
day before our interview she had to travel three hours to the capital city of Henan to 
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submit a funding application for the Global Fund while her leg was injured.491 Given the 
costs associated with formal organizational activities, grassroots groups were eventually 
forced either to withdraw themselves from the Global Fund or to cease AIDS activism 
all together.  
As the AIDS movement was moving further and further towards NGO 
formalization, grassroots groups of PLWHA became increasingly marginalized when 
they were not able to advance the project of organizational expansion between 2007 and 
2009. One activist stated, “People would look down on me. People always make fun of 
the way we talk, we walk, and how we eat a lot. You know, we are peasants. Sometimes 
we eat a bit more at conference since they have good food. Some peasants also smoke 
and spit in public. Other organizations would say that we are a low quality group.”492 
LL, who served on the CCM PLWHAWC, described himself as useless because he 
could “only speak for myself” while “organizations’ voices [are] weighted much more 
than individuals.”493  
Conflicts between gay and PLWHA organizations intensified after 2009, as the 
former monopolized more and more of the Global Fund funding. As SHZ explained, 
“Tongzhi always gain predominance at all kinds of meetings. You know, they have 
more young people and they are much more educated. We patients are peasants. We are 
not as articulate as they are. You know, we got in lots of arguments but they always 
won.”494 Another activist even argued that gay organizations contributed to the spread of 
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AIDS: “Those tongzhi don’t really consider AIDS as a threat. I am not opposed to their 
plans to develop tongzhi culture under the cloak of AIDS. But the problem is that many 
of their so-called prevention activities are actually providing space and opportunities for 
tongzhi to have unsafe sex. This is why the more tongzhi organizations are founded, the 
higher infection rate is among tongzhi.”495  
In response, AIDS activists in rural areas turned back to direct and disruptive 
action after 2009. In contrast to the forms of rightful resistance practiced in the early 
2000s, as discussed in Chapter 4, rural activists developed a new collective petition 
model to target governments at the provincial and central level. Between 2010 and 
2012, activists organized at least four large-scale petitions. In each instance, 100 to 300 
patients went to Beijing, staging protests in front of the Ministry of Health and Ministry 
of Civil Affair. MGH told me about her experience serving on the CCM PLWHA and 
said, “That was nonsense: The Global fund, westerns, NGOs. Nobody can help you but 
yourself. The government owed us. If I want anything, I’ll just go to Beijing and ask for 
it.”496 
Direct transgressive action estranged PLWHA groups from the center of the 
movement, which further marginalized infected peasants. For example, several victims 
of contaminated blood who were very near death launched a campaign begging for 
emergency medical assistance from the local government in the county of Linyin in 
Henan province in 2012. The campaign was only able to mobilize small-scale protests 
of local PLWHA organizations; most other organizations remained silent. Six patients 
passed away in a local hospital. One activist said, “If it happened five years ago, we 
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would march down the street together. But now everybody is on its own.”497 Such 
fragmentation was also partly caused by the newly consolidated repressive apparatus, as 
elaborated in the next section. 
 
III. Manufacturing Civil Society 
 
It is clear that the Chinese state would not have invested in building a formal 
system of AIDS governance without the intervention of the Global Fund. The 
increasing influence of the Global Fund actually challenged the state’s infrastructural 
power to exercise a monopoly of control and implement independent policy choices in 
AIDS governance. This compelled the Chinese state to respond, though it did so in 
unexpected ways with complicated results.  
With the Global Fund’s requirement that the state accept grassroots NGOs as 
part of the multisectoral governance structure, the option of simply eliminating all the 
bottom-up groups and their activities was removed from the state’s repressive 
repertoire. Instead, as AIDS became an important area for state building, the state was 
challenged to reaffirm its centrality in this new policy domain in a non-violent and 
indirect way. The state needed to channel AIDS activism into something that was not 
only controllable, but also something that could actually assist the state to achieve its 
three goals of: (1) providing the appearance of civil society in order to gain external 
legitimacy and resources; (2) erasing the undesired domestic effects of transnational 
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AIDS institutions such as human rights norms; and (3) expanding the reach of the state 
in order to penetrate into marginal subpopulations such as infected peasants and gays.  
 
i. New Repressive Actors: The NGOization and Internationalization  
of Social Organizations 
 
Rather than relying on its previous socialist repertoire of strategies, the state 
began instead to draw on and repurpose resources from the multisectoral AIDS 
governance framework. While transnational AIDS institutions designated 
nongovernmental actors as an authorized group of agents, the Chinese state created a set 
of institutional mechanisms that could control AIDS activism at both domestic and 
international levels. As discussed in Chapter 5, the state established a series of 
government-organized NGOs (GONGOs) that appeared to comply with transnational 
criteria, but essentially served as state puppets in the multisectoral process. This is what 
I call “using NGOs to control NGOs” (yi min guan mi). As the state adopted 
institutional models and organizational forms from transnational AIDS institutions, this 
new configuration of repression not only led to the fragmentation of AIDS activism 
towards the end of 2010 and signaled the decline of social movements (Swayers and 
Meyer 1999), but also allowed the state to complete the building of a “multisectoral” 
AIDS governance domain that actually  reaffirmed the state’s centrality.  
New repressive agents were produced through a process of “NGOizing” health 
social organizations (shehui zuzhi). Social organizations are professional associations 
created by the state to engage in social welfare service related to AIDS control, partly 
on a government-financing basis. They are extensions of the Party into society, 
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nationwide in scope and organized hierarchically. The main function of these 
organizations is not to aggregate and represent group interests for consideration in the 
policymaking process, but to facilitate the propagation of Party policy to the relevant 
groups. Table 6.1 outlines the primary differences between social organizations and the 
more explicitly government-sponsored mass organizations. 
 
Table 6.1 Comparisons of Mass Organizations and Social Organizations 
 Mass Organizations (qunzhong zuzhi) 
Social Organizations 
(shehui zuzhi) 





Communist Youth League       
China Red Cross 
Chinese Association of 
STD/AIDS Prevention and Control 
Chinese Association of 
Preventive Medicine 
Personnel Appointed members of the government 
Government officials double as 
leading officers 
Membership Coerced subpopulations Organizational membership 
Finance Government budget Partly funded by government 
Technology No technical expertise Expertise in medicine 
 
 
While there are twenty-five major social organizations involved in AIDS 
programs, the Chinese Association of Preventive Medicine and the Chinese Association 
of STD/AIDS Prevention and Control (hereafter, CASAPC) are the largest. They 
represent two different groups, respectively. The former represents professional medical 
societies (xue hui) that include the Chinese Association of Medicine and the Chinese 
Nurse Association among others. The latter represents comprehensive and 
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administrative associations (xie hui). This group of organizations also includes the 
Chinese Foundation for the Prevention of STD and AIDS and the China Family 
Planning Association among others.  
Social organizations involve officials from a variety of government entities 
outside the Ministry of Health, such as security and police departments. Approved 
directly by the state council, most of them are exempt from the regulation of the 
Ministry of Civil Affairs. Although headed by senior officials in the central 
government, these organizations have much more autonomy and flexibility. Unlike 
mass organizations, social organizations do not carry administrative rank or power. 
Therefore, social organizations made a better candidate to take on the role of NGOs in 
order to channel AIDS activism actors across local and international levels. 
Though social organizations concerned with AIDS began to emerge in the 
1990s, they were largely inactive, serving primarily as window dressing until 2005 
when they were recruited by the government to interact with grassroots groups.498 The 
Chinese state launched a series of external and internal reforms to convert social 
organizations into “transnational NGOs.” The goal was for social organizations to 
“become the leader of domestic NGOs,” “become an important force in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
498 For example, in response to the WHO’s call, the Ministry of Health proposed to set up a 
national coordinating and decision-making organ for HIV/AIDS intervention in 1992. This 
proposal was rejected by the state council, which considered AIDS an issue limited only to 
deviant groups. As a compromise, the Chinese Association of STD/AIDS Prevention and 
Control was founded on World AIDS Day in 1993 in order to appease international audiences. 
Historically, social organizations were an indispensable part of the transition from a socialist-
planned economy to a market economy in the 1980s. While the state largely continued to 
dominate the (re)distribution of all means of production, the government’s role in directly 
managing welfare was dismantled. It thus transferred some government functions and personnel 
to their affiliated social organizations in order to avoid the bureaucratic burden. Social 
organizations, as appendages to their sponsoring government agencies, are relatively more 
flexible and open to innovation, and more effective and faster at exploring and implementing 
policies (Spires 2011). 
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nongovernmental diplomacy,” and to “get a footing in international society.”499 The 
state specifically invested in building, training, and expanding social organizations. This 
process had two components. The first was a campaign of NGOization that focused on 
organizational development. In the 1990s, there were only two social organizations 
working in the AIDS area. In 2002, the state allocated special funds from the central 
government to start a National Social Mobilization Program for AIDS Control. This 
funding aimed to support and strengthen social organizations to conduct AIDS related 
activities and turn them into a new significant actor in controlling AIDS activism across 
borders.  It provided $247, 670 USD for 21 social organizations to start conducting 
HIV/AIDS intervention in 2002. This grant increased every year, with $768, 370 USD 
for 56 organizations in 2006, and $1, 459, 750 USD for 60 organizations in 2008. By 
2012, there were at least 600 social organizations branches and offices in the AIDS 
domain throughout the country, the number of which actually exceeded that of 
grassroots groups.500 
In contrast to mass organizations that only took the name of NGOs, social 
organizations actually transformed themselves by adopting the organizational forms of 
NGOs. This is what they called “one organizations, two faces” (yitao renma, liangtao 
paizi).501 They conducted a series of internal reforms to mimic the structure and 
management of NOGs. They set up Boards of Directors (or Steering 
Committees/Advisory Groups), designed NGO constitutions, and organized planetary 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
499 “An Internal Speech by the Head of the Standing Committee of Communist Party of 
Beijing,” March 6, 2009. 
500 Interview 244 (Government), July 18, 2013. 
501 Field notes, May 24, 2009. 
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member meetings. Indeed, transnational AIDS institutions themselves were major 
contributors to this process of NGOizing social organizations by offering organizational 
forms and materials as well as discursive resources. For example, some U.S.-based 
NGOs, such as Family Health International, provided guidance for project 
administration. When international grants were offered to strengthen the capacity of 
civil society, the central government allocated a large portion of the grants to social 
organizations for training and prevention interventions. Taking the Global Fund China 
Program Round 6 as an example, this program was titled “Mobilizing Civil Society to 
Scale Up HIV/AIDS Control Efforts in China” and more than half of the grant was 
funneled to social organizations. Similarly, the CASAPC and the Chinese Association 
of Preventive Medicine received 20 million USD from the United States, placing them 
both among the top 10 Chinese recipients of grants from U.S. sources (Spries 2011).  
The second component of the state’s effort to refashion social organizations was 
internationalization.  This process involved promoting social organizations’ ability to 
engage with transnational advocacy networks. The Party outlined six principal 
strategies for social organizations to prevail over grassroots NGOs at the transnational 
level:  (1) “being present” (you ying) in order to participate in international activities; 
(2) “being articulate” (you sheng) in presenting the state’s perspectives; (3) “being 
appealing” (you hu) in advancing the state’s interest; (4) “being persuasive” (you ying) 
in advocating for support; (5) “being active” (you wei) in developing connections with 
international NGOs networks; and (6) “being important” (you wei)—becoming core 
members of global civil society. These principles were further elaborated as follows: 
(1) and (2) are the first step. We are not familiar with how international NGOs 
act. So we need to attend various international conferences to understand who 
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they are, what they think, and what they do. So we can shoot at the target. (3) 
and (4) focus on how to draw international attention. We shall interact with 
transnational advocacy networks but not getting in any direct conflict with them. 
When they accuse us, our own social organizations need to be there to publicize 
ourselves. So the audience can be exposed to different views and make those 
NGOs’ words suspicious. The next level is (5) and (6). We need to have our 
social organizations established in major international NGO networks. So we 
can always fight back when the state is under attack.502 
In short, social organizations working around AIDS carved out new types of structures, 
activities, and functions in response to the growing interconnections between grassroots 
groups and transnational AIDS regimes. They became a vehicle for the state to suppress 
AIDS activism by interrupting the cohesion of activist campaigns, contaminating the 
effect of their activities, displacing grassroots groups’ access to material resources, 
disrupting their internal organization, creating dissension between groups, and 
distracting the focus of AIDS activism.  
 
IV. New Repressive Repertoires: “Using NGOs to Control NGOs” 
 
Contrary to mass organizations, which declared grassroots NGOs illegal in the 
early 2000s, social organizations claimed their own legitimacy as rooted in civil society 
politics. By promoting themselves as implementing multisectoral governance in China, 
social organizations produced a non-political and cooperative NGO model that focused 
on supporting and serving the government in order to contest and marginalize the 
existing political advocacy model within AIDS activist communities. While traditional 
repressive action is limited to the domestic level (Earl 2003), social organizations made 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
502 Interview 243 (Government), June 30, 2009.	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it possible for the Chinese state to extend its reach to the transnational level to influence 
and shape AIDS grassroots groups.  
Social organizations became the major representatives of so-called civil society 
and essentially enabled the state to attend a variety of international conferences, starting 
with the 7th International Congress on AIDS in Asia and the Pacific in 2005. They also 
served as the state’s mouthpiece to the international audience. In 2007 and 2009, social 
organizations were in charge of writing the “Participation and Support of Civil Society 
Organizations and Community-based Groups” session of the first UN General 
Assembly Special Session on HIV/AIDS Country Progress Report.503 Social 
organizations also hosted a series of meetings with grassroots groups to collect 
information, a move that lulled several of the groups into not producing their own 
shadow reports. However, none of the grassroots groups’ critiques and suggestions 
appeared in the report, which stated simply that “the Chinese government will promote 
the deeper participation of civil society organizations in the AIDS response, and will 
increase its financial commitment. In turn, we hope that community-based organizations 
will coordinate their efforts with the national strategy.”504  
In 2009, the Chinese government submitted for the first time a national report 
under the universal periodic review to the UN Human Rights Council. The International 
Department of the Communist Party organized social organizations to participate in the 
writing of the report as NGOs. One social organization involved in the process 
explained: 
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The Party attached great importance to this report. Hu Jintao, our president, gave 
specific directives to win the battle. It had became clear to the Party that those 
experts of the Human Rights Council did not take the government’s report 
seriously. Why? Because no government would say bad things about itself. So 
they actually concentrate on NGOs’ reports. This is why our work is important. 
You know, many government officials are used to write reports in the name of 
the state. But we know how to frame the report properly.505 
At the domestic level, social organizations employed four strategies.506 First, social 
organizations sought to compete with grassroots advocacy organizations for leadership.  
In addition to fashioning their own internal structure to mimic NGOs, social 
organizations formed the Chinese NGO Alliance to Combat STD/AIDS using British 
governmental funding in 2007 in direct response to the building of grassroots advocacy 
networks. The Alliance’s stated mission is to “provide information and technical 
support for grassroots groups, increase their organizational capacity, and mobilize unite 
grassroots groups in supporting the government in AIDS intervention.”507 More 
tellingly, however, the Alliance’s so-called “Guidelines for NGO Action in Fighting 
AIDS” stated that “NGOs are not anti-government so NGOs should abide by rules of 
domestic laws and government disciplines and collaborate with local governments.”508 
Second, social organizations disseminated the “proper” model of NGO 
participation in AIDS intervention among NGO communities and the general public. In 
line with transnational models, social organizations edited manuals of project operation, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
505 Interview 242 (Activist), June 23, 2009. 	  
506 While the state uses social organizations like pawns or puppets in a sense, social 
organizations themselves as a semi-bureaucratic organ do enjoy certain autonomy, albeit still in 
accordance with the state's interests. It would be mistaken to think social organizations only act 
on orders from above.  
507 “The Founding of Chinese NGO Alliance to Combat STD/AIDS,” Health News Report, 
November 15, 2007.	  
508 Chinese Association of STD/AIDS Prevention and Control, “The Working Report of the 
Third Council of the Chinese Association of STD/AIDS Prevention and Control,” June 28, 
2009. 
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monitoring, and evaluation to set up standards for grassroots organizations. They also 
produced several reports on the activities of Chinese NGOs, some of which were 
translated and sent to the Global Fund509 and World Bank.510 They also began publishing 
journals for grassroots organizations and PLWHA.  
Third, social organizations tempted grassroots groups with offers of technical 
assistance, organizational training, and especially funding trustee service511—something 
social organizations were able to do given their lion share of international funding. 
Then, in selecting which groups to assist, social organizations favored grassroots 
organizations working with gay communities in urban areas. This process deepened the 
divisions already developing between groups working with gays, female sex workers, 
and peasants infected via blood. When one of the most famous activists, Hu Jia, was 
arrested in 2008, only activist groups working on contaminated blood issues 
participated in the rescue campaigns, while all other groups remained silent. One 
activist complained how Hu Jia was sentenced because international pressure could not 
be translated into domestic mobilization any more.512 Tension between grassroots 
organizations started to rise especially after 2008. For example, social organizations 
often spread rumors to attack the personal integrity or private life of various activists.  
Fourth, social organizations tried to influence AIDS advocacy campaigns 
directly and to pre-empt other activists’ efforts. After avoiding the issue of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
509 Joint Meeting of NGOs in AIDS Prevention and Control, October 2005. 	  
510 Chinese Association of STD/AIDS Prevention and Control, “A Report on NGOs’ Activities 
in Xinjiang,” 2005. 
511 While most grassroots NGOs do not register with the government, they do not possess the 
independent legal standing to open a bank account to receive foreign funds. Usually grassroots 
NGOs need a funding trustee to receive and distribute funding. 
512 Interview 342 (Activist), May 27, 2009.	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contaminated blood for a long time, the China Red Ribbon Forum in Beijing was 
founded to address human rights related to AIDS in 2010.513 This forum was chaired by  
former officials from the Ministry of Health who later served as the heads of the 
Chinese Association of Preventive Medicine and Chinese Association of STD/AIDS 
Prevention and Control. Ironically, these were the very officials who were involved in 
covering up the blood selling issues during their tenure in office. Funded by UNAIDS, 
the first meeting of this forum was supposed to discuss the issue of compensation for 
people who were infected via blood, but failed to invite anyone from the infected 
communities. In his speech at the meeting, the vice Minister of Health claimed that the 
forum showed the Chinese government’s efforts in leading the society to protect the 
human rights of people living with AIDS. The statement was true, though not in the 
way he intended. Later, during a campaign to help another activist Tian Xi, the China 
Red Ribbon Forum issued a statement. This statement used a writing style similar to 
statements issued by advocacy groups that had actually supplied false information about 
Tian’s situation and justified the local government’s action.514  
Overall, social organizations aimed to promote male gay organizations and 
marginalize PLWHA organizations—all of which was consistent with the broader effort 
to reframe AIDS as a homosexual disease, rather than something connected to structural 
failures, such as blood contamination. By 2012, the state-sponsored version of civil 
society was well established in AIDS governance.  
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V. Conclusion 
 
This chapter demonstrates how transnational AIDS institutions empowered 
urban gay male groups, but impeded female sex worker groups and derailed the 
activism of peasants who were infected via contaminated blood. I argue that the 
contradictions embedded in transnational AIDS institutions account for the paradoxical 
proliferation and fragmentation of the Chinese AIDS movement. Transnational AIDS 
intervention programs authorized the legitimacy of civil society participation, which 
enabled AIDS activism to grow within an otherwise repressive environment by 
adopting the organizational form of AIDS advocacy NGOs. However, in providing 
specific scripts and models of action, transnational intervention programs privileged 
technical, medical, and policy rationality as criteria determining who counts as 
authorized actors and stakeholders in AIDS governance, as well as who governs and 
how. Subpopulations such as gay men, female sex workers, and people living with 
HIV/AIDS were thus constituted as subjects and prioritized (or deprioritized) 
accordingly. Ultimately, while urban gay groups with high levels of education were able 
to orient themselves around transnational intervention frameworks for self-organizing, 
other communities in China could not translate their local experience of the disease into 
transnational medical categories and policy terms. Such a split only played into the 
hands of the state, which led to the failure of the whole movement. 
This chapter stresses a relational and dialectical conception of power and its 
multi-sided manifestations in the social interactions of local actors. This perspective 
emphasizes that movements are never intrinsically bounded entities with one single 
defining issue and an ideal-type of constituents and participants; rather, it reminds us of 
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the importance of examining the uneven and power-laden transnational relationships 
that constitute social movements.  












Right before World AIDS Day in November 2012, China’s incoming prime 
minister, Li Keqiang, met with leaders of several grassroots AIDS NGOs in Beijing. 
This was the first time that a top Chinese leader ever shook hands with grassroots NGO 
members on TV. With a large red ribbon pinned to his jacket and in front of the United 
Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF)’s representative to China, 
Li said that “NGOs play an indispensable role in the national battle against AIDS.”515 Li 
further ordered the Minister of Health to pledge funding to the Shenlan Volunteer 
Working Group, an NGO working for homosexual males based in Tianjing, a large city 
next to Beijing. All but one of the grassroots leaders were homosexual men, including 
three who represented people living with HIV/AIDS. The meeting led to widespread 
public attention, with the New York Times describing it as “a high-profile endorsement” 
for the AIDS movement.516 
The next day about ninety peasants from Henan province who were infected 
with HIV via contaminated blood broke through various obstacles and arrived in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
515 “Li Keqiang: Pooling the Strength of the Society to Deal with Challenges of AIDS,” Xinhua 
News Agency, November 28, 2013. 	  
516 “In China, Grass-Roots Groups Take On HIV/AIDS Outreach Work,” New York Times, 
January 2, 2013. 	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Beijing to petition the central government to keep its promise to provide basic care for 
children affected by HIV and AIDS. This was the seventh collective petition organized 
by grassroots NGOs working with infected peasants since the policy was released in 
2009.517 No official in Beijing was willing to meet with them and the peasants were 
forcibly returned to Henan.  
Grassroots AIDS NGOs did not exist in China before 2002. The episodes above 
reflect the remarkable growth as well as the fragmentation and decline of AIDS 
activism as one of the few national-level social movements in post-socialist China since 
the late 1970s. This dissertation demonstrates the role of transnational institutions in 
driving the emergence and transformation of grassroots advocacy organizations. I argue 
that transnational institutions do not simply serve as suppliers of structural or symbolic 
leverage and material resources. Instead, I present a conflict-centered institutional 
approach that emphasizes how the cultural frameworks of transnational AIDS 
institutions—as a set of practices, organizational forms, and repertoires of action—
actually constitute local activists as actors by shaping and reshaping the domestic 
institutional terrain where mobilization and repression take place.  
My findings display two ways in which the cultural influence of transnational 
institutions was transmitted to the local level: (1) indirectly, by shifting state repressive 
behavior, and (2) directly, by promoting specific organizational forms and 
marginalizing others for local activism. The Chinese state has been facing increasing 
external pressure from transnational AIDS institutions to reduce its repression of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
517 Ministry of Civil Affairs, “Circular of the Ministry of Civil Affairs of the People’s Republic 
of China, On Further Strengthening Guaranteeing the Welfare of Children Affected by 
HIV/AIDS (Minzhengbu Guanyu Jinyibu Jiaqiang Shou Aizibing Yingxiang Ertong Fuli 
Baozhang Gongzuo de Yijian),” issued March 6, 2009.	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grassroots groups since the early 2000s. Importantly, the organizational model 
promoted by transnational AIDS institutions actually disclaims states’ central role in 
domestic health institutions and grants legitimacy to grassroots self-organizing. This 
process put the very issue of AIDS squarely on the political agenda of the Chinese state 
which had for decades until then simply avoided the issue. However inadvertently, as 
the external intervention of transnational institutions constrained certain repressive 
behavior, it has also been constitutive of a new repertoire of repressive state strategies. 
Instead of accepting or opposing global norms, the Chinese state actively focused on 
manipulating international material and symbolic resources to develop semi-state 
repressive agents along with traditional security/police forces within and even outside 
its territory. The objectives in countering the AIDS movement shifted from 
extinguishing all AIDS activism, to facilitating and shaping urban gay groups in a 
particular direction in order to manufacture a fake “civil society” to distract 
international attention and undermine the movement from within China. The 
characteristics of repression have thus transitioned from overt and direct coercion to 
covert and indirect strategies. 
The other mechanism highlighted in the dissertation concerns how the 
increasing impact of transnational AIDS institutions promoted local mobilization in a 
formal organizational form, which empowered urban gay male groups, but impeded 
female sex worker groups and derailed the activism of peasants who were infected via 
contaminated blood. Transnational AIDS intervention programs authorized the 
legitimacy of civil society participation, which enabled AIDS activism to grow within 
the otherwise repressive environment by adopting the organizational form of AIDS 
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advocacy NGOs. However, in providing specific scripts and models of action, 
transnational intervention programs privileged technical, medical, and policy rationality 
as determinants of who counts as authorized actors and stakeholders in AIDS 
governance, as well as who governs and how. Subpopulations such as gay male groups, 
female sex workers, and peasants living with HIV/AIDS were thus constituted as 
subjects and prioritized (or deprioritized) accordingly. Ultimately, while urban gay 
groups with high levels of education were able to orient themselves around 
transnational intervention frameworks for self-organizing, other communities in China 
could not translate their local experience of the disease into transnational medical 
categories and policy terms. Such a split only played into the hands of the state, which 
led to the failure of the whole movement. 
This concluding chapter situates the conflict-centered institutional approach 
within the broader scholarship on transnational contentious politics. It discusses 
analytical issues raised by the contention that institutional logics of AIDS governance 
were central to challenging and/or maintaining authoritarian rule in China. It then 
outlines the implications of the findings of the dissertation for debates about global 
health governance, domestic conflict, and community development.  
 
I. Transnational Institutions, Politics, and Actorhood 
 
I employ a conflict-centered institutional approach to understand how and with 
what consequences changes in the nature and operation of power and domination at the 
global level affect the characteristics of domestic politics. This approach is cultural in 
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that it treats actors as culturally constructed and their action as highly scripted. This is 
part of a broader scholarly movement that specifically rejects a view presuming the 
existence of autonomous and rational social movement actors and understands those 
actors and their agency as embedded in multiple and contradictory institutions. The goal 
of much of this work is not to reject the validity of traditional sociological factors such 
as power, resources, or even interests, but to broaden the explanatory power of existing 
contentious politics studies to capture the characters of emerging transnational 
structures and processes.  
The conflict-centered institutional approach redirects analytical focus to the 
construction of activist actorhood and strives to explain why challenges take the form 
they do. This departs from existing studies of social movements in authoritarian 
contexts that are designed, first and foremost, to explain the conditions under which 
challenges originate, survive, and succeed. While this set of research questions has 
effectively undergirded many transnational social movement studies, a growing amount 
of evidence raises questions about how well those questions are generative of insights 
that capture the nuance of transnational institutions and their interactions with domestic 
political processes (Bob 2002; Tarrow 2005). The conflict-centered institutional 
approach extends this line of thinking and contributes to a growing body of literature 
that focuses on identifying new research questions and developing new descriptive and 
theoretical tools in order to study how power structures are constituted and 
operationalized in a fundamentally different way at the transnational level (Kay 2011; 
Khagram, Riker and Sikkink 2002) in two ways. 
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First, the conflict-centered institutional approach conceptualizes transnational 
institutions as a cultural model constituted of specific institutional arrangements, 
organizational principles, and administrative techniques. This model is marked by the 
presence of myriad voices and the increased relevance of non-state actors, which 
generates a new form of governance and political participation. This dissertation 
demonstrates how transnational AIDS institutions gave rise to a new AIDS governance 
model, which generated conflict regarding the roles and boundaries of responsibility 
held respectively by international organizations, states, and non-state actors, and 
regarding the relationships between them in the distribution and delivery of public 
health goods. Chapters 4 and 5 show how this process not only enabled the formation of 
blood politics which otherwise would not have emerged, but also put in motion the 
making of civil society politics by redefining the principal values and issues of 
collective action in the domain of AIDS.  
My findings demonstrate that cultural changes redefined politics and resistance 
around AIDS by prescribing “the appropriate procedure, tactics, and institutional forms 
through which conflicts could be carried out” (Offe 1985, 820). Transnational AIDS 
institutions are not a polity at the global level that diminish or replace the power of 
nation states. Rather, they are a problem-solving-oriented governance model manifested 
in rationalized, standard, and professional language. I argue that this a model served as 
an engine driving the formation and reconfiguration of AIDS activism in China in two 
ways. On the one hand, this model encouraged individuals and groups to mobilize in the 
form of formal organizations to pursue their “interests.” On the other hand, this model is 
still is in the process of formation as transnational AIDS institutions expand and 
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develop. This ongoing process involves the creation of different organizational entities, 
disputes over institutional principles, norms, rules, and procedures between those who 
govern and who are governed, which in turn generates focal points of domestic conflict.  
Second, the conflict-centered institutional approach allows me to identify the 
social mechanisms that transmit global precepts to domestic groups and individuals, and 
shows that these mechanisms are ill-captured by classical concepts of coercion, 
normative influence, and mimesis. As my findings show, transnational structures and 
processes channel or facilitate the formation of certain—but importantly, not all—
actors, goals, and strategies of local communities. Much of the current literature rests on 
a view of “globalization from below” (Falk 1999) that emphasizes how globalization 
provides a fertile setting for democracy from below, as characteristic of more voluntary, 
reciprocal, and horizontal patterns of interaction (della Porta and Tarrow 2005). Even 
though some scholars notice the ambiguous influences of external factors on local social 
movements (Bob 2001, 2002; Henderson 2003; Lunsing 1999; Tarrow 1998), most 
studies examine mostly successful cases of transnational ties and applaud how 
transnational institutions provide more incentives, resources, and other favorable 
circumstances for domestic activism. As a result, current approaches downplay the 
divergent effects of transnational institutions and pay inadequate attention to power 
imbalances and conflicts among activists.    
Instead of articulating a celebratory paradigm about the impact of rising 
transnational institutions, this dissertation distinguishes and explains the mobilizing and 
demobilizing effects of transnational engagement. It highlights that movements never 
emerge as intrinsically bounded entities with one single defining issue and an ideal-
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typical constituency and participants. The research questions, instead, which issues are 
prioritized, whose voices are heard, and who is ultimately silenced in the unfolding 
process of transnational influence.  
 
II. Transnational Contentious Politics and Authoritarian States 
 
Examining the consequences of changes in the nature and operation of power 
and domination at the global level for domestic politics is a major theoretical concern to 
academics across a range of disciplines, such as sociology, political science, 
international relations, public policy, and development studies. Many theorists have 
noted the ways in which the emerging governing architecture at the supranational level 
opens up participation to a wider range of non-state actors in a range of areas. However, 
the role of strong states in light of such changes remains hotly contested. A thriving 
literature on the global dimensions of social movements demonstrates that nation-states 
are no longer the dominant organizing framework for politics of resistance. On the other 
hand, scholars within mainstream transnational relations traditions argue forcefully to 
the contrary: that the political structuration of strong states continues to determine the 
domestication of global factors. The dynamics between global processes and strong 
national regimes thus remain at the center of debate. 
This dissertation takes on this theoretical challenge by examining the ambivalent 
encounter between transnational AIDS institutions and the Chinese state as a strategic 
research site. Transnational AIDS institutions are in a period of rapid expansion, driven 
by changing health challenges, an upsurge in funding and political recognition, and new 
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rules and norms such as human rights and participant democracy. At the same time, 
China has become the most robust one-party authoritarian regime, despite internal and 
external challenges since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.  
Based on this particular empirical case, I argue that the solution to the current 
theoretical impasse is to recognize the relationship between globalization and any given 
state as a historically-contingent linkage. Many studies tend to emphasize an 
incompatible interplay between globalization and authoritarian states by focusing on the 
regime-type of the state, defined by its degree of democratization and state oppression 
capacity. This conceptualization makes the state a powerful independent variable in 
explaining cross-national differences in mobilization over a long period of time. 
However, when the state is reduced to only the most stable and observable aspects of its 
political regime (Khattra, Jasper, and Goodwin 1999), the state becomes an unitary 
entity that pursues fixed preferences as “diabolus ex machina, producing opportunities, 
awaiting mobilization, landing heavily on some actors and facilitating others, but not 
participating directly in contention” (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001, 78).  
In contrast, this dissertation perceives authoritarian states as a complex 
organization composed of multiple overlapping and nested subfields, each of which is 
self-contained to a different degree and operating more or less autonomously with its 
own central logic. Those subfields are defined and shaped, in part, by transnational 
institutions. While the political apparatus of the Chinese state has been increasingly 
tightening its control in various arenas, its domestic health institutions were more 
vulnerable to external pressure as they are marginal and weak among various 
institutions. Chapter 6, for example, discusses how public health officials were attuned 
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to the impact of transnational AIDS institutions when external intervention facilitated 
the expansion of the health bureaucracy. My findings demonstrate the paradoxical 
dynamics between transnational AIDS institutions and authoritarian states.  
On the one hand, this dissertation highlights how the increasing influence of 
transnational institutions feeds or transforms existing frictions between different 
domestic institutions, which provides various cultural scripts and organizational 
principles for local actors to internalize and elaborate. This is why AIDS activism was 
able to evolve into one of the few national-level social movements in China challenging 
the aggravated repression of political institutions.  
On the other hand, my analysis shows that, even though transnational AIDS 
institutions have been ceded more authority, the success of the governance architecture 
promoted by transnational institutions, ironically, relies on the performance of the 
national health systems. In other words, the requirement of a capable state government 
is built into the foundation of global health governance. So, instead of being simply 
replaced or diminished, the legitimacy of the Chinese state can, in many ways, be 
reinforced when it engages with the AIDS governance models of transnational health 
institutions. I argue that authoritarian states are dynamic actors translating abstract 
global models into concrete practices of local AIDS governance. As Chapters 5 and 6 
illustrate, the Chinese state did not simply accept or reject transnational norms. Instead, 
it seemed to seize upon the fact that AIDS reframed as a “global disease” opened up a 
new arena for state-building. China thus adopted an aggressive interventionist stance in 
the HIV/AIDS arena in order to reclaim its leading role in the public health governance. 
I conclude that in the context of globalization, health—traditionally perceived as “low 
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politics”—has become a key site through which traditional authoritarian regimes are 
both challenged and reinforced. 
 
III. Global AIDS Governance and Local Conflict 
 
Despite its significant impact, the global politics of health governance is not an 
area typically studied by sociologists. However, analysis of the transnational 
institutionalization occurring in this area has the potential to yield rich theoretical 
insights and inform debates of central concern to political sociologists regarding 
globalization and nation states. The new multi-institutional power structure emerging in 
global AIDS governance fundamentally challenges a key principle of political sociology 
and international relations—the conceptions of politics and resistance as being narrowly 
determined by formal political institutions as the single source of power and 
domination. Instead, this project suggests that globalization comprises processes 
through which the political field is redefined both in the configuration of its context and 
in the way politics evolves to generate new actors, values, and processes. This view is 
far more complicated and dynamic than the prevalent idea of simply adding another 
identical layer or variable to previous domestic politics discussions.  
This dissertation makes an important intervention in the emerging field of global 
health by analyzing the inequality of access to the institutions of global health 
governance. In today’s world of changing health risks and opportunities, the 
development of a broader health agenda and governing architecture opens up 
participation to a wider range of non-state actors. This dissertation is an especially 
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timely and critical evaluation of these new forms of governance that exposes and 
interrogates concepts like democracy, participation, community, and civil society—
concepts that usually serve as uncritically examined assumptions in most discussions of 
social movements and authoritarian regimes in general. 
Ultimately, this dissertation explains why, despite massive investment, external 
intervention failed to achieve the goals of reducing human rights violations against 
people living with HIV/AIDS and promoting participant democracy in public health 
policy making in China. The key insight of my analysis is that the current institutional 
arrangements allowed the Chinese state to actively engage with transnational 
institutions, going so far as to manufacture a state-sponsored “civil society” in order to 
defend the state’s legitimacy and central role in public health governance. This process 
ironically contributed to China’s ability to achieve desired foreign policy objectives and 
craft an image of a responsible status quo power participating in the global health 
system, rather than a rule breaker or a challenger. This finding has broad policy 
implications. Private foundations, for example, constitute major actors in transnational 
health institutions and China has become a favored destination for U.S. foundation 
funding since 2003. Among 195 countries, China ranked third in the number of grants 
received in YEAR, with AIDS intervention programs receiving the most funding. By 
providing a critical evaluation of international health intervention projects, I bring a 
different perspective to authoritarian state and international relations studies.  
However, I would be remiss to conclude this dissertation without 
acknowledging that while AIDS activism has declined, it was, indeed, one of a few 
social movements that challenged the Chinese state to build and invest in a new policy 
	   311	  
area. Uncertainty caused by transnational institutions and AIDS activism has made it 
even more crucial for authoritarian states to ensure obedience in new arenas of social 
life, and to prevent the growth of alternative centers of power. Modern authoritarian 
systems of rule are exercised through the appropriation of the state as the one central 
source of power and domination. The statehood of authoritarian regimes is thus erected 
on and preserved through the realization of the a priori state-centered principal about 
what and how societal institutions should be constituted, their logics, and the particular 
ways in which they operate (Dawisha and Zartman 1988; Perlmutter 1981). In contrast 
to European states, but much like authoritarian cases in East Europe (Way and Levitsky 
2006), Middle East (Buchs 2009), and Asia (Boureau 2009), the Communist Party has 
built a new nation-state in China by establishing institutions that monopolize rule-
making and the use of force. State repression has thus become a central part of 
authoritarian state-building, rather than simply an attempt to police order in general 
(Burton 2005). As transnational AIDS institutions displaced the authority of nation-
states and called for local mobilization, the Chinese state was challenged to penetrate 
into the new space the transnational regimes had created.  From the state’s perspective, 
the making of an AIDS policy area thus became a project to build organizational 
structures and practices that could extend the reach of the authoritarian order against 
external pressure. As a result, public health as a policy domain was established.  






Historical Comparison and Multi-Institutional Ethnography: Methods and Data 
 
The research on which this dissertation is based began as a straightforward 
comparison between three activist sub-groups in China: female sex workers, gay males, 
and peasants infected via blood. The rationale behind this three-pronged approach was 
to explore the power dynamics within the AIDS movement and explain why certain 
sub-groups were able to address the needs of the people it claimed to represent, while 
others failed to do so. Once I entered the field site in 2007, however, I realized not only 
that I would have to expand my fieldwork to include transnational AIDS institutions 
and the Chinese state, but also that these two entities did not simply constitute the 
background or target of the AIDS movement. Instead, both were actors that actively 
facilitated or channeled the formation of certain – but importantly, not all – actors, 
goals, and strategies of AIDS activism. Further, it became evident that comparative 
historical research is indispensable to develop explanations of transnational contentious 
politics that are at once historically grounded and generalizable beyond the unique case 
of China. The advantage of this method is that it offers a way to depart from a series of 
assumptions, rooted in American organizational society, about why social movements 
emerge, what social movements should look like, what the carriers of social movements 
are, and how social movements relate to other actors. Instead of taking grassroots 
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advocacy NGOs as a starting point, historical analysis questions (1) why and how 
people constructed formal organizations rather than other social forms; and (2) why and 
how civil society became an organizational and normative goal and principle of AIDS 
activism. The key to understanding the overall proliferation of AIDS NGOs and 
conflicts between sub-groups lies in the historical origins and development of the AIDS 
movement.  
I combine archival research, participant observation, and in-depth interviews to 
explore three field sites – grassroots advocacy groups, the Chinese state, and 
transnational AIDS institutions – between 2007-2013.518 The three sub-groups of female 
sex workers, gay males, and peasants infected via blood were not separate and discrete 
cases; indeed, they were acutely aware of one another. They were also embedded in a 
broader inter-organizational network and subject to the same measures of success. 
Multi-institutional ethnography was an appropriate way to uncover the organization of 
the trans- or extra-local interactions (Smith 2005) that structured the particularity of 
local grassroots groups. And archival research directed my attention less towards the 
specific strategic choices made by individual grassroots groups, and more to how the 
rules and scripts of the whole AIDS movement evolved over time.  
My research focused on a sensitive, risky, and controversial topic inside and 
outside Chinese activist communities. My own identity as a Chinese female 
heterosexual researcher with degrees from one of the most prestigious universities in 
China and currently studying abroad made dealing with barriers and capitals of class, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
518 All the informants were Chinese. I am responsible for the translation of the data used in this 
dissertation with the exception of a few published documents. Pseudonyms are provided for all 
the informants for their safety.  
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gender, and sexuality an important part of the field work itself at three distinctive field 
sites.   
 
I. Grassroots Advocacy Groups 
 
Grassroots advocacy groups were my first field site. In June and July 2007, I 
began participant observation by volunteering my time and skills as an intern (shixi) and 
researcher at what I call the Health Education Institution in Beijing, one of China’s 
largest national grassroots AIDS NGO incubators. The Health Education Institution 
presented an ideal position for me to gain an overall view of the AIDS NGO landscape. 
Its activities involve all kinds of local communities affected by HIV/AIDS and it 
collaborates with around 60 grassroots AIDS groups throughout the county and 
provides material and organizational support for more than 20 advocacy groups. It was 
through this initial participant observation work that I selected three activist sub-groups 
– female sex workers, gay males, and peasants infected via blood – and identified major 
actors in the AIDS movement.  
Gaining access to the Health Education Institution was not easy. During my 
initial stage of data collection between February and May 2007, I surveyed news reports 
provided by three official press agencies of the Chinese central government – Xinhua 
News Agency, People’s Daily, China Youth Daily, and Guangming Daily – between 
2000-2007 with the assistance of a master’s student in Sociology at Beijing University. 
While I was able to identify a list of major AIDS NGOs and activists, I could not find 
valid addresses or contact information. After waiting for almost a month in vain for 
activists to answer my phone calls and e-mails in Beijing, I visited a leading activist and 
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scholar in Guangzhou, who suggested that I start my research at the Health Education 
Institution. She also introduced me to the head of the Institution, who received me with 
little hesitation.  
While the Health Education Institution had three primary project offices, it 
mostly focused on male homosexuality issues during my stay. I was assigned to the 
Policy Research and Advocacy Project Office (hereafter, PRAP). The PRAP office, 
sponsored by the Open Society Foundation based in the U.S., was tasked with internal 
organizational building such as setting up a Board of Directors. It also represented the 
Institution at different international and national meetings, conferences, and workshops. 
More importantly, the PRAP office served as a secretary for the largest national 
network of grassroots AIDS NGOs at the time, responsible for its routine operation and 
monthly online meetings. 
I worked at the PRAP office mostly from 9 to 4, five days a week. Sometimes I 
was invited to take part in the outreach activities and inter-organizational meetings 
conducted on nights and weekends. The Health Education Institution was located in a 
rented office space in a business and residential condo community. The PRAP office 
was about 10 square feet with five computer desks. At first my co-workers were not 
thrilled about my presence and most of them were reluctant to instruct me. The first 
week on the job I found myself in the position of the observed more than of the 
observer, though I gradually learned that this was a feature of the workplace and not 
simply of my personal reception by my co-workers. On the one hand, the Institution 
was undergoing further organizational formalization at the time and the PRAP was 
trying to enforce stricter workplace discipline. Each individual staff member was trying 
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to figure out how to make work plans and summaries without making mistakes. My co-
workers later told me that they thought it would only be a week before I started to come 
to work late or just disappeared, as other “westerns” interns had. On the other hand, the 
Institution began to see the existence of soft repression. Even though there was no 
public or overt repression, the Institution was taking measures to strengthen its security 
vis-à-vis the office space and computers.519 The whole organization was penetrated with 
suspicion and fear, which made it even harder for staff members to accept outsiders. As 
Chapter 5 and 6 discuss, indirect and covert use of non-force could disrupt grassroots 
activists, scare off potential supporters’ communities, and indirectly affect activists’ 
perception of political opportunities. My old professors in college called me during my 
fieldwork when security officers inquired about my background.520 Those professors 
tried to persuade me to switch to a safer topic. The situation rendered me sleepless for 
nights and I even changed my cell phone worrying about whether it was tapped. 
However, these experiences brought my co-workers and me closer. By the time I left 
the Institution, I had become familiar enough with the work that my co-workers had 
come to involve me in their own projects. 
My role at the PRAP office was ambiguous. I was working on several 
independent projects assigned by the head of the office, as well as assisting my co-
workers with things like translation, proposal writing, press releases, conferences 
organizing, and volunteer training. The fact that I was a PhD student from the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
519 For example, only three members could open the front gate for the Institution. I only had the 
key for our individual office. Everybody had to log off their computers whenever they leave 
their seats even for a five-minute interval. Nobody was allowed to share computers with other 
staff.  
520 Their questions focused on who sponsored my research and what my agendas were.  
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University of Michigan presented the Institution with the opportunity to engage in a 
little publicity. To note just one example, when the director of the Chinese Center for 
Disease Control and Prevention visited the Institution, I was particularly highlighted 
during the introduction. My research was never covert; I could ask questions and take 
field notes openly. The head of the Institution offered me opportunities to attend Global 
Fund meetings and UN conferences, as well as exposing me to their inter-organizational 
meetings with other grassroots NGOs working with gay males, peasants infected via 
blood, IDUs, and immigrant women and children.  
At the same time, my foreignness could provoke hostility. As discussed in 
Chapter 6, many members of AIDS activist communities began to question whether 
foreign organizations and people were sincerely concerned about local NGOs and 
people or whether such outsiders cared only about their own agendas. For instance, the 
Institution hosted its annual forum and invited its collaborative groups as well as many 
major activists to attend. For the sake of my research, the head of the Institution 
generously assigned me to take meeting notes. However, some activists got angry 
during the discussion of international cooperation and suddenly accused me of taking 
advantage of grassroots groups for self-interest. I left the conference room and started 
crying. Even though my co-workers comforted me, I did not come to realize until later 
that the incident was reflective of tensions between various organizations across 
borders.  
I did not start conducting interviews until my last two weeks at the Institution, 
when I was already familiar with my research site (see Appendix 2-a). Both the head of 
the Institution and my co-workers became enthusiastic about my research and they 
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raised a lot of important issues and questions. The first one to reach out to me was a 
young European woman, PLM, who worked at the PRAP office. PLM spoke fluent 
Chinese, had worked at the Institution for a long time, and was successfully blending in. 
We were both familiar with the language of civil society and human rights in western 
society and we started talking about my research in English. PLM taught me the ropes 
and introduced me to her contacts in the Law and Human Rights Project Office and 
LGBT/MSM Health Education Project Office. PLM was also the one who translated my 
project to other staff members at the Institution, who soon began to accept me not just at 
the workplace, but also began to invite me to lunch and dinner, even opening their 
homes and families to me.  
In this way, staff members were able to help me refine my research approach 
and, in some cases, helped me to carry out the research. They also introduced me to 
people at two other incubator NGOs for interviews (see Appendix 2-a). Each interview 
lasted around 1.5–3 hours. Half of the participants gave me permission to use recorders, 
and I took notes for the rest. During interviews, I focused on people’s activities, their 
relationships with major local actors in HIV/AIDS intervention, and their evaluation of 
the AIDS grassroots organizational field as a whole. I did not use a formal interview 
guide other than a set of broad questions, as both of my co-workers as my first two 
participants expressed a strong preference for unstructured interviews.  
The contacts I accumulated at the Institution eased my entry into the whole 
activist community, especially among gay male activists. I conducted follow-up 
interviews with most of my participants over the following years in order to trace AIDS 
activism’s development. I also remained friends with some staff members at the 
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Institution even after they left for other NGOs or foundations. They continued to 
provide me with updates about AIDS activism. They also assisted me in recruiting 
participants, especially from incubator NGOs and gay male communities (see Appendix 
2-a). 
 
i. Gay Male Sub-Group 
 
I and my assistants conducted 28 semi-structured interviews with gay activists in 
Beijing and Shanghai between 2009 and 2013.521 While all the interviews were based on 
a set of standard questions (see Appendix 2-b), I translated them into Chinese and 
customized the interview guides for every single participant based on my knowledge of 
their organizational background. Most interviews were conducted in participants’ 
offices, as gay male NGOs usually had fixed formal office spaces of their own. 
Conducting the interviews in these spaces also gave me access to observe their daily 
activities and routine operations. Some interviews were conducted at high-end 
restaurants or coffee shops chosen by participants.522 The sites for these interviews were 
in stark contrast to where my interviews with peasants and female sex workers were 
conducted. Interviews with gay men ranged from 1 to 2.5 hours and all but two was 
audiotaped and transcribed in Chinese. Some participants gave consent to have their 
photos as well as the office’s photos taken in the manner they preferred. Detailed field 
notes were made after interviews to describe the participants, interview space, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
521 Interviews in 2013 were conducted with the assistance of a team of six undergraduate 
students at the School of Public Health of the Beijing University Health Science Center. I gave 
them a qualitative research training section.  
522 Some participants even paid for my meals.  
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processes, and unexpected encounters. Those interviews were supplemented by hours of 
informal conversations over meals and drinks along with observing three outreaches 
and one conference in each of 2007, 2012, and 2013.  
Gaining access to gay male organizations was the most straightforward. Most of 
my gay male informants had at least a college degree, and were young professionals 
who were used to cosmopolitan life styles. My class and education background made it 
easier for gay male activists to relate to me as a friend or counselor who knew western 
society well. A lot of our informal conversations focused on their travels to the United 
States or other foreign countries to attend conferences and workshops. They were also 
familiar with speaking to western researchers and journalists and knew how to present a 
positive picture of their organizations suitable for a western audience. It facilitated the 
research when I was aiming at examining the rules and norms and standards of 
successful grassroots AIDS NGOs. However, I did conduct structured interviews with a 
detailed interview guide to more strictly control the interview process.  
Furthermore, my fieldwork occurred during a period of intense public health 
globalization, when international public health researchers, especially those from the 
United States, were increasingly interested in using grassroots NGOs to gain access to 
local Chinese communities to operate projects or obtain data. My identity as a Chinese 
person studying abroad thus became a double-edged sword. It allowed some of my gay 
male activists to talk about their engagements with foreigners in a more critical and 
open way. I shared my experience regarding how to apply for an overseas degree in 
public health or public administration and how to navigate the western world of 
philanthropy when participants asked for my opinion. However, my identity also put me 
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in a complicated position. At first, I attempted to volunteer my skills as a HIV/AIDS 
advocate, which turned out to be more disruptive than constructive after 2010. As I 
discuss in Chapters 3 and 6, gay male communities in China have a long complicated 
history interacting with the western world. There has never been any consensus within 
gay male activist communities except for a brief period of time between 2004 and 2007, 
as discussed in Chapter 5. As conflicts within the activist communities escalated, only 
1/2 of my participants were recruited through informants, as developing close working 
relationships with any one male gay NGO could put me in opposition to others. As a 
result, I had to try to adopt a neutral position, which was not always successful.   
 
ii. Infected Peasant Sub-Group 
 
Gaining access to activist sub-groups composed of and/or working on behalf of 
infected peasants was even more difficult and time-consuming. Even though I met with 
leading activists in this sub-group in Beijing in 2007 and 2009, those activists only 
represented a particular group of local actors who had the resources to travel to Beijing 
and conduct advocacy activities there, as discussed in Chapter 5. However, this activist 
sub-group became increasingly isolated as the rift within the activist community was 
growing. While my fieldwork was mostly conducted in urban areas, the tension between 
urban and rural activists left me in an awkward position and nobody was willing to 
introduce me to local communities in rural areas. It was my good fortune that I got in 
touch with DEH in May 2012. DEH is an urban activist who had only begun to focus 
his attention on the blood contamination issue earlier that year. Since then, he had 
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traveled throughout rural areas in Henan and Hebei provinces to visit and help local 
peasants by showing documentaries on infected peasants’ struggles against HIV/AIDS 
and training activists to utilize computer and internet technology. He was thus equipped 
with local knowledge regarding how to contact and interact with infect peasants and 
navigate poor rural areas. In particular, DEH had no formal organizational affiliation, 
which made him a great guide who was accepted widely by all the local activists. We 
traveled together in June 2012.  
My entrance into the field site of infected peasants was rather dramatic. Two 
days after I arrived in Zhengzhou, the capital city of Henan province, a security officer 
called my participant while we were talking in a hospital. The officer’s first question 
was “Is this girl an American or Chinese?,” even before he asked what I was doing. 
Dissatisfied with our answers, two local policemen detained me at the hotel the next 
morning. Although activists had told me stories about getting detained or arrested, it 
wasn’t until those policemen knocked on my door, ordered me to open it, and asked me 
to leave with them that I realized what repressive state apparatus means in reality. I was 
certainly mindful that being detained was always a possibility, so all the interview 
recordings along with field notes were already uploaded to my online space to protect 
participants’ identities. Nonetheless, it was such a terrifying experience that I would 
tremble in fear whenever I saw a police station or car on the street afterwards. 
Fortunately, this detention was simply a warning. I was released after being interrogated 
for three hours by three officers. The security officer dropped DEH and I off at the train 
station. After we were forced to leave, the whole process was recorded in my field 
notes. Ironically, the whole detention process was broadcast online by DEH through 
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twitter who was standing outside the police station, which actually helped to facilitate 
subsequent recruiting for interviews when activists considered me on their teams.      
I visited 23 grassroots groups in 19 towns and villages, and conducted 46 
interviews with grassroots advocacy group leaders, members, peasants living with 
HIV/AIDS as well as independent activists with no organizational affiliation (see 
Appendix 2-a). The interviews ranged from 0.5 to 4 hours. Most interviews took place 
either in hospitals or activists’ homes, where they conducted activities. I chose those 
locations because of the dearth of information available on these extremely widespread 
but understudied environments. Three group leaders preferred my hotel room due to 
security concerns. The three groups with offices chose to talk to me at their offices. All 
but two interviews were recorded and transcribed in Chinese. I took notes of unrecorded 
interviews. Certain participants gave consent to have their photos taken. Five group 
leaders invited me to spend nights at their home. I usually waited until the end of the 
day to take field notes in English.  
As most infected peasants were not used to speaking to outsiders, I decided to 
conduct in-depth unstructured interviews using the oral history method (Wang Zheng 
1999). I wanted to attend to narrators’ voices and the overall logic of the narrative in 
order to uncover infected peasants’ perspectives, which were already so marginalized in 
AIDS activism. The advantage I had in exercising this method was that I had already 
been immersed in AIDS activist communities for five years, so I was familiar with 
major events, campaigns, and actors, and I already had a sense of the epidemic’s history 
and trajectory. What was left out in my previous fieldwork, however, was the more 
subjective realm of opinions, attitudes, appraisals, evaluations, emotions, values, and 
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beliefs. My interviews with infected peasants focused on the choices they had made – 
and how they might have been made otherwise. More specifically, after introducing my 
research topic, every interview started with participants’ own narratives of how they 
had become AIDS activists. The interviews in general covered (1) their activities; (2) 
their interaction with the Global Fund agent, governments, and other sub-group 
activists; and (3) their translation and utilization of transnational rules and resources. I 
usually ended interviews with at least one meal to have more informal conversations. 
Simply getting access to rural field sites was very difficult, but conducting 
research there posed a whole different set of hurdles. To stave off exposure to local 
police and security departments, we did not stay at any village or county for more than 
2 days. I changed my cell phone to hide my tracks.523 Uncertainty and suspicion 
permeated activist groups given the government’s use of electronic surveillance, 
informants, and cooptation. I had to cancel two interviews when, in each case, more 
than five other activists alleged that the activists in question were collaborating with the 
government.524 We did not even tell our participants we were coming until we arrived at 
their front doors.525 Rural areas hit hard by HIV/AIDS in Henan province suffered from 
poverty and a lack of transportation infrastructure. We moved around on trains, buses, 
taxies, motorbikes, and tricycles and spent hours on unpaved roads. With limited access 
to clean water and food, both DEH and I got sick due to heat and fatigue. My physical 
limitations (which are related to my class) proved to be obstacles to data collection. For 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
523 Luckily jurisdiction of those officials who detained me was limited to Zhengzhou city rather 
than the whole province. I was thus able to continue to conduct research in other areas.  
524 I could not determine whether those allegations were true. In fact, it proved to be rumors in 
some other cases. However, this is an example how soft repression could create enmity and 
distrust inside the activist community and damage their coalitions.   
525 In rural areas this type of behavior is acceptable.  
	   325	  
instance, when I visited one activist’s rental house next to a hill of garbage, the house 
was covered in flies inside and out. I already had two inflamed wounds on my feet. The 
whole interview process was so excruciatingly uncomfortable that I declined the host’s 
invitation to stay with them overnight.  
In addition to posing physical challenges, the data collection process also 
provoked strong emotions on my part, which certainly shaped my perspective. For 
instance, one 22-year-old man living with AIDS passed away from a sudden heart 
attack when we were visiting the grassroots group with which he was affiliated. He was 
infected through a blood infusion during a surgery when he was 6. Looking at the cold 
body of a young man who was actually talking to us the night before was nothing less 
than heartbreaking. What was even more upsetting was that we had to leave to complete 
my research schedule.  
However, conducting research in rural areas was made successful by the 
participation of infected peasants. They welcomed me with open arms, eager to share 
their experiences and thoughts. My class background did not affect the data as I 
expected it might. Surprisingly, only three participants paid attention to my overseas 
background; most of them tended to focus instead on Beijing University, where I got 
my college degree. These participants were facing isolation and marginalization in their 
daily lives, so the fact that a young woman from a prestigious university was willing to 
pay them a visit and listen to their stories was comforting and encouraging. During most 
interviews, it did not take much time before participants were relaxed and elaborating 
on their responses. Nobody gave me brief answers, asked how many more questions I 
had, or just stopped talking. Meanwhile, I noticed how my small figure, younger 
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looking and casual outfits made me resemble one of those sympathetic volunteering 
college students from the city who were welcomed in village.  
 
iii. Female Sex Worker Sub-Group 
 
Only two female sex worker groups were included in this dissertation, which 
was reflective of their status in the AIDS movement. Between 2007-2012, I was only 
able to access male sex worker groups and conduct 7 interviews with them. Equipped 
with fixed office space, all of those groups identified themselves as gay male groups. 
The history of female sex worker groups was much shorter. There was only a brief 
window of opportunity after 2007 when those groups began to emerge. But I did not 
have funds to research this community during that period. This young activist sub-group 
was hit the hardest in 2010 when the security and police departments started to crack 
down on the female sex industry and the whole AIDS movement took a turn for the 
worse. The trajectory of female sex worker groups was exactly the outcome of the 
paradoxical expansion and decline of the AIDS movement discussed in Chapter 6.  
 
iv. Archival Research 
 
In addition to participant observation and interviews, I also developed an 
archival dataset composed of two parts. The first part consists of news reports of AIDS 
activism in both Chinese and English. For reports in Chinese, I conducted a full search 
of the Xinhua News Agency Multimedia Database and China Core Newspaper 
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Databases from 1989 to 2012. For reports in English, I did a similar search of 
LexisNexis Academic Databases with the assistance of an undergraduate student at the 
University of Michigan. The second part consists of documents generated by activists. I 
started building this dataset at the Institution based on its internal e-mail archives from 
2003. I was allowed access to this archive until 2010. All the e-mails were downloaded, 
sorted, and organized with the assistance of a Master’s student at Beijing University. 
The e-mails were combined with (1) one of the largest public online forums of AIDS 
activists, the posts (2005-2012) of which were downloaded with the assistance of two 
undergraduate students at Beijing University and the University of Michigan; and (2) 
the internal e-mail group of one of the largest grassroots advocacy networks, the e-mails 
(2010-2012) of which were provided and downloaded by two activists. My informants 
also provided me with a wide range of statements, declarations, reports, activity 
announcements, campaign materials, public letters, pictures, and posts in both paper and 
electronic forms.  
 
II. Chinese State 
 
I combined archival research and in-depth interviews to collect data on the 
Chinese state. For archival research, I surveyed (1) China Statistical Yearbooks through 
China Data Online; (2) China’s policies, regulations, and law through the University of 
Michigan Asia Chinese Studies Online from Wanfang; (3) news reports in Chinese 
through the Xinhua News Agency Multimedia Database and China Core Newspaper 
Databases and those in English through LexisNexis Academic Databases; (4) internal 
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documents provided by officials during interviews; (5) secondary literature in Chinese, 
including China Academic Journals, China Doctoral Dissertations, and China Masters’ 
Theses through China Knowledge Resource Integrated Databases from 1989 to 2012.  
My interview data came from two field sites. The first study conducted in 2009 
focused on government and Communist Party agents in four provinces who were in 
charge of regulating and policing NGO activities and social movements including the 
Bureau of Civil Affairs, the Foreign Affairs Office, the Police Department, and the 
Homeland Security Department. My objective was to study the operation of the state 
repressive apparatus in general and in AIDS issue areas specifically. 
This study was a small part of what I call the Chinese Social Organizations 
Project (CSOP). I was fortunate to be hired as a research assistant working for CSOP, 
which provided me with highly restricted access to Chinese government departments. 
The principle researcher of CSOP was an enthusiastic support of my research while he 
had been involved in AIDS activism. He also granted me access to all the data 
generated in the study of CSOP.  
19 unstructured interviews were conducted with 36 government officials 
between May and August 2009 (see Appendix 2-a). Interview requests were sent to the 
departments who decided when and what officials would take part in interviews. The 
participants for each interview ranged from 1 to 3 officials. The interviews lasted 
between 1 and 2 hours. 15 interviews were recorded and transcribed in Chinese. Notes 
were taken for unrecorded ones. All the interviews took place in government office 
buildings. The principle researcher of CSOP was present at all the interviews. He was 
the one who started each interview by elaborating on how our purpose was to 
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understand how to regulate the cross-border activities of NGOs better. Then participant 
officials started talking. The process was closer to formal reporting instead of 
conversations. I only asked questions from the perspective of a layman. In general, 
interviews covered not only AIDS NGOs, but also the goals, tactics and plans of the 
central government and Party, as well as the participants’ assessment of the 
international and national situations behind the political and policy orientations. 
Interviews were usually followed with lunches paid for by the government, which 
provided me with opportunities to have more informal conversations and ask more 
questions.  
Conducting research with officials was much easier than gaining access to them. 
Most participants recognized the significance of the topic. They were willing to talk 
about the specific challenge they were facing in dealing with booming transnational 
activism as an organizational problem for their individual departments. Compared to 
activists, participant officials more frequently used terms such as social movements, 
activism, human rights, control, and repression. They were also interested in hearing 
what solutions we can come up with as scholars. 
My gender and age were an important factor in shaping the data. I was cast as a 
young female assistant for the CSOP principle researcher. Participants did not always 
respond to my questions. Sometimes sexism that was prevalent at the governmental 
workplace surfaced in the interviews. For example, one official next to me put his hand 
on my leg during lunch. I had to find an excuse to leave the table and then pretended 
nothing happened. On another occasion, officials mentioned an important internal 
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document. When I asked if I could use it, one official suggested jokingly that I might 
have to flirt (sajiao) and drink with one of them to get it. Everybody laughed.  
The second set of interviews, conducted in June and July 2013, targeted Chinese 
public health officials in Beijing with the assistance of the research team mentioned in 
the last section. Officials of the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention 
were selected since they were the principle recipient of the Global Fund financial 
support in China, and the major entity of HIV/AIDS program implementation. Starting 
in 2007, I had tried different ways to get in touch with China CDC officials but never 
succeeded. Only two officials agreed to have informal conversations with me in 2007. 
Fortunately, a Chinese scholar agreed to use their personal connections to help me 
recruit participant officials in 2013. At participants’ request, I was only given their 
department affiliation with no personal information, in order to avoid bureaucratic 
procedures. 
6 officials agreed to participate in structured interviews (see Appendix 2-a). 
Based on a set of standard questions in English (see Appendix 2-c), I created a Chinese 
interview guide for every participants based on their department affiliations. The 
Chinese scholar mentioned above screened the interview guide and sent them to 
participant officials upon request. All but one interview was conducted in participants’ 
office buildings. They lasted between 1.5 to 2.5 hours, all of which were recorded and 
transcribed in Chinese. Participants were mostly in control during interviews as they 
would start answering questions in the guide. Interviews covered three sets of questions, 
including (1) public health officials’ interactions with transnational AIDS institutions; 
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(2) impact of the Global Fund on the design and implementation of AIDS intervention 
programs; and (3) China CDC officials’ interaction with grassroots AIDS NGOs.  
 
III. Transnational AIDS Institutions 
 
Data collection consisted of two parts. For the first part, I conducted extensive 
archival research and set up an archival dataset. The first part of this dataset was 
collected through United Nations Official Documents System Search for (1) HIV/AIDS 
related UN resolutions, declarations, and implementations; and (2) UNAIDS/WHO 
policies, guidelines, reports, and briefs between 1981 to 2011. An undergraduate 
student at the University of Michigan assisted me in compiling data. I also conducted a 
full search of LexisNexis Academic Databases from 1989-2012 for news reports, press 
releases, and media statements from the United States and European Union countries, as 
well as major international foundations and human rights organizations’ reports related 
to AIDS activism in China. Drawing on these archival resources, I was able to construct 
the evolution of the principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures of the 
transnational AIDS institutions that legitimize a code of conduct and certain types of 
programs in the HIV/AIDS intervention arena.  
The Global Fund was the focus of the second part. At the international level, I 
established a historical timeline that charts when the Global Board created and/or 
revised which institutional and organizational initiative with what purposes, based on 
online documents of the Global Fund including board meeting minutes, newsletters, 
reports, funding application guidelines, funding applications, and program reports. This 
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body of documents was combined with secondary reports obtained through the 
organization Global Fund Observer. My search was limited to documents related to 
NGO participation.  
At the national level, I concentrated on the China Country Coordinating 
Mechanism (China CCM) as a national-level committee responsible for governing 
Global Fund operation within countries. I conducted participant observation at the 
Secretariat for China CCM in Beijing between June and August 2009. I began to 
observe the campaigns for the second election of the China CCM of the Global Fund in 
Beijing in 2009. At the time, the Secretariat was recruiting interns to handle a surge in 
workload caused by the election controversies. Knowing my research topic, a senior 
Chinese professor with whom I used to work introduced me to the Executive Secretary.  
It was much easier for me to blend into the environment at the Secretariat with 
many young public health professionals. The Secretariat is located in a high-level 
building in an upscale area of Beijing, where most of the foreign embassy and UN 
entities are clustered. I could look over the whole city of Beijing from the office. My 
co-workers enthusiastically coached in almost every aspect of the job – from 
accounting, human resources, and public relations to communication and coordination. I 
was not only assigned to assist with the election, but I was also involved in the daily 
operation of the office and participated in one CCM Plenary meeting, as well as two 
national working group meetings. The working hours were usually between 9 a.m. to 6 
p.m. each day, 5-6 days a week.526 Sometimes I worked for 12-14 hours a day when 
elections became hectic. I usually took very short notes during intervals at work and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
526 I took time off work at the Global Fund to do interviews with governmental officials while 
the Secretariat was being accommodating.  
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then completed them on my subway ride home. Staff members of the Secretariat were 
friendly and welcoming and I was able to spend hours socializing with them over meals 
and/or after work as we became friends.  
My stay at the Secretariat presented a unique place from which I was able to 
participate in the operation of the Global Fund in China, observe the election process 
that involved the entire AIDS activist communities, interact with various grassroots 
leaders, and speak to other major players such as governmental officials, private 
foundations, and international organizations. The Secretariat actually shared a 
conference room, kitchen, and other common areas office space with the UNAIDS 
China Representative Office, which also allowed me to have informal conversations 
with UNAIDS staff members. In addition, my participant observation provided me with 
access to the archival records of the China CCM, such as planning and management 
documents, consulting reports, meeting minutes, letters of opinions and suggestions 
from representatives from multilateral/bilateral organizations, academic sectors, and 
grassroots NGOs. 
However, as a researcher who had worked with grassroots groups before, I was 
without question an oddity. The first time an NGO meeting was hosted at the 
Secretariat, one activist recognized me. I was not allowed to participate in the meeting 
as a result, due to concerns regarding a potential conflict of interest. After confirming 
that I would not release information about the election to any group I knew, I was 
finally assigned the task of taking, organizing, distributing notes of meetings with two 
election consultants in Hong Kong and Shanghai. Still, every time that grassroots 
representatives took part in meetings, my presence would be made known to make sure 
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nobody would dispute it. I also stopped going to NGO meetings outside the Secretariat 
and chose to send a Master’s student at Beijing University to take notes for me.  
The ethnographic work was supplemented by 5 interviews with 2 UN officials, 2 
international NGOs, and 1 international foundations (see Appendix 2-a). All the 
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Staff 122 2009 16-Jun Beijing 
16 Incubator OFM Staff 42 2009 20-Jul Beijing 
17 Incubator YA Love Home Staff 32 2009 2-May Beijing 
18 Incubator HSL Staff 11 2013 23-Jul Beijing 
        
19 Gay male DB Group Leader 33 2007 30-Jun Tianjing 
20 Gay male DB Group Leader 33 2007 30-Jun Tianjing 
21 Gay male DB Group Leader 23 2012 19-Jun Tianjing 
22 Gay male Happy Group Leader 42 2009 26-Jun Shanghai 
23 Gay male Happy Group Leader 11 2009 16-Aug Shanghai 
24 Gay male Heart and Life Group Leader 42 2011 12-Apr 
Ann 
Arbor 
25 Gay male Heart and Life Group Leader 42 2012 1-Jun Shanghai 
26 Gay male Heart and Life Group Staff 34 2012 1-Jun Shanghai 
27 Gay male Heart and Life Group Staff 22 2012 1-Jun Shanghai 
28 Gay male Shanghai AB Group Leader 21 2012 2-Jun Shanghai 
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29 Gay male YY Group Leader 132 2012 2-Jun Shanghai 




Leader 11 2013 11-Jul Beijing 




Staff 11 2013 11-Jul Beijing 
32 Gay male Beijing 412 Center Staff 322 2013 17-Jul Beijing 
33 Gay male LB Public Goods Leader 34 2013 17-Jul Beijing 
34 Gay male LB Public Goods Staff 1422 2013 26-Jul Beijing 
35 Gay male NM Society Leader 411 2013 19-Jul Beijing 
36 Gay male NM Society Leader 411 2013 19-Jul Beijing 




Leader 22 2013 20-Jul Beijing 
38 Gay male Sincerity QQ Leader 241 2013 20-Jul Beijing 
39 Gay male Love Home Working Group Leader 431 2013 20-Jul Beijing 
40 Gay male Beijing Hope Leader 211 2013 20-Jul Beijing 
41 Gay male Love Home Working Group Leader 431 2013 20-Jul Beijing 
42 Gay male Beijing Hope Leader 211 2013 20-Jul Beijing 
43 Gay male Intelligence China Leader 31 2013 23-Jul Beijing 
44 Gay male PLWHA Network Staff 42 2013 25-Jul Beijing 
45 Gay male PLWHA Network Staff 11 2013 25-Jul Beijing 
46 Gay male YY Group Leader 132 2013 26-Jul Beijing 
        
47 Infected peasant SY Group Leader 14 2012 4-Jun Henan 
48 Infected peasant 
SS Self-Help 
Group Leader 43 2012 4-Jun Henan 
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49 Infected peasant DC Group Leader 123 2012 4-Jun Henan 
50 Infected peasant DC Group Leader 123 2012 5-Jun Henan 
51 Infected peasant DC Group Leader 32 2012 5-Jun Henan 
52 Infected peasant XZ Home Leader 32 2012 5-Jun Henan 
53 Infected peasant LY Group Member 241 2012 5-Jun Henan 
54 Infected peasant HSL Station Member 111 2012 7-Jun Henan 
55 Infected peasant LK Group Member 142 2012 8-Jun Henan 
56 Infected peasant NL Group Member 442 2012 8-Jun Henan 
57 Infected peasant NL Group Member 122 2012 8-Jun Henan 
58 Infected peasant 
SQ Working 
Group Leader 41 2012 8-Jun Henan 
59 Infected peasant LY Group Member 242 2012 9-Jun Henan 
60 Infected peasant LY Group Leader 231 2012 10-Jun Henan 
61 Infected peasant RZ Group Leader 342 2012 11-Jun Henan 
62 Infected peasant RZ Group Leader 241 2012 11-Jun Henan 
63 Infected peasant 
LS Candle 
Group Leader 222 2012 11-Jun Henan 
64 Infected peasant 
LS Candle 
Group Member 212 2012 12-Jun Henan 
65 Infected peasant 
LS Candle 
Group Member 341 2012 12-Jun Henan 
66 Infected peasant 
LS Candle 
Group PLWHA 111 2012 12-Jun Henan 
67 Infected peasant 
LS Candle 
Group PLWHA 112 2012 12-Jun Henan 
68 Infected peasant 
LS Candle 
Group PLWHA 213 2012 12-Jun Henan 
69 Infected peasant 
LS Candle 
Group PLWHA 314 2012 12-Jun Henan 
70 Infected peasant 
LS Candle 
Group PLWHA 221 2012 12-Jun Henan 
71 Infected peasant 
LS Candle 
Group PLWHA 133 2012 12-Jun Henan 
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72 Infected peasant 
LS Candle 
Group PLWHA 211 2012 12-Jun Henan 
73 Infected peasant 
LS Candle 
Group PLWHA 231 2012 12-Jun Henan 
74 Infected peasant NY Group Leader 231 2012 12-Jun Henan 
75 Infected peasant 
NY Bamboo 
Group Leader 411 2012 13-Jun Henan 
76 Infected peasant SC Group Leader 242 2012 14-Jun Henan 
77 Infected peasant SC Group Leader 221 2012 14-Jun Henan 
78 Infected peasant SP PLWHA Leader 41 2012 15-Jun Henan 
79 Infected peasant XX Love Heart Leader 142 2012 15-Jun Henan 
80 Infected peasant 
HB Sunshine 
Home Leader 212 2012 16-Jun Henan 
81 Infected peasant 
HB Sunshine 
Home Member 231 2012 16-Jun Henan 
82 Infected peasant 
HB Sunshine 
Home Member 133 2012 16-Jun Henan 
83 Infected peasant 
HB Candle 
Group Leader 142 2012 18-Jun Hebei 
84 Infected peasant 
GA Half Sky 
Group Leader 242 2012 18-Jun Hebei 
85 Infected peasant HSC Group Leader 242 2012 18-Jun Hebei 
86 Infected peasant HSC Group Member 112 2012 18-Jun Hebei 
87 Infected peasant HSC Group Member 111 2012 18-Jun Hebei 
88 Infected peasant TJ Group Leader 241 2012 19-Jun Tianjing 
89 Infected peasant N/A
527 N/A 24 2012 3-Jun Henan 
90 Infected peasant N/A N/A 441 2012 3-Jun Henan 
91 Infected peasant N/A N/A 211 2012 15-Jun Henan 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
527 Independent activists with no organizational affiliation. 
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92 Infected peasant N/A N/A 41 2012 23-Jun Beijing 
        
93 Female sex worker ZY Angles Leader 131 2013 8-Aug Beijing 
94 Female sex worker YHC Group Leader 234 2013 9-Aug Beijing 
        
95 Government Civil Affair Official 424 2009 14-May A 





Official 212 2009 17-Jul A 
98 Government Police Official 112 2009 16-Jul A 
99 Government Security Official 122 2009 29-Jul A 
100 Party Civil Affair Official 413314 2009 14-May A 
101 Party Civil Affair Official 413 2009 4-Sep A 
102 Party Foreign Affair Official 44 2009 19-May A 
103 Party Foreign Affair Official 44 2009 16-Jun A 
104 Party Foreign Affair Official 124 2009 8-Jul A 
105 Party Civil Affair Official 43242 2009 3-Aug B 
106 Party Foreign Affair Official 44 2009 3-Aug B 
107 Party Civil Affair Official 31242 2009 5-Aug C 
108 Party Foreign Affair Official 44 2009 5-Aug C 
109 Party Foreign Affair Official 2344 2009 6-Aug C 
110 Party Foreign Affair Official 1444 2009 6-Aug C 
111 Party Civil Affair Official 14242 2009 6-Aug C 
112 Government Civil Affair Official 222133 2009 27-Aug D 
113 Party Foreign Affair Official 2244 2009 27-Aug D 
114 Government Health Official 241 2013 12-Jul A 
115 Government Health Official 443 2013 15-Jul A 
116 Government Health Official 244 2013 18-Jul A 
117 Government Health Official 12121 2013 20-Jul A 
118 Government Health Official 121 2013 21-Jul A 
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119 Government Health Official 443 2013 22-Jul A 
        
120 International NGO RMR Leader 122 2009 6-Sep Beijing 










UNAIDS Staff 314 2013 17-Jul Beijing 












Semi-Structured Interview Questions (For Leaders and Members of Grassroots 
Advocacy NGOs) 
 
1. Grievances and Targets 
1) Please describe issues that your group focuses on.  
2) Please rank these issues in importance. Why? 
3) Has your group changed its issue focus over time? If so, why? 
 
2. Tactics and Strategies   
1) What types of tactics and strategies does your group use?  
2) Please rank them in importance and effectiveness. Why? 
3) Have your tactics and strategies changed over time? If so, how and why? 
4) What factors led to your tactics and strategies? 
5) Do you think your current tactics and strategies successful? 
6) Are there other tactics and strategies you want to implement but cannot? What are 
your obstacles? 
 
3. Organizational forms 
1) Please describe the organizational type of your group.  
2) Do you consider your group as a NGO? What do you consider as a NGO? 
3) Who are the founders? 
4) Has your group changed its organizational forms? How and why? 
5) Does your group have an official mission? When did you come up with this? 
6) Please describe your group’s funding situation and other kinds of support you 
have received. Have they changed since the beginning? 
7) Please describe your members. 
8) Would you like to grow your group as an organization? If yes, in what way? What 
help would you need? If no, why? 
 
4. Initiatives and Programs 
1) What programs and projects are your group working on?  
2) How has the project developed over the years?  
 
5. External Relations with the State 
1) Please describe your relations with local governments including CDC and 
monitoring departments such as civil affair bureau, police department and so on. 
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Please rank those offices and officials in importance as well as openness. Have 
them changed over years? How and why? 
2) What kinds of relations does your group prefer? Why? 
3) What do you do to build and maintain those relations?  
4) What impact does the Global Fund have on your interactions with local 
governments? 
 
6. External Relations with the Global Fund 
1) Please describe your group’s relations with the Global Fund. Has it changed over 
the years? If yes, why? 
2) How did you know the Global Fund and establish contact? 
3) What does the Global Fund offer (e.g., information, materials, resources, 
technique, personnel)? Has this changed over time? If yes, how? 
4) What conditions or agreements are in order to receive help? 
5) Have you felt pressured by those requirements?  
6) What impact does the Global Fund have on your organizational development and 
program initiatives? 
7) What responsibilities or duties do you have in the relationship with the Global 
Fund? 
8) How do you work with the Global Fund? (e.g., meeting with the staff, training, 
funding application, project implementation) 
9) What do you think of the Global Fund framework? Other alternative 
frameworks? 
10)  Do you have contact with international AIDS governance bodies other than the 
Global Fund? If yes, please compare them. 
 
7. Relations with the community 
1) Please describe your group’s personnel. Volunteers or employees?  
2) Please describe the most important community that you work with. Has it 
changed over time? If yes, why? 
3) What is the role of local communities in your activities? 
4) Has your group changed in any way the possibility to meet with the community? 
How? 
5) Please describe your community’s needs. Are they consistent with your activities?  
6) How does your community perceive the Global Fund framework?  











Structured Interview Questions (For Health Departments) 
 
1. Please describe the main activities related to HIV/AIDS that your office engages 
in. 
2. Which of your activities are directly related to the practice of the Global Fund 
framework: agenda-setting, financial and resource allocation research and 
development, implementation and delivery, and monitoring, evaluation, and 
learning?  
3. Are there specific areas of the Global Fund framework more prevalent than 
others? Why? 
4. When did your office start to engage in activities involving Global Fund 
frameworks? 
5. What factors led to your office participating in these activities (e.g., domestic 
and international factors as internal needs, other offices, political policy, 
professional regulation, press/media, international organization/NGO pressure, 
and so on)? 
6. What does your office hope to achieve by adopting and implementing the Global 
Fund framework? 
7. What types of issues did your office consider before a Global Fund framework 
program was introduced and instituted (e.g., politics, legitimacy of framework 
and program, specificity to office goals)? 
8. When practicing intervention programs within the Global Fund framework, are 
there specific forms of programs that are more prevalent than others (e.g., 
prevention over treatment, sex workers over affected peasants)? Why?  
9. What role does the China CCM play in your office’s activities?  
10. Please describe your interactions and relationships with members from non-state 
actors in the China CCM for the Global Fund (e.g., international organization, 
international NGO, grassroots organization, affected communities). 
11. Does your office interact with non-state actors outside the Global Fund 
framework? Why or why not? 
12. Please describe the areas in which those activities take place. When did they 
start?  
13. Are there activity areas that are more open to non-state actors than others? Why? 
14. Are there specific types of non-state actors that are easier to work with? Why? 
15. What obstacles does your office face in implementing the Global Fund 
framework (e.g., politics, efficiency, unable to reach local communities)? 
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16. Do you think that your office has successfully implemented the Global Fund 
framework? Why or why not? 
17. If your office required assistance in implementing the Global Fund framework, 
would it seek assistance from within the department or from other organizations 
(e.g., other state agencies, international organizations, international NGOs, 
grassroots organizations, affected communities)? 
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